BERNARD FARMER, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
AI-generated. These summaries, headnotes, and key points are machine-generated and may contain errors or omissions. Always verify against the full opinion text below. Not legal advice.
The court held that the trial court erred in imposing attorney's fees without providing the appellant notice and an opportunity to be heard.
[1] A trial court may not impose attorney's fees against a defendant without providing prior notice and an opportunity to be heard.
[2] A defendant's election not to waive notice and the right to appear at a hearing for the assessment of appointed counsel fees does not relieve the court of the obligation…
Previewing 2 of 4 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceThe appellant was convicted of attempted second-degree murder. The trial court imposed attorney's fees pursuant to statute without prior notice to the…
The full statement of facts, procedural history, and disposition for this case are member content.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence© FLexlaw, Inc. — AI-generated enrichments are proprietary. All rights reserved.
Explore caselaw by topic → Browse Notice And Opportunity To Be Heard cases and more on FLexlaw
RYDER, Acting Chief Judge.
Bernard Farmer attacks the trial court’s final judgment adjudicating him guilty of attempted second degree murder with a firearm and imposing costs of prosecution and attorney’s fees. He raises three issues. We find no merit to either the first issue concerning the admission of the victim’s photograph or the second issue concerning the imposition of costs pursuant to section 939.01, Florida Statutes (1991). We do, however, agree with appellant that the trial court erred in imposing attorney’s fees without affording appellant notice and an opportunity to be heard.
The trial court imposed attorney’s fees pursuant to section 27.56, Florida Statutes (1991). Appellant’s counsel, a public defender, advised the court in the appellant’s presence at the sentencing hearing that he intended to file a motion for attorney’s fees for 41.5 hours at $50.00 per hour. The judge then discussed generally with the defendant that a civil judgment might be imposed against him for such costs. The final judgment specified only that attorney’s fees would be assessed at a rate of $50.00 per hour. Appellant specifically elected not to waive notice of and the right to appear at a hearing to assess a reasonable fee for appointed counsel. The public defender’s motion for attorney’s fees filed three weeks later was not served on defendant. Appellant’s first notice of the imposition of attorney’s fees was his receipt of a copy of the judgment.
Prior notice is indispensable to the imposition of attorney’s fees under section 27.-56(l)(a). In the Interest of R.B., 582 So. 2d 163 (Fla. 4th DCA 1991). Because appellant did not receive adequate prior notice of the imposition of attorney’s fees, we reverse the assessment of attorney’s fees. The trial court may conduct further proceedings with prior notice to appellant and an opportunity for a hearing on the assessment of attorney’s fees. We otherwise affirm the judgment and conviction.
Reversed.
HALL and ALTENBERND, JJ., concur.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Cited By
-
Abel Oliveros Reyes v. State, 655 So. 2d 111 (Fla. 2d DCA 1995)…, as discussed in section IV of this opinion. • § 27.56, Fla.Stat. (1991). The public defender fees may be taxable as a cost. These costs are case-specific and require compliance with the notice procedures for discretionary costs. Farmer v. State, 617 So. 2d 447 (Fla. 2d DCA 1993). • § 893.13(4), .16, .165, Fla.Stat. (1991). As discussed in section VI of this opinion, the trial court is authorized to impose costs for certain drug treatment and education funds in cases involving offenses under chapter 893…
-
Trice v. State, 655 So. 2d 1270 (Fla. 2d DCA 1995)…be reversed because the fees were assessed without affording him the opportunity to object to the amount of the assessment. See Wilson v. State, 651 So. 2d 1302 (Fla. 2d DCA 1995); Reyes v. State, 655 So. 2d 111 (Fla. 2d DCA 1995); Farmer v. State, 617 So. 2d 447 (Fla. 2d DCA 1993); Bourque v. State, 595 So. 2d 222 (Fla. 2d DCA 1992). On remand, Mr. Trice shall have thirty days from the date of the mandate within which to file a written objection to the amount assessed. If an objection is filed with the tria…
-
Deldesondro Callaway v. State, 658 So. 2d 593 (Fla. 2d DCA 1995)…ton v. State, 635 So. 2d 1032 (Fla. 2d DCA 1994). We also strike the $300 in public defender fees because the trial court failed to give the appellant notice and an opportunity to be heard regarding the imposition of those fees. See Farmer v. State, 617 So. 2d 447 (Fla. 2d DCA 1993). Lastly, we strike the imposition of $100 to the FDLE for laboratory services since the trial court failed to determine the appellant’s ability to pay. See Johnson v. State, 620 So. 2d 791 (Fla. 1st DCA 1993). Upon remand, the sta…
Previewing 3 of 10 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- In the Interest of R.B., 582 So. 2d 163 (Fla. 4th DCA 1991)