DAVE SWANSON, PETITIONER,
v.
THOMAS ALLISON, DIRECTOR, ORANGE COUNTY CORRECTIONS, RESPONDENT

Fla. 5th DCA | 1993-04-26
No. 93-525
GOSHORN, C.J., and COBB and THOMPSON, JJ„ concur.
617 So. 2d 1100 Florida District Court of Appeal, Fifth District (1993) Positive Treatment
Cited by 7 cases

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Synopsis

Dave Swanson was arrested for domestic violence battery and detained at first appearance pending a domestic violence investigation. The court granted his habeas corpus petition, holding that absent statutory authority, judges cannot deny pre-trial release to those charged with simple misdemeanor battery based solely on potential harm to the community.


Holding

A trial court lacks constitutional or statutory authority to deny pre-trial release to one charged with misdemeanor simple battery based on a threat of harm finding. While section 741.2902(1) requires courts to consider victim safety in domestic violence cases, using this statute to detain those charged with simple batteries constitutes an unconstitutional application.


Headnotes

[1] A person charged with a non-capital offense not punishable by life imprisonment is entitled to pre-trial release on reasonable conditions unless no conditions can reasona…

[2] Before denying pre-trial release based on a threat of harm to the community, a court must find that the present charge constitutes a "dangerous crime."

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Key Quotes

“Before denying pre-trial release because of the threat of harm to the community, the court must make several findings, including that the present charge is a "dangerous crime." See § 907.041(4)(b)4., Fla.Stat. (1991). Although the legislature's definition of "dangerous crime" includes the felony offense of aggravated battery, we find no constitutional or statutory authority for denying pre-trial release to one charged with misdemeanor battery, where the detention is based on a threat of harm finding.”

Establishes the core holding that misdemeanor battery cannot be basis for denying pre-trial release on harm grounds

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Facts & Procedural History

Swanson was arrested for domestic violence battery, which is the statutory equivalent of simple battery. The judicial officer at first appearance deta…

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Opinion of the Court
PER CURIAM.

PER CURIAM.

Dave Swanson was arrested for “domestic violence battery,” of which the statutory equivalent is simple battery. The judicial officer at first appearance detained Swanson and ordered a domestic violence investigation. Swanson filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus to obtain his pre-trial release. Although Swanson was subsequently released on bail after the investigation was completed, we issue this opinion because it addresses an issue of importance and is one that is likely to recur. See Martina v. State, 602 So. 2d 1334, 1335 n. 5 (Fla. 5th DCA 1992).

The Constitution of the State of Florida provides that every person charged with a non-capital offense not punishable by life imprisonment is entitled to pre-trial release on reasonable conditions, unless no conditions of release can reasonably protect the community from risk of physical harm, assure the presence of the accused at trial, or insure the integrity of the judicial process. Art. I, § 14, Fla. Const. Before denying pre-trial release because of the threat of harm to the community, the court must make several findings, including that the present charge is a “dangerous crime.” See § 907.041(4)(b)4., Fla.Stat. (1991). Although the legislature’s definition of “dangerous crime” includes the felony offense of aggravated battery,1 we find no constitutional or statutory authority for denying pre-trial release to one charged with misdemeanor battery, where the detention is based on a threat of harm finding.

The legislative intent with respect to domestic violence cases is that the court at first appearance consider the safety of the victim and the victim’s minor children and exercise caution in releasing defendants. See § 741.2902(1), Fla.Stat. (1991). However, if section 741.2902(1) is being used to detain those charged with simple batteries arising out of domestic disputes, the statute is being unconstitutionally applied. In this case, the state did not even seek pretrial detention. Therefore, the judge’s failure at first appearance to determine reasonable conditions of release is even more troubling. See Fla.R.Crim.P. 3.132.

Although Swanson was arrested and charged with “domestic violence battery,” there is no such statutory offense. It appears that certain law enforcement officials, prosecution units, and courts have in effect created the offense of “domestic violence battery” to place the burden on those arrested to demonstrate that pre-trial release would pose no threat of harm.

When a person is charged with a serious offense arising out of a domestic dispute, such as aggravated battery, we have no qualms with pre-trial detention if the state can prove the necessity for such action. However, any policy authorizing the denial of pre-trial release for those charged with simple battery based on a finding of potential harm is unconstitutional. If any judge at first appearance intentionally disregards this opinion and Martina, this court will take whatever action necessary to enforce compliance with constitutional precedent.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

GOSHORN, C.J., and COBB and THOMPSON, JJ„ concur. . § 907.041(4)(a)3., Fla.Stat. (1991).


Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus


Citator

Cited By

  • Mazer v. Orange Cnty., 811 So. 2d 857 (Fla. 5th DCA 2002)
    …ct the rights of a party. Godwin, 593 So. 2d at 212 (citing Holly v. Auld, 450 So. 2d 217, 218 n. 1 (Fla.1984); Keezel v. State, 358 So. 2d 247 (Fla. 4th DCA 1978)); Martina v. State, 602 So. 2d 1334 (Fla. 5th DCA 1992); see also Swanson v. Allison, 617 So. 2d 1100 (Fla. 5th DCA 1993). The instant case comes within the third exception. The collateral legal consequence here is Mazer’s right, vel non, to attorney’s fees. See Soud v. Kendale, Inc., 788 So. 2d 1051 (Fla. 1st DCA 2001) (holding that a request for…
  • Dep't OF Health & Rehabilitative Servs. v. J.S.G., 635 So. 2d 1065 (Fla. 5th DCA 1994)
    …rtheless, the refusal of a trial court to follow the clear dictates of the law is another matter entirely. As this court has made clear in other analogous contexts, mootness will not stand in the way of an appropriate remedy. See Swanson v. Allison, 617 So. 2d 1100 (Fla. 5th DCA 1993). PETITION DENIED. DAUKSCH, GRIFFIN and DIAMANTIS, JJ., concur.…
  • State v. FOX, 647 So. 2d 1051 (Fla. 5th DCA 1994)
    …907.041(4)(b), Florida Statutes. The court cited two cases from other districts, Mininni v. Gillum, 477 So. 2d 1013 (Fla. 2d DCA 1985) and Bradwell v. McClure, 488 So. 2d 566 (Fla. 1st DCA 1986), and two cases from this district, Swanson v. Allison, 617 So. 2d 1100 (Fla. 5th DCA 1993) and Martina v. State, 602 So. 2d 1334 (Fla. 5th DCA 1992), as authority for his conclusion. This erroneous ruling constitutes a departure from the essential requirements of law requiring issuance of the writ. In Mininni, the tri…

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