THE STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLANT,
v.
LEONARDO HERNANDEZ, APPELLEE
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The State of Florida appealed the trial court's discharge of defendant Leonardo Hernandez under the speedy trial rule. The appellate court reversed, holding that a Florida Supreme Court emergency order tolling speedy trial time limits due to Hurricane Andrew's devastation of Dade County should have been applied, making the defendant's discharge premature.
The discharge was premature and is reversed. The Supreme Court's emergency tolling order applied to this case, stopping the running of the speedy trial window from August 24 through September 6, 1992. When the window resumed on September 7, only eight of the required ten days had elapsed by September 9, so the defendant could not yet be discharged.
[1] A trial court's discharge of a defendant under the speedy trial rule may be reversed if the time limits were tolled due to an extraordinary event.
[2] The Florida Supreme Court has the authority to toll time limits in criminal proceedings as part of its power to administer the judiciary.
Previewing 2 of 5 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“This order, which the Supreme Court issued as part of its power to administer the judiciary, see Art. V, § (2)(a), Fla. Const., served to toll the running of the speedy trial window period in this case.”
Establishes that the Florida Supreme Court's emergency order tolling speedy trial time limits was valid and applied to the defendant's case.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceHernandez was charged with two criminal counts and filed a demand for speedy trial on June 29, 1992. The 50-day period elapsed on August 18, 1992, and…
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LEVY, Judge.
We reverse the defendant’s discharge under the speedy trial rule. The defendant had been charged with two criminal counts, and had filed a demand for a speedy trial on June 29, 1992. On August 18, 1992, the 50 days prescribed in Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.191(a)(2)(4) [since renumbered 3.191(b)(4)] elapsed without the defendant being brought to trial. The defendant immediately filed a Motion to Discharge 1 which was heard August 18, 1992, at which time the trial court ordered that the defendant be brought to trial within 10 days or be forever discharged. See Fla. R.Crim.P. 3.191(i)(3) (since renumbered 3.191(p)(3)). The defendant was not brought to trial, and was discharged by the trial court on September 9, 1992.
However, on August 24, 1992, Hurricane Andrew decimated many parts of Dade County. As a result, the Florida Supreme Court issued an order, applicable only to Dade County, tolling “all time limits authorized by rule and statute affecting the speedy trial procedure in criminal and juvenile proceedings” beginning August 24, 1992, for two weeks. In re Emergency Petition to Extend Time Periods Under All Florida Rules of Procedure, 17 Fla.L.Weekly S578 (Fla. Sept. 2, 1992). This order, which the Supreme Court issued as part of its power to administer the judiciary, see Art. V, § (2)(a), Fla. Const., served to toll the running of the speedy trial window period in this case.
Consequently, five days of the 10-day window had elapsed prior to August 24th, and the window was tolled from August 24th through September 6th. Thereafter, the window resumed running on September 7th. Clearly, only eight days of the window period had elapsed when the defendant was discharged on September 9th. His discharge was, therefore, premature and is reversed. This case is remanded for fur ther proceedings consistent herewith. See State v. Hernandez, 573 So. 2d 1037 n. 1 (Fla. 3d DCA 1991).
Reversed and remanded.
. This pleading has since been renamed “Notice of Expiration of Speedy Trial Time” in order to distinguish it from a "Motion to Discharge” which is filed at the expiration of the Rule 3.191(p) window period. In re Amendments to the Florida Rules of Criminal Procedure, 606 So. 2d 227 (Fla. 1992).
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Ramirez v. McCRAVY, 4 So. 3d 692 (Fla. 3d DCA 2009)…y the chief justices due to the weather emergencies. However, we conclude that the orders should be strictly construed in the context of statutes, as opposed to rules. See Sullivan v. State, 913 So. 2d 762 (Fla. 5th DCA 2005) and State v. Hernandez, 617 So. 2d 1103 (Fla. 3d DCA 1993) (both dealing with the speedy trial rule). We reach this conclusion because the six administrative orders recite as its authority article V, section 2, of the Florida Constitution, which grants the Florida Supreme Court the power…
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State v. Emmanuel, 323 So. 3d 188 (Fla. 4th DCA 2021)…discharge reversed where administrative orders pertaining to hurricanes tolling speedy trial time tolled the period in which defendant had to be brought to trial after his notice for expiration of speedy trial was filed), and State v. Hernandez, 617 So. 2d 1103, 1103 (Fla. 3d DCA 1993) (order granting discharge for failure to bring defendant to trial within required 3 time period reversed where administrative order pertaining to hurricane tolled rules relating to speedy trial procedure). Fla. Admin…
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Francois v. State (Fla. 1st DCA 2021)
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- In re Amendments to the Florida Rules of Criminal Procedure, 606 So. 2d 227 (Fla. 1992)
- State v. Hernandez, 573 So. 2d 1037 (Fla. 3d DCA 1991)