DOUGLAS WAYNE SPICER, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
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Spicer was convicted of robbery with a mask and the trial court sentenced him to life imprisonment as a habitual offender after reclassifying the offense from a second-degree to first-degree felony. The court holds that while section 775.0845 enhances the penalty for robbery with a mask, it does not reclassify the degree of the felony, so the offense remains a second-degree felony for habitual offender sentencing purposes.
Section 775.0845(4) is an enhanced penalty statute but does not reclassify the degree of the felony. Robbery with a mask remains a second-degree felony for habitual offender sentencing purposes, and the maximum sentence as a habitual offender for a second-degree felony is thirty years, not life imprisonment.
[1] An enhanced penalty statute that increases the maximum punishment for an offense does not reclassify the degree of the felony unless the statute explicitly states such re…
[2] Penal statutes must be construed according to their literal meaning, and legislative intent to broaden their definition will not be presumed.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“Penal statutes must be construed in terms of their literal meaning.”
Establishes the interpretive standard requiring plain language construction of criminal statutes
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceSpicer was charged with armed robbery with a mask, trafficking in illegal drugs, and possession of a controlled substance. A jury convicted him of the…
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PATTERSON, Judge.
Spicer and a codefendant were charged with armed robbery with a mask, trafficking in illegal drugs, and possession of a controlled substance. Spicer was convicted by a jury of the lesser offense of robbery with a mask and acquitted on the remaining charges. The state filed the required notice, seeking to have him sentenced as a habitual offender. Robbery is a second-degree felony punishable by up to fifteen years’ imprisonment. §§ 812.13(2)(c) and 775.082(3)(c), Fla.Stat. (1989). If, however, a mask was worn during the commission of the robbery, section 775.0845(4), Florida Statutes (1989), provides that the offense “shall be punishable as if it were a felony of the first degree,” permitting a maximum penalty of thirty years.
In this case, the trial court interpreted section 775.0845(4) as requiring robbery with a mask to be reclassified as a first-degree felony. The court then used the first-degree conviction to sentence Spicer to life imprisonment under the habitual of fender statute, section 775.084(4)(a)(1), Florida Statutes (1989). Spicer argues that although section 775.0845 is an enhanced penalty statute, it does not reclassify the degree of felony. Thus, he argues that he can be sentenced as a habitual offender only for a second-degree felony. We agree and reverse.
Penal statutes must be construed in terms of their literal meaning. State v. Jackson, 526 So. 2d 58 (Fla.1988). Words used by the legislature will not be expanded to broaden the definition of such statutes. Perkins v. State, 576 So. 2d 1310 (Fla.1991). If the legislature had intended section 775.0845 to reclassify offenses, it would have so stated, as it did in section 775.087, Florida Statutes (1989): “Possession or use of weapon; aggravated battery; felony reclassification;” and in section 775.0875, Florida Statutes (1989): “Unlawful taking, possession, or use of a law enforcement officer’s firearm; crime reclassification; _” (Emphasis added.) In fact, section 775.0875 is similar to the habitual offender statute, in that neither of the enhanced penalty statutes reclassify the degree of the offense. See Dominguez v. State, 461 So. 2d 277 (Fla. 5th DCA 1985).
The trial court was therefore placed in an “either-or” situation. The court could use the enhanced penalty provisions of section 775.0845 and impose a guidelines sentence not exceeding thirty years or it could use the second-degree felony conviction to sentence Spicer as a habitual offender to a maximum of thirty years’ imprisonment.
Accordingly, we vacate the sentence imposed. Since Spicer does not contend that he does not meet the criteria to be sentenced as a habitual offender and the trial court has elected to make that determination, on remand the trial court may resen-tence Spicer as a habitual offender to a maximum of thirty years.
Reversed and remanded.
CAMPBELL, A.C.J., and THREADGILL, J., concur.
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Citator
Cited By (16 total)
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Cabal v. State, 678 So. 2d 315 (Fla. 1996)…distinct, separate crime of the next higher degree. In reaching its decision, the district court certified conflict with Woods v. State, 654 So. 2d 606 (Fla. 5th DCA 1995), Archibald v. State, 646 So. 2d 298 (Fla. 5th DCA 1994), and Spicer v. State, 615 So. 2d 725 (Fla. 2d DCA 1993).1 For the reasons expressed, we agree with the district court decisions in Woods, Archibald, and Spi-cer, and quash the decision of the Third District Court in this case because we find that section 775.0845, as it existed at the…
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Archibald v. State, 646 So. 2d 298 (Fla. 5th DCA 1994)…wearing a mask (Count II) from a second degree felony to a first degree felony and then imposing a life sentence as a violent habitual offender. §§ 775.084, 775.0845, 784.045(l)(a)2, (2), (1993). As authority, the defendant cites Spicer v. State, 615 So. 2d 725 (Fla. 2d DCA 1993). In Spicer, the court held that section 775.0845(4), Florida Statutes (1989) was an enhanced penalty statute and did not operate to reclassify the degree of felony. The Spi-cer court specifically found that the lower court erred i…
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Devell Hawkins v. State, 693 So. 2d 562 (Fla. 2d DCA 1996)…attempted armed robbery with a mask. His attorney filed an Anders1 brief, raising several issues. The state concedes, and we agree, that Mr. Hawkins’ judgment incorrectly reflects that he was sentenced for a first-degree felony. See Spicer v. State, 615 So. 2d 725 (Fla. 2d DCA 1993). On remand the judgment should be corrected to reflect a conviction for a second-degree felony. We also strike the $2 cost imposed pursuant to section 943.25(13), Florida Statutes (1993), because the trial court did not announce…
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Perkins v. State, 576 So. 2d 1310 (Fla. 1991)
- State v. Jackson, 526 So. 2d 58 (Fla. 1988)
- Dominguez v. State, 461 So. 2d 277 (Fla. 5th DCA 1985)