CATHERINE SALTER, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
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Catherine Salter appealed her involuntary commitment to Florida State Hospital under section 394.467. The court reversed and vacated the commitment order, finding insufficient clear and convincing evidence that she met the statutory criteria for involuntary placement.
The court reversed the commitment order, holding that the record did not support by clear and convincing evidence that Salter met the third criterion for involuntary placement—specifically, that she is manifestly incapable of surviving alone and poses a real and present threat of substantial harm to her well-being or likelihood of inflicting serious bodily harm.
[1] Involuntary commitment for mental health treatment requires proof by clear and convincing evidence that the person is mentally ill, has refused or is unable to determine…
[2] A court must find by clear and convincing evidence that a person is incapable of surviving alone and that without treatment, the person is likely to suffer neglect or ref…
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“In order to involuntarily confine a mentally ill person for treatment pursuant to section 394.467, the court must find that: (1) the person is mentally ill; (2) because of mental illness, the person has refused placement or is unable to determine whether placement is necessary; (3) the person is manifestly incapable of surviving alone or with the help of willing and responsible family or friends, and without treatment is likely to suffer from neglect or refuse to care for herself and such neglect or refusal poses a real and present threat of substantial harm to her well-being, or there is substantial likelihood that in the near future she will inflict serious bodily harm on herself or another person, as evidenced by recent behavior causing, attempting, or threatening such harm; and (4) all relevant and available less restrictive treatment alternatives are inappropriate.”
Establishes the four-part statutory test for involuntary commitment that must be satisfied by clear and convincing evidence.
Previewing 1 of 3 key quotes on this case — the court’s exact language, pinpointed for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAppellant Salter was subject to an involuntary commitment proceeding. The state presented only one witness, Dr. DeMoya, a psychiatrist, who testified …
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PER CURIAM.
This is an appeal from an order placing appellant involuntarily in Florida State Hospital pursuant to section 394.467, Florida Statutes (1991). We reverse and vacate the order of commitment.
In order to involuntarily confine a mentally ill person for treatment pursuant to section 394.467, the court must find that: (1) the person is mentally ill; (2) because of mental illness, the person has refused placement or is unable to determine whether placement is necessary; (3) the person is manifestly incapable of surviving alone or with the help of willing and responsible family or friends, and without treatment is likely to suffer from neglect or refuse to care for herself and such neglect or refusal poses a real and present threat of substantial harm to her well-being, or there is substantial likelihood that in the near future she will inflict serious bodily harm on herself or another person, as evidenced by recent behavior causing, attempting, or threatening such harm; and (4) all relevant and available less restrictive treatment alternatives are inappropriate. The standard of proof in state involuntary commitment proceedings is clear and convincing. In re Beverly, 342 So. 2d 481 (Fla.1977).
The only witness called by the state was Dr. DeMoya, a psychiatrist. He testi fied that appellant refused to cooperate with any treatment recommended. He never stated what treatment or medication was recommended or necessary. Dr. DeMoya testified that appellant was in danger of self-neglect or some violent act and needed to be involuntarily placed for further care and supervision because she is unable to make good decisions about her well-being, but he did not state the nature of the self-neglect that appellant would sustain if not committed. Cf. Welk v. State, 542 So. 2d 1348 (Fla. 1st DCA 1989); Schexnayder v. State, 495 So. 2d 850 (Fla. 1st DCA 1986). The record does not support, by clear and convincing evidence, the conclusion that appellant met the third criterion necessary for involuntary placement.
The observation in Schexnayder is equally applicable to the present case:
We recognize that the problem dealt with here is an ongoing one, that conditions change, and indeed, that the state may be obliged to institute further proceedings for the protection of the appellant. However, this knowledge cannot justify our failure to act on the basis of the record as we find it today.
495 So. 2d at 852. The order for involuntary hospitalization of appellant is reversed and vacated, and it is ordered that appellant be discharged.
SMITH, BARFIELD and MICKLE, JJ., concur.
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Citator
Cited By
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Lyon v. State, 724 So. 2d 1241 (Fla. 1st DCA 1999)…tion,2 “she w[ould] be almost incoherent in her speech, not able to take care of herself, she’ll require supervision, she’ll require structure.” The social worker’s testimony added nothing significant on this point. Our decision in Salter v. State, 618 So. 2d 352 (Fla. 1st DCA 1993), controls the present case. In Salter, the state relied on the testimony of one Dr. DeMoya to prove self neglect posed “a real and present threat of substantial harm.” § 394.467(1), Fla. Stat. (1993). Dr. DeMoya testified that a…
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Blue v. State, 764 So. 2d 697 (Fla. 1st DCA 2000)…In an involuntary commitment proceeding, the State bears the burden of proving by clear and convincing evidence that the statutory criteria authorizing involuntary commitment have been met. In re Beverly, 342 So. 2d 481 (Fla.1977); Salter v. State, 618 So. 2d 352 (Fla. 1st DCA 1993). Without question, Appellant meets the criteria of section 394.467(l)(a)l. She is mentally ill, she has refused voluntary placement, and she may not be able to determine for herself whether placement is necessary. At issue is wh…
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Singletary v. State, 765 So. 2d 180 (Fla. 1st DCA 2000)…mere fact of mental illness is insufficient justification for involuntary commitment. See Adams v. State, 713 So. 2d 1063 (Fla. 1st DCA 1998); Williams, 522 So. 2d at 984. See also Lyon v. State, 724 So. 2d 1241 (Fla. 1st DCA 1999); Salter v. State, 618 So. 2d 352 (Fla. 1st DCA 1993). Many of her symptoms may be controlled by medication, the evidence showed, but doctors testified she has a tendency to neglect taking medications prescribed for her. Ms. Singletary’s mother, Roberta White, testified that she wa…
Authorities Cited
- In re Preer Beverly, 342 So. 2d 481 (Fla. 1977)
- State v. Vasquez, 495 So. 2d 850 (Fla. 3d DCA 1986)
- Schexnayder v. State, 495 So. 2d 850 (Fla. 1st DCA 1986)