GULF IRON WORKS, A CORPORATION, APPELLANT,
v.
GEORGE S. GANDY, APPELLEE
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Gulf Iron Works sought to enforce a materialman's lien against property owner Gandy for materials delivered during construction, but the bill was dismissed because the Iron Works failed to establish that Gandy authorized the charges despite knowing that the contractor Richardson had limited authority to purchase only for cash.
The court affirmed the dismissal, holding that Iron Works failed to prove Gandy authorized the charges and that as a creditor aware of Richardson's limited agency, Iron Works was required either to demand cash payment or contract directly with Gandy.
“The Circuit Judge was justified in finding that the complainant knew, or should have known, that Richardson's agency was limited to buying for cash, and was without authority to purchase goods on Gandy's credit.”
Establishes the core principle that Iron Works had notice of Richardson's limited authority and thus bore responsibility for the unauthorized charges.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceRichardson was hired to manage building operations at a daily wage plus percentage of costs, with authority limited to purchasing materials for cash o…
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Cockrell, J.
A bill to enforce a lien for materials furnished in the construction of a building-was dismissed, and the complainant appeals.
The materials were ordered by one Richardson, and the case turns upon Richardson’s agency in the transaction.
It appears that Richardson was in charge of the huilding operations, being paid by a daily wage and a percentage upon the entire cost. His authority was to buy materials for cash only, and in purchasing the materials from the Iron Works, the seller had the option of shipping them with sight draft attached to the bill of lading or to charge them to Richardson, or to charge them to Gandy, if Gandy would approve the last alternative.
We have not the original entry before us, but it appears that at one time a statement for the materials was sent to Gandy, the charge being in his name, and that the Iron Works later wrote a letter apologizing for having sent the bill to him by mistake when it should have been sent to Richardson. There is evidence that Gandy never approved the charging of the materials to himself.
The Circuit Judge was justified in finding that the complainant knew, or should have known, that Richardson’s agency was limited to buying for cash, and was without authority to purchase goods on Gandy’s credit. They were told distinctly that they were not to charge the materials to Gandy unless he in terms authorized it to be done; they could have demanded cash for the order, as was the special contract between Gandy and Richardson, and being advised of this special limitation of Richardson’s authority, they should have observed it, or followed his suggestion and made contract with his principal direct. This the complainant claims to have done, but but the defendant as emphatically denies that it was, and upon this disputed question of fact, we cannot say that the complainant met the burden of proof.
The rejected evidence presents no ground for reversal. Under well recognized rules there was not sufficient predicate for the admission of the proffered writings.
The decree is affirmed.
Taylor, C. J., and Whitfield and Ellis, JJ., concur. Shackleford, J., took no part.
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Stowers v. Wheat, 78 F.2d 25 (5th Cir. 1935)…r doubt that under a lease of 'the kind here one contracting with the lessee gets no lien against the interest of the owner, but only against that of the lessee. They cite Harper Lbr. Co. v. Teate, 98 Fla. 1055, 125 So. 21; Gulf Iron Works v. Gandy, 70 Fla. 306, 70 So. 366; Belote v. Chalifoux, 68 Fla. 537, 67 So. 108. They say that the decisions from other states are not controlling, for all of them, except the Missouri case, rest on statutes containing provisions construed as making the lessee under a le…