L.W., A CHILD, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE

Fla. 2d DCA | 1993-05-14
No. 91-04034
RYDER, A.C.J., and ALTENBERND, J., concur.
618 So. 2d 349 Florida District Court of Appeal, Second District (1993) Positive Treatment
Cited by 10 cases

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Synopsis

L.W., a juvenile, appeals his adjudication of delinquency for aggravated battery after the trial court excluded a defense witness due to his failure to list that witness during discovery. The court reverses, holding that total exclusion was an excessive sanction for an inadvertent, non-prejudicial discovery violation.


Holding

The court holds that exclusion of the witness was too severe a sanction. Where a discovery violation is inadvertent and non-prejudicial to the opposing party, relevant evidence should not be excluded unless no other remedy suffices.


Headnotes

[1] Excluding a witness for a discovery violation is an excessive sanction when the violation is inadvertent and does not prejudice the opposing party's ability to prepare fo…

[2] The severity of sanctions for discovery violations must be determined by considering the totality of the circumstances, including whether the violation was willful or ina…

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Key Quotes

“the extent to which sanctions should be imposed for discovery violations depends upon the totality of the circumstances, including whether the violation was inadvertent or willful, whether it was trivial or substantial, and, most important, whether it prejudiced the opposition's ability to prepare for trial”

Establishes the test for determining appropriate discovery sanctions

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Facts & Procedural History

L.W. was charged with aggravated battery for allegedly grazing two persons with his car. During trial, L.W. sought to call Christopher, a passenger in…

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Opinion of the Court
FRANK, Judge.

FRANK, Judge.

L.W., a juvenile, appeals from an adjudication of delinquency entered after the trial court pronounced him guilty of two counts of aggravated battery. He contends that his failure to disclose a witness during discovery did not warrant the trial court’s refusal to allow him to call the person as his witness. We agree and reverse.

L.W. was arrested and charged with aggravated battery after allegedly intentionally grazing two persons with his car. During the presentation of his case, L.W. sought to call the passenger in his car, Christopher, to testify on his behalf. L.W. admitted he had not identified Christopher as one of his witnesses, but he advised the trial court that the state had agreed to allow Christopher to testify. When the trial court asked the state attorney if she had an objection to Christopher’s appearing as a witness, the following colloquy occurred:

[The state]: I have an objection if I’m not allowed time to talk to this witness, to this witness testifying, yes, Your Hon-or. THE COURT: Why [isn’t he] on the witness list?

[Defense counsel]: Your Honor, I do not have a response to that. I did, in fact, speak to the witness, and I’m not aware of any reason why [he is] not on an amended witness list.

THE COURT: Objection sustained.

We agree with L.W. that the exclusion of Christopher was too severe a sanction. The extent to which sanctions should be imposed for discovery violations depends upon the totality of the circumstances, including whether the violation was inadvertent or willful, whether it was trivial or substantial, and, most important, whether it prejudiced the opposition’s ability to prepare for trial. Richardson v. State, 246 So. 2d 771, 775 (Fla.1971); Patterson v. State, 419 So. 2d 1120 (Fla. 4th DCA 1982), pet. for rev. denied, 430 So. 2d 452 (Fla.1983). The record reveals that the state was willing to allow Christopher’s testimony if it was afforded an opportunity for a pre-testimonial interview. Nothing in the record indicates the violation was either intentional or substantial. L.W.’s attorney could not explain why Christopher had been overlooked on the witness list, but the court was assured he had not been purposely excluded. Moreover, had the witness been permitted to testify, no prejudice would have been visited upon the state; the state recognized that Christopher’s testimony would have contributed little toward the defense.

Where, as here, the state suffers little, if any, prejudice by an inadvertent discovery violation, the trial court, in tailoring a just remedy, must be mindful that “[Relevant evidence should not be excluded ... unless no other remedy suffices.” Patterson, 419 So. 2d at 1123 (quoting Cooper v. State, 336 So. 2d 1133, 1138 (Fla.1976), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 925, 97 S.Ct. 2200, 53 L.Ed.2d 239 (1977)); see also, Duarte v. State, 598 So. 2d 270 (Fla. 3d DCA 1992) (reversible error to exclude party’s undisclosed witness without inquiring into extent of prejudice suffered by the state and whether lesser remedy will suffice). We cannot ignore the inequity of so severe a consequence for an otherwise non-prejudicial discovery violation.

Reversed and remanded for a new trial.

RYDER, A.C.J., and ALTENBERND, J., concur.


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Citator

Cited By

  • Comer v. State, 730 So. 2d 769 (Fla. 1st DCA 1999)
    …2d at 1023. In the case at bar, the lower tribunal summarily excluded the proposed testimony of Deveaux without conducting any inquiry. Therefore, the issue of [*775] procedural prejudice was never properly addressed. This was error. L.W. v. State, 618 So. 2d 349 (Fla. 2d DCA 1993) (without supporting factual findings in accordance with Richardson requirements, exclusion of witness previously undisclosed on defense’s witness list was too severe a sanction). “In a criminal case, the exclusion of a defense wi…
  • Sanchez-Andujar v. State, 60 So. 3d 480 (Fla. 1st DCA 2011)
    …s well before trial. “[Wjithout supporting factual findings in accordance with Richardson requirements, exclusion of witness previously undisclosed on defense’s witness list was too severe a sanction.” Comer, 730 So. 2d at 775 (citing L.W. v. State, 618 So. 2d 349 (Fla. 2d DCA 1993)). See also Dawson v. State, 20 So. 3d 1016, 1020 n. 3 (Fla. 4th DCA 2009) (noting “that a trial court must address all three prongs of the Richardson inquiry; otherwise, the court’s analysis is not adequate”). More fundamentally,…
  • Weiand v. State, 701 So. 2d 562 (Fla. 2d DCA 1997)
    …ed. Furthermore, even if the late disclosure had been a discovery violation, the trial court is required to consider less severe alternatives before excluding a witness as a sanction. Cooper v. State, 336 So. 2d 1133, 1138 (Fla.1976); L.W. v. State, 618 So. 2d 349, 360-51 (Fla. 2d DCA 1993); Lee v. State, 534 So. 2d 1226, 1227 (Fla. 1st DCA 1988); State v. Plachta, 415 So. 2d 1356, 1358 (Fla. 2d DCA 1982). The trial court also excluded the testimony of two defense witnesses, each of whom were being called to…

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