JERRY WYSONG, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE

Fla. 4th DCA | 1993-03-03
No. 92-0189
STONE, J., and OWEN, WILLIAM C. Jr., Senior Judge, concur.
614 So. 2d 670 Florida District Court of Appeal, Fourth District (1993) Caution
Cited by 9 cases

AI-generated. These summaries, headnotes, and key points are machine-generated and may contain errors or omissions. Always verify against the full opinion text below. Not legal advice.

Synopsis

Appellant Wysong entered no contest pleas to marijuana charges after his motion to suppress evidence was denied. The Fourth District Court of Appeal affirmed the denial, holding that police officers did not conduct an illegal search when they approached Wysong's front door despite "No Trespassing" signs, as the threshold area and open field are not Fourth Amendment protected areas.


Holding

The court held that approaching the front door and knocking on it did not constitute an illegal entry. "No Trespassing" signs do not render a doorway or unfenced front yard a constitutionally protected area, and the threshold area of the home has no reasonable expectation of privacy under the Fourth Amendment.


Headnotes

[1] A "No Trespassing" sign does not render a doorway a constitutionally protected area for Fourth Amendment purposes.

[2] Approaching the front door of a home through an unfenced yard to investigate an informant's tip does not constitute an illegal entry.

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Key Quotes

“It has been held that there is no reasonable expectation of privacy in the threshold area of the home.”

Establishes that the doorway/threshold is not a constitutionally protected area under the Fourth Amendment

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Facts & Procedural History

Police officers investigating an informant's tip that Wysong was growing marijuana came to his home at the end of a dirt road. "No Trespassing" signs …

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Opinion of the Court
BRESCHER, GEORGE A., Associate Judge.

BRESCHER, GEORGE A., Associate Judge.

Jerry Wysong, the defendant in the criminal action below, entered no contest pleas to marijuana and paraphernalia charges and reserved the right to appeal the trial court's denial of his motion to suppress. We affirm.

The investigating police officers in this case came to Wysong’s home in order to investigate a tip from an informant that Wysong was growing marijuana on his property. The home was at the end of a dirt road and there were one or more “No Trespassing” signs on the road as well as a “No Trespassing” sign on a tree in front of Wysong’s house. The officers saw the signs on the road, but do not remember whether' they saw the sign on the tree in front of the house. The officers approached the front door of the home through the unfenced front yard and knocked on the door where they were received by a female who stated she lived in the home.

The evidence presented at the motion to suppress also indicated the officers fully explained to the female why they were there and the information they received that there was marijuana on the premises. The female denied the presence of any marijuana but nonetheless voluntarily allowed the officers to come into the home and then into the backyard where the illegal substance was found. The female testified she was aware that she could have required the presentation of a warrant before allowing the officers to enter the property, but voluntarily let them into the house because she saw no point in continuing to lie to them. The officers did not advise the female that she had the right to refuse them admittance into the home.

We find that it was reasonable for the officers in this case to investigate the informant’s tip of ongoing criminal activity. The issue then presented is whether the officers’ approach to the front door of the home and the knocking on that door constituted an illegal entry upon that property because of the display of the “No Trespassing” sign.

We find that it does not. The defendant contends the “No Trespassing” sign posted in the front yard was a visible effort to establish a zone of privacy and accordingly was entitled to protection under the .Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution. It has been held that there is no reasonable expectation of privacy in the threshold area of the home. See United States v. Santana, 427 U.S. 38, 96 S.Ct. 2406, 49 L.Ed.2d 300 (1976). “No Trespassing” signs do not render a doorway to be a constitutionally protected area. Neither thresholds nor open fields are within the scope of the Fourth Amendment. See Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170, 104 S.Ct. 1735, 80 L.Ed.2d 214 (1984).

In this instance the unfenced front yard was equivalent to an open field through which the officer passed to get to the threshold front door. Also our sister court in the second district has recently opined in State v. Sarantopoulos, 604 So. 2d 551 (Fla. 2d DCA 1992):

Further, in Oliver, the majority of the Supreme Court rejected Justice Marshall’s desire to adopt a rule that “[p]ri-vate land marked in a fashion sufficient to render entry thereon a criminal trespass under the law of the State in which the land lies is protected by the Fourth Amendment.” Oliver, 466 U.S. at 195, 104 S.Ct. at 1750.

Id. 604 So. 2d at 555.

Accordingly, the judgment appealed from is affirmed.

STONE, J., and OWEN, WILLIAM C. Jr., Senior Judge, concur.


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Cited By

  • State v. Rabb, 920 So. 2d 1175 (Fla. 4th DCA 2006)
  • …ed front yard, for instance, is not generally considered protected by the Fourth Amendment due to the lack of expectation of privacy in what is visible to the entire public, while a backyard is, as a general rule, protected. Compare Wysong v. State, 614 So. 2d 670 (Fla. 4th DCA 1993), with Morsman v. State, 360 So. 2d 137 (Fla. 2d DCA 1978). However, even these general rules are subject to the fact specific analysis required by Dunn. Therefore, the trial court erred in requiring the Department to obtain a sea…
  • State v. Rabb, 881 So. 2d 587 (Fla. 4th DCA 2004)
    …, 836 So. 2d 1040, 1055 n. 7 (Fla. 4th DCA 2003) (noting that an unfenced front yard is generally not considered protected by the Fourth Amendment due to the “lack of expectation of privacy in what is visible to the entire public”); Wysong v. State, 614 So. 2d 670, 671 (Fla. 4th DCA 1993) (finding that an “unfenced front yard was equivalent to an open field through which the officer passed to get to the threshold front door”); Koehler v. State, 444 So. 2d 1032, 1033 (Fla. 1st DCA 1984) (determining that an un…

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