ANDREW EDWARD SNYDER, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
AI-generated. These summaries, headnotes, and key points are machine-generated and may contain errors or omissions. Always verify against the full opinion text below. Not legal advice.
Andrew Snyder appeals his sentencing for violating community control, arguing that the trial court improperly applied post-1988 sentencing guidelines to crimes committed before July 1, 1988, resulting in an illegal departure sentence. The court reversed and remanded for resentencing, allowing the trial judge to reconsider whether a departure sentence is appropriate upon learning of the ex post facto violation.
The permitted guidelines ranges effective July 1, 1988, cannot be applied to a defendant who committed crimes prior to that date. Because Snyder's crimes were committed in 1986 and 1987, the 5-year sentence constituted a departure sentence requiring written reasons. However, when a trial court is unaware it is imposing a departure sentence, it may consider on remand whether a departure is appropriate.
[1] The permitted guidelines ranges, effective July 1, 1988, cannot be applied to a defendant who committed crimes prior to that date.
[2] Sentencing a defendant under guidelines ranges that became effective after the commission of the offenses constitutes an ex post facto violation.
Previewing 2 of 4 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“The permitted guidelines ranges, effective July 1, 1988, cannot be applied to a defendant who committed his crimes prior to that date.”
Establishes the ex post facto principle preventing application of post-1988 sentencing guidelines to pre-1988 crimes.
Previewing 1 of 3 key quotes on this case — the court’s exact language, pinpointed for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceSnyder was placed on probation in 1986 after pleading guilty to burglary of a dwelling (February 1986). He subsequently pled nolo contendere to burgla…
The full statement of facts, procedural history, and disposition for this case are member content.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence© FLexlaw, Inc. — AI-generated enrichments are proprietary. All rights reserved.
Explore caselaw by topic → Browse Ex Post Facto Violation cases and more on FLexlaw
PER CURIAM.
Andrew Edward Snyder has appealed from sentences imposed after violation of community control. We reverse, and remand for resentencing.
In 1986, Snyder was placed on probation following a guilty plea to burglary of a dwelling, committed on February 18, 1986 (Case No. 86-478). He thereafter pled nolo contendere to burglary of a structure, committed on January 16, 1987 (Case No. 87-479), and to violating probation in 86-478. In March 1990, the trial court revoked probation, and sentenced Snyder to 2 years community control plus 13 years probation. The court imposed 5 years probation in 87-479, to run concurrently with the probationary term imposed in 86-478.
In August 1992, Snyder pled nolo conten-dere to violating probation. The scoresheet utilized at the subsequent sentencing proceeding reflected a total of 49 points. After the two-cell increase authorized for Snyder's two successive violations of probation, see Williams v. State, 594 So. 2d 273, 275 (Fla.1992), this total corresponded to a recommended range of 3y2-4y2 years, and a permitted range of 2V2-5V2 years. After noting that “a guideline sentence would be 5V2 years,” the trial court sentenced Snyder to concurrent 5-year terms, plus 8 years probation in 86-478.
Snyder argues that his sentence is illegal, to wit: because he committed his crimes prior to the July 1, 1988 effective date of the permitted guidelines range, it would be an ex post facto violation to sentence him under that range. Therefore, the maximum guidelines sentence was 4½ years (the maximum of the recommended range), and the 5 years imposed by the trial court constituted a departure sentence for which no written reasons were provided. The state concedes that the maximum guidelines sentence herein was 4½ years. However, it urges that the trial court be permitted to consider a departure sentence on remand.
The permitted guidelines ranges, effective July 1, 1988, cannot be applied to a defendant who committed his crimes pri-or to that date. Jones v. State, 599 So. 2d 769, 770 n. 1 (Fla. 1st DCA 1992), citing Puffinberger v. State, 581 So. 2d 897, 900 (Fla.1991). Snyder committed his crimes in 1986 and 1987, hence he correctly asserts that the permitted range could not be used in sentencing him. The result was a departure sentence for which the trial court provided no written reasons.
However, there is no indication in the record that the trial judge intended to impose a departure sentence. On the contrary, it affirmatively appears that he believed the 5-year sentence to be within the guidelines. When a trial court does not know that it is imposing a departure sentence requiring written reasons, it may consider on remand whether a departure from the guidelines is appropriate. Henderson v. State, 577 So. 2d 653, 654 (Fla. 1st DCA 1991), citing State v. Betancourt, 552 So. 2d 1107, 1108 (Fla.1989). See also Roberts v. State, 534 So. 2d 1225 (Fla. 1st DCA 1988), approved 547 So. 2d 129 (Fla.1989) (when a trial court is unaware that it has imposed a departure sentence because of an incorrect scoresheet, the trial judge may consider whether departure would be appropriate when the correct scoresheet is before him on remand).
The sentence imposed herein is reversed, and the case remanded for resentencing, at which time the trial judge may consider whether departure would be appropriate.
JOANOS, C.J., and ZEHMER and WEBSTER, JJ., concur.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Cited By
-
Strongbull Sequoia v. State, 624 So. 2d 381 (Fla. 4th DCA 1993)…o seven years and a permitted sentence of four and one-half to nine years. As the state concedes, the permitted guidelines ranges, effective July 1, 1988, cannot be applied to a defendant who committed his crimes prior to that date. Snyder v. State, 615 So. 2d 231 (Fla. 1st DCA 1993). Despite this, the state argues that appellant’s sentence should be affirmed because the trial court may impose any sentence it originally might have imposed plus a one-cell bump up. See Fla.R.Crim.P. 3.701(d)(14); Williams v. St…
-
Gibbs v. State, 667 So. 2d 371 (Fla. 1st DCA 1995)…525 So. 2d 465 (Fla. 1st DCA 1988); Slappy v. State, 516 So. 2d 342 (Fla. 1st DCA 1987). Upon violating probation, a defendant cannot be sentenced to a term that could not have been validly imposed at the time of initial sentencing. Snyder v. State, 615 So. 2d 231 (Fla. 1st DCA 1993); Davis v. State, 636 So. 2d 575 (Fla. 4th DCA 1994). The trial court must determine which of Gibbs’ offenses were committed before October 1, 1986, score these as “additional offenses,” and recalculate his scoresheet accordingly.…
-
Davis v. State, 636 So. 2d 575 (Fla. 4th DCA 1994)…lidly imposed at the time of initial sentencing. Therefore, it was error to impose a sentence that could only have been imposed initially as a departure from the guidelines, without complying with the requirements for departure. See Snyder v. State, 615 So. 2d 231 (Fla. 1st DCA 1993); Strickland v. State, 596 So. 2d 1155 (Fla. 2d DCA), rev. denied, 602 So. 2d 942 (Fla.1992), cert denied, — U.S. -, 113 S.Ct. 1289, 122 L.Ed.2d 681 (1993). See also State v. Williams, 546 So. 2d 809 (Fla. 4th DCA), rev. denied, 5…
Previewing 3 of 6 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- State v. Betancourt, 552 So. 2d 1107 (Fla. 1989)
- Williams v. State, 594 So. 2d 273 (Fla. 1992)
- Doyal Powell Roberts v. State, 547 So. 2d 129 (Fla. 1989)
- Puffinberger v. State, 581 So. 2d 897 (Fla. 1991)
- Henderson v. State, 577 So. 2d 653 (Fla. 1st DCA 1991)
- Doyal Powell Roberts v. State, 534 So. 2d 1225 (Fla. 1st DCA 1988)
- Bamberg v. State, 599 So. 2d 769 (Fla. 2d DCA 1992)