CURTIN R. COLEMAN, II, APPELLANT,
v.
MARIE PRESTON LAND COLEMAN, APPELLEE
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In this alimony enforcement case, the Fourth District Court of Appeal upheld a trial court's entry of an income deduction order against a former husband who challenged it on the ground that his ex-wife had no minor children living with her. The court held that income deduction orders are statutorily required upon enforcement of any alimony obligation, regardless of whether minor children are present in the household.
Income deduction orders are not limited to households with minor children. Upon enforcement of any alimony obligation, the court shall enter an income deduction order as required by Florida Statutes section 61.1301(1)(a), regardless of the presence or absence of minor children in the household.
[1] An order establishing, enforcing, or modifying an alimony or child support obligation requires the court to enter a separate order for income deduction if one has not alr…
[2] Income deduction orders for alimony enforcement are not limited to households with minor children.
Previewing 2 of 4 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“Upon the entry of an order establishing, enforcing, or modifying an alimony or a child support obligation, the court shall enter a separate order for income deduction if one has not been entered.”
Statutory provision from section 61.1301(1)(a) that the court interpreted to require income deduction orders for all alimony enforcement, not just those involving minor children.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceThe parties were divorced in 1964, and the husband was ordered to pay permanent periodic alimony. He paid until 1989, when he filed a motion to modify…
The full statement of facts, procedural history, and disposition for this case are member content.
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[*533] FARMER, Judge.
The parties were divorced in 1964, and he was ordered to pay her permanent periodic alimony, which he did until 1989. In that year he filed a motion to modify, alleging changed circumstances. In September 1991, the trial court denied any modification. She then moved for a money judgment on the arrearages that had accumulated since the filing of the application for modification, and the trial court held another hearing and entered the money judgment. More motions followed the money judgment, ultimately culminating in orders denying rehearing, alteration or amendment of the orders, and any stay pending review. She finally filed a motion for an income deduction order, which the trial court entered immediately without a hearing or response from him.
On appeal, he attacks the income deduction order on the grounds that she no longer has any minor children living with her.1 He misreads the statute. Income deduction orders are not limited by the statute to households with minor children. The applicable provision of section 61.-1301(l)(a), Florida Statutes (1991), reads:
Upon the entry of an order establishing, enforcing, or modifying an alimony or a child support obligation, the court shall enter a separate order for income deduction if one has not been entered.
The unmistakable meaning of this text is that the enforcement of any alimony obligation requires an income deduction order. Here the court obviously enforced the unpaid alimony by a money judgment. That judicial action was enough to require the separate income deduction order.2
AFFIRMED.
ANSTEAD, J., concurs.
DELL, J., concurs in result only.
. He has also appealed the order denying modification and other orders related to it. We express no views on these other appeals, as we have received no record or briefs in them as of the filing of this opinion.
. We simply disagree with Schorb v. Schorb, 547 So. 2d 985 (Fla. 2d DCA 1989), to the extent that it holds otherwise. The text of the legislation is broad enough to include impecunious former spouses even if they have no minor children living with them. The fact that the primary motive was to protect young children does not at all mean there was no desire to give the same protection to needing spouses living alone. In any event, the legislative history of a statute is irrelevant where the wording of a statute is, as here, clear and unambiguous. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co. v. Huntington National Bank, 609 So. 2d 1315 (Fla.1992). An inquiry into legislative intent may be conducted only where the statute is ambiguous on its face. Streeter v. Sullivan, 509 So. 2d 268, 271 (Fla.1987).
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
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Lambertini v. Lambertini, 817 So. 2d 942 (Fla. 3d DCA 2002)…o a judgment” (as happened here), the court “was obligated to enter either an immediate or a delayed income deduction order.” State Dept. of Revenue v. LaPorte, 735 So. 2d 574, 575 (Fla. 2d DCA 1999) (citations omitted); see also Coleman v. Coleman, 614 So. 2d 532, 533 (Fla. 4th DCA 1993). There is, however, a caveat. The obligor must have the ability to pay the deduction amount. An installment amount, or an income deduction amount, cannot be established which would leave the obligor without sufficient funds…
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State v. LaPORTE, 735 So. 2d 574 (Fla. 2d DCA 1999)…nue v. Jenness, 698 So. 2d 877, 878 (Fla. 2d DCA 1997)(“The legislative mandate ... is clearly that either an immediate or a delayed income deduction order shall be entered in all cases in which an order of support is entered.”); Coleman v. Coleman, 614 So. 2d 532 (Fla. 4th DCA 1993). If the trial court believed the mother was estopped from seeking enforcement of all or a portion of the child support arrearage, then the trial court should have reduced the amount of arrearage to whatever amount it determined…
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Curtin R. Coleman, II v. Coleman, 629 So. 2d 103 (Fla. 1993)…McDONALD, Justice. We have for review Coleman v. Coleman, 614 So. 2d 532 (Fla. 4th DCA 1993), which directly conflicts with Schorb v. Schorb, 547 So. 2d 985 (Fla. 2d DCA 1989). We have jurisdiction pursuant to article V, section 3(b)(3) of the Florida Constitution. We approve the district court’s decision and disapprove…
Previewing 3 of 4 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Streeter v. Sullivan, 509 So. 2d 268 (Fla. 1987)
- AETNA Cas. & Sur. Co. v. Huntington Nat'l Bank, 609 So. 2d 1315 (Fla. 1992)
- Graham M. Schorb v. Schorb, 547 So. 2d 985 (Fla. 2d DCA 1989)