DANIEL DIVINE AND SANDRA DIVINE, APPELLANTS,
v.
PRUDENTIAL PROPERTY & CASUALTY INSURANCE COMPANY, AN INSURANCE CORPORATION LICENSED TO DO BUSINESS IN THE STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE

Fla. 5th DCA | 1993-03-05
No. 92-674
Goshorn, C.J., W. Sharp, J., Griffin, J.
614 So. 2d 683 Florida District Court of Appeal, Fifth District (1993) Positive Treatment
Cited by 8 cases

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Synopsis

The court reversed an insurance company's denial of uninsured motorist coverage, holding that insurers cannot avoid statutory UM coverage requirements by relocating exclusionary language into policy definitions of "insured."


Holding

An insurer may not circumvent the rule requiring uninsured motorist coverage for class I insureds by moving exclusionary language from explicit exclusions into the definition of who qualifies as an "insured" under the policy.


Headnotes

[1] An insurer cannot circumvent statutory uninsured motorist coverage requirements by relocating exclusionary language from explicit exclusions into the definition of who qu…

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Key Quotes

“UM covers a class I insured whenever and wherever bodily injury is inflicted on him by an uninsured motorist. Mullis does not permit coverage to be confined to injury while operating only the owned vehicle or while not operating a vehicle furnished for the insured's regular use, no matter whether such limitations be found in an exclusion or in a definition of who is insured.”

The court explaining the scope of uninsured motorist coverage under Mullis and rejecting the insurer's attempt to limit coverage through definitional language.

Facts & Procedural History

Daniel and Sandra Divine sought uninsured motorist coverage under a Prudential Property & Casualty Insurance policy that contained a coverage limitati…

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Opinion of the Court
PER CURIAM.

PER CURIAM.

We reverse on the authority of Nationwide Mutual Fire Ins. Co. v. Phillips, 609 So. 2d 1385 (Fla. 5th DCA 1992). We are unpersuaded by appellees’ attempt to distinguish this ease on the basis that the coverage limitation which it contends precludes uninsured motorist (UM) coverage is more narrow than that contained in Nationwide’s policy. The essential question is whether, by the simple expedient of moving exclusionary language into the definition of who is “insured” under the policy, insurers can avoid the rule of Mullis v. State Farm Mut. Auto Ins. Co., 252 So. 2d 229, 237 (Fla. 1971) and the statutory device allowing insurers to offer policies of uninsured motorist coverage containing such coverage limitations. As in Nationwide, we hold the insurer may not do so. Mullís holds that UM covers a class I insured whenever and wherever bodily injury is inflicted on him by an uninsured motorist. Mullís does not permit coverage to be confined to injury while operating only the owned vehicle or while not operating a vehicle furnished for the insured’s regular use, no matter wheth er such limitations be found in an exclusion or in a definition of who is insured. The attempt is a disingenuous misapplication of the maxim that UM coverage follows liability coverage and we will not validate it.

REVERSED and REMANDED.

GOSHORN, C.J., W. SHARP and GRIFFIN, JJ., concur.


Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus


Citator

Cited By

  • World Wide Underwriters Ins. Co. v. Welker, 640 So. 2d 46 (Fla. 1994)
    …insured, it cannot then deprive that insured of uninsured motorist coverage by “the simple expedient of moving exclusionary lan [*53] guage into the definition of who is ‘insured’ under the policy.” Divine v. Prudential Property & Casualty Ins. Co., 614 So. 2d 683, 683 (Fla. 5th DCA) review dismissed, 618 So. 2d 1369 (Fla.1993). “The statute is designed for the protection of injured persons, not for the benefit of insurance companies_” Brown v. Progressive Mutual Ins. Co., 249 So. 2d 429, 430 (Fla.1971). To h…
  • …er policy issued by another insurance company. We think this case is controlled by Mullis v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co., 252 So. 2d 229 (Fla.1971) and this court’s decisions in Divine v. Prudential Property & Casualty Insurance Co., 614 So. 2d 683 (Fla. 5th DCA), rev. dismissed, 618 So. 2d 1369 (Fla.1993) and Nationwide Mutual Fire Insurance Co. v. Phillips, 609 So. 2d 1385 (Fla. 5th DCA 1992), rev. granted, 620 So. 2d 761 (Fla.1993). In Mullis, the Florida Supreme Court held that whenever bo…
  • GEICO Indem. Co. & GEICO Gen. Ins. Co. v. Perez, 260 So. 3d 342 (Fla. 3d DCA 2018)
    …ccupy vehicles ... owned by but which are not 'insured automobiles' of named insured. " Id. at 233 (emphasis added); see also Coleman v. Fla. Ins. Guar. Ass'n, Inc., 517 So. 2d 686, 689 (Fla. 1988) (same); Divine v. Prudential Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co., 614 So. 2d 683, 683 (Fla. 5th DCA 1993) (concluding that an insurer cannot avoid the rule in Mullis simply by altering the definition of who is "insured" under the policy). Put another way, where an insured is injured while occupying an owned vehicle that is not l…

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