ROBERT S. KAUFMAN, INDIVIDUALLY AND AS TRUSTEE, APPELLANT,
v.
DAN P. HELLER, AS PERSONAL REPRESENTATIVE OF THE ESTATE OF GARY D. MAY AND DARYL SCOTT, APPELLEES

Fla. 3d DCA | 1993-04-06
No. 91-1054
Before SCHWARTZ, C.J., and BASKIN and GERSTEN, JJ.
616 So. 2d 1064 Florida District Court of Appeal, Third District (1993) Positive Treatment
Cited by 3 cases

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Synopsis

A landlord appealed a trial court's judgment that awarded damages and attorney's fees to tenants in a possession action. The court reversed the fee award to the tenants and remanded for determination of the landlord's fees, as the landlord was the prevailing party in the possession action, while affirming the judgment on the tenants' counterclaim for damages.


Holding

The landlord was the prevailing party in the action for possession because the trial court's order on possession constituted a final judgment disposing of the whole merits of the landlord's cause, and the landlord was therefore entitled to have his request for fees determined by the court. The fee award to the tenants is reversed and the case is remanded for determination of the landlord's fees.


Headnotes

[1] A party who obtains a judgment for possession of leased premises is the prevailing party entitled to attorney's fees.

[2] An order granting a writ of possession is a final judgment that disposes of the merits of the landlord's cause of action for possession.

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Key Quotes

“A final judgment "determines and disposes of the whole merits of the cause before the Court by declaring that the plaintiff either is or is not entitled to recover by the remedy chosen"”

Establishes the standard for what constitutes a final judgment that determines the merits of a cause of action.

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Facts & Procedural History

Landlord Kaufman filed an action against tenants May and Scott seeking possession of leased premises, costs, and fees. After the lease term expired, t…

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Opinion of the Court
PER CURIAM.

PER CURIAM.

Landlord Robert S. Kaufman appeals a final judgment awarding tenants/counter-claimants, Gary D. May and Daryl Scott, damages and attorney’s fees. We reverse the fee award to the tenants and remand for an award of attorney’s fees to the landlord.

The landlord filed an action against the tenants seeking possession of the leased premises, costs and fees. During the pendency of the proceedings, the lease term expired; however, the tenants remained in possession of the property. The landlord filed a motion for judgment of possession. After a hearing on the motion, the trial judge ordered the tenants to vacate the property, or face a writ of possession. The trial court reserved jurisdiction to award the landlord fees. The order was not appealed; the tenants vacated the property. At the conclusion of the litigation, the court denied the landlord’s request for fees, entered a judgment for the tenants on their counterclaim, and awarded the tenants fees.

The landlord correctly asserts on appeal that he was the prevailing party in the action for possession. A final judgment “determines and disposes of the whole merits of the cause before the Court by declaring that the plaintiff either is or is not entitled to recover by the remedy cho-sen_” Francisco v. Victoria Marine Shipping, Inc., 486 So. 2d 1386, 1391 (Fla. 3d DCA 1986), citing Irving Trust Co. v. Kaplan, 155 Fla. 120, 125, 20 So. 2d 351, 354 (1944). The order on possession was a final disposition of the whole merits of the landlord’s cause before the court: possession of the leased property. After the entry of this order, no further action was required from the court in the possession action. That order was, therefore, a final judgment and could not be altered absent a timely filed request. Travelers Indemnity Co. v. Walker, 401 So. 2d 1147 (Fla. 3d DCA 1981). Thus, the landlord prevailed in the action for possession and was entitled to have his request for fees determined by the court.

For these reasons, the order awarding the tenants fees is reversed, and the cause is remanded for a determination of the landlord’s fees.

Furthermore, appellant’s remaining points lack merit. The trial court did not commit reversible error in entering the final judgment awarding the tenants damages on their counterclaim. See Ault v. Lohr, 538 So. 2d 454 (Fla.1989); Bankers Multiple Line Ins. Co. v. Farish, 464 So. 2d 530 (Fla.1985). That judgment is affirmed.

Judgment affirmed; fee award reversed and remanded.


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Citator

Cited By

  • Reyes v. Aqua Life Corp., 209 So. 3d 47 (Fla. 3d DCA 2016)
    …as a final judgment. See De La Osa v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., No. 3D14-1455, 208 So. 3d 259, 2016 WL 7232272 (Fla. 3d DCA Dec. 14, 2016) (en banc) (holding that the term “judgment” as used in rule 1.540(b) includes final orders); Kaufman v. Heller, 616 So. 2d 1064, 1065 (Fla. 3d DCA 1993) (treating an order issued on possession of real property as a final judgment because it was “a final disposition of the whole [*51] merits of the landlord’s cause before the court”), see also Courtney v. Catalina, Ltd., 130…

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