S.E.G., A CHILD, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
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A juvenile adjudicated delinquent for trespass to a conveyance and obstructing an officer challenges a restitution condition requiring her to pay for vehicle damages. The court reverses the restitution order because the passenger did not directly or indirectly cause the damages—only the driver did—and Florida law requires a causal nexus between the defendant's offense and the damages.
The court reversed the restitution order, holding that a defendant must have caused damage at least directly or indirectly to be liable for restitution under Florida Statutes section 775.089(1). Because S.E.G.'s damages as a trespasser to a conveyance did not directly or indirectly cause the vehicle damage—only the driver's separate conduct did—she cannot be held responsible for restitution.
[1] A juvenile adjudicated delinquent for trespass to a conveyance cannot be ordered to pay restitution for damages to the stolen vehicle if the damages were caused solely by…
[2] Restitution for damages to a stolen vehicle may not be ordered against a passenger when the damages were incurred entirely as a result of collisions by the driver.
Previewing 2 of 4 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“a trial court shall order a defendant to make restitution to the victim for damage caused directly or indirectly by the defendant's offense, unless it finds compelling reasons not to do so”
States the statutory requirement for restitution under Florida law, establishing that causation (direct or indirect) is essential
Previewing 1 of 3 key quotes on this case — the court’s exact language, pinpointed for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceS.E.G., a juvenile, was a passenger in a stolen vehicle that was involved in collisions. The vehicle sustained damages of $1,567.00 entirely as a resu…
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THREADGILL, Judge.
S.E.G., a juvenile, adjudicated delinquent for trespass to a conveyance and obstructing an officer without violence, challenges a condition of community control requiring her to pay restitution for damages to a stolen vehicle in which she was a passenger. We reverse.
Section 775.089(1), Florida Statutes (1991) provides that a trial court shall order a defendant to make restitution to the victim for damage caused directly or indirectly by the defendant’s offense, unless it finds compelling reasons not to do so. At the appellant’s restitution hearing, the evidence established that the damages to the stolen vehicle were incurred entirely as a result of collisions by the driver. The trial court ordered the appellant to pay $1,567.00 in restitution. The appellant contends, and the state does not dispute, that at all times she was merely a passenger in the vehicle. She argues that she should not have to pay for damages that she did not cause either directly or indirectly. We agree.
In G.C. v. State, 560 So. 2d 1186 (Fla. 3d DCA1990), aff'd, 572 So. 2d 1380 (Fla.1991), the district court reversed an order of restitution imposed against an appellant adjudicated delinquent for trespass to a conveyance. As in the instant case, the appellant had been a passenger in a stolen vehicle. The court found that most, if not all, of the damage to the vehicle had been caused by the driver when he stole it and later negligently parked it. The district court reversed the restitution order insofar as it related to the driver’s separate conduct, reasoning that under section 775.089, a defendant must have caused the damage at least indirectly. See also State v. Williams, 520 So. 2d 276 (Fla.1988) (defendant charged with leaving the scene of an accident could not be responsible for damages not caused directly or indirectly by her crime).
Similarly, in this case, the damages to the stolen vehicle were caused solely by the driver’s separate conduct in operating the vehicle. There is no evidence that the appellant directly or indirectly caused or contributed to any of the damages by her act of trespass.
We therefore reverse and remand with directions to strike that condition of community control requiring the appellant to make restitution. In all other respects the order is affirmed.
Reversed in part; otherwise affirmed.
LEHAN, A.C.J., and PATTERSON, J., concur.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Cited By
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K.M.G. v. State, 652 So. 2d 481 (Fla. 2d DCA 1995)…e of a civil conspiracy that might make K.M.G. responsible for the other teenager’s act of theft. We reverse the order of restitution because the-record does not establish that the defendant was more than a passenger in the vehicle. S.E.G. v. State, 618 So. 2d 345 (Fla. 2d DCA 1993). Reversed. PARKER, A.C.J., and ALTENBERND and WHATLEY, JJ., concur.…
Authorities Cited
- State v. Williams, 520 So. 2d 276 (Fla. 1988)
- State v. G.C., 572 So. 2d 1380 (Fla. 1991)
- G.C. v. State, 560 So. 2d 1186 (Fla. 3d DCA 1990)