LAMAR MIFFIN, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
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Lamar Miffin appeals the denial of his motion to correct his habitual offender sentence, which was enhanced under a version of Florida's habitual offender statute that the Florida Supreme Court found unconstitutional for violating the single-subject requirement. The appellate court affirms because Miffin was not prejudiced by the specific amendments to the statute that were declared unconstitutional.
Miffin's motion to correct sentence is denied because although the error in the statute is fundamental, the resentencing requirement applies only to defendants affected by the specific amendments declared unconstitutional in Johnson. Since Miffin alleges no prejudice from the 1989 amendments and was not disadvantaged by any of the particular changes that violated the single-subject requirement, he is not entitled to resentencing.
[1] A statute declared unconstitutional due to a single-subject violation remains effective as it existed prior to the unconstitutional amendment.
[2] A defendant must demonstrate prejudice from the unconstitutional amendments to a statute to be entitled to relief.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“the resentencing requirement will apply only to those defendants affected by the amendments to section 775.084 contained in chapter 89-280”
Establishes the limiting principle for which defendants are entitled to resentencing following the unconstitutional statute declaration
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceMiffin received an enhanced sentence as a habitual offender under Florida's habitual offender statute. The Florida Supreme Court subsequently found th…
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PER CURIAM.
Lamar Miffin appeals the summary denial of his motion to correct sentence. We affirm. Miffin received an enhanced sentence under the habitual offender statute. § 775.-084, Fla.Stat. (1989). The supreme court has found that this version of the statute was enacted in violation of the constitutional requirement that legislation embrace a single subject. State v. Johnson, 616 So. 2d 1 (Fla.1993). Miffin’s offenses appear to have occurred during the “window period” between the original 1989 enactment of the revised law and its 1991 reenactment.
Chapter 89-280, Laws of Florida, amended the existing statute in several ways, none relevant to the present case. First, the term “qualified offense,” relevant to foreign predicate convictions, was expanded to include the District of Columbia, American territories, and foreign countries. Second, the definition of “habitual violent felony offender” was expanded to include persons previously convicted of aggravated battery. Third, section 775.0842, dealing with prosecution of “career criminals,” was reworded consistent with these other modifications.
The error described in Johnson is fundamental. However, the supreme court further stated that “the resentencing requirement will apply only to those defendants affected by the amendments to section 775.084 contained in chapter 89-280.” 616 So. 2d at 4. This is so because when an amendment to a statute is declared unconstitutional, the statute as it existed prior to amendment remains effective. Henderson v. Antonacci, 62 So. 2d 5 (Fla.1952). Johnson was sentenced as a habitual violent felony offender, based on a prior conviction for aggravated battery. He was thus disadvantaged by the statutory amendment. In contrast, Miffin alleges no prejudice from application of the 1989 amendments.1 He was not sentenced as a habitual violent felony offender, nor was his sentence enhanced by a prior conviction from an Amer-ican territory or foreign state. Cf. Burton v. State, 616 So. 2d 7 (Fla.1993).
Affirmed.
HALL, A.C.J., and ALTENBERND and BLUE, JJ., concur. . After the trial court denied his original motion, Miffin filed a motion for rehearing in which he complained that "the trial court failed to make the findings necessary to qualify the petitioner herein for habitual offender sentencing."
It is not entirely clear what Miffin is talking about. Originally the habitual offender statute required the sentencing court to determine, citing specific and articulable facts, whether an extended sentence “is necessary for the protection of the public.” Eutsey v. State, 383 So. 2d 219 (Fla.1980). As noted in King v. State, 597 So. 2d 309 (Fla. 2d DCA), rev. denied, 602 So. 2d 942 (Fla.1992), this requirement no longer exists. Moreover, the legislation that accomplished that purpose, Ch. 88-131, § 6, Laws of Fla., is not the same provision that suffers from "single subject” problems and was invalidated in Johnson.
If, on the other hand, Miffin is denying that he qualifies as a habitual offender because of a lack of prior convictions, the error may be addressed via rule 3.800(a). Judge v. State, 596 So. 2d 73 (Fla. 2d DCA 1991), rev. denied, 613 So. 2d 5 (Fla.1992). In any event Miffin filed his notice of appeal before the trial court could rule on his motion for rehearing. Accordingly, the motion for rehearing is deemed to have been abandoned. Jackson v. State, 570 So. 2d 1038 (Fla. 2d DCA 1990), rev. dismissed, 581 So. 2d 165 (Fla.1991).
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Cited By
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B.H. v. State, 645 So. 2d 987 (Fla. 1994)…be unconstitutional.5 State ex rel. Boyd v. Green, 355 So. 2d 789 (Fla.1978); Henderson v. Antonacci, 62 So. 2d 5 (Fla.1952); Brister v. State, 622 So. 2d 552 (Fla. 3d DCA 1993); Rankin v. State, 620 So. 2d 1028 (Fla. 2d DCA 1993); Miffin v. State, 615 So. 2d 745 (Fla. 2d DCA 1993). As courts in other states have noted, this rule generally is applicable only where the loss of the invalid statutory language will result in a “hiatus” in the law that would be intolerable to society. State in re Hunter, 387 So .…
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Johnson v. State, 627 So. 2d 114 (Fla. 1st DCA 1993)…1991), approved, 616 So. 2d 1 (Fla.1993), a constitutional challenge is permitted only if Appellant would not have qualified as a habitual felony offender under the substantially similar pre-amendment (1988) version of the statute. Miffin v. State, 615 So. 2d 745 (Fla. 2d DCA 1993) (affirming enhanced sentence [*115] where application of statutory amendments did not appear to prejudice defendant bringing “Johnson” challenge of 1989 statute); Tims v. State, 592 So. 2d 741 (Fla. 1st DCA 1992). From our review…
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Rankin v. State, 620 So. 2d 1028 (Fla. 2d DCA 1993)…he was disadvantaged by the application of that statute. If not — that is, if the same sentence could have been imposed under the prior version of the statute— resentencing is not required. Burton v. State, 616 So. 2d 7 (Fla.1993); Miffin v. State, 615 So. 2d 745 (Fla. 2d DCA 1993). The legislature twice amended section 775.084 in the last decade. Prior to October 1, 1988, a “habitual felony offender” was defined as someone with either one prior Florida felony conviction or convictions for two first degree…
Previewing 3 of 9 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- State v. Johnson, 616 So. 2d 1 (Fla. 1993)
- Fredford James Eutsey v. State, 383 So. 2d 219 (Fla. 1980)
- Judge v. State, 596 So. 2d 73 (Fla. 2d DCA 1991)
- King v. State, 597 So. 2d 309 (Fla. 2d DCA 1992)
- Henderson v. Antonacci, 62 So. 2d 5 (Fla. 1952)
- Burton v. State, 616 So. 2d 7 (Fla. 1993)
- Cleophus Jackson v. State, 570 So. 2d 1038 (Fla. 2d DCA 1990)