VERNON E. ROCHESTER, APPELLANT,
v.
AUDREY ROCHESTER, APPELLEE

Fla. 2d DCA | 1993-04-23
No. 92-01699
DANAHY, A.C.J., and PATTERSON, J., concur.
616 So. 2d 1200 Florida District Court of Appeal, Second District (1993)

AI-generated. These summaries, headnotes, and key points are machine-generated and may contain errors or omissions. Always verify against the full opinion text below. Not legal advice.


Holding

The court held that the trial judge properly denied the petition to modify alimony because the alimony payments stemmed from a substantial marital asset, Vernon's retirement benefits.


Facts & Procedural History

Vernon Rochester sought to modify the permanent periodic alimony provision of his dissolution judgment. The alimony payments were derived from his ret…

The full statement of facts, procedural history, and disposition for this case are member content.

Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence

© FLexlaw, Inc. — AI-generated enrichments are proprietary. All rights reserved.


Opinion of the Court
HALL, Judge.

HALL, Judge.

Vernon Rochester challenges the order denying his supplemental petition for modification and relief from the final judgment of dissolution of his marriage to Audrey Rochester. We affirm.

In his petition, Vernon sought modification of the permanent periodic alimony provision of the final judgment of dissolution. The trial judge properly denied Vernon’s petition because the source of the alimony payments was a substantial marital asset, Vernon’s retirement benefits. In Diffen-derfer v. Diffenderfer, 491 So. 2d 265, 268 (Fla.1986), the supreme court recognized that “often a lack of sufficient offsetting assets or other circumstances may leave the court with little option but to utilize the pension benefits in calculating permanent periodic or rehabilitative alimony.” This case presents just such a situation. If the judge had modified the amount of alimony, he would have improperly eroded Audrey’s entitlement to a share of a substantial marital asset accumulated over a forty-year marriage.

Accordingly, we affirm the order denying Vernon’s petition. We do not reach Vernon’s fourth issue regarding liability for the promissory note as that issue appears to be pending in the trial court.

Affirmed.

DANAHY, A.C.J., and PATTERSON, J., concur.


Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus


Citator

Authorities Cited

Full citator, related cases, and AI research tools

Open in FLexlaw