WILLARD K. RANDOLPH AND RANDOLPH ENTERPRISES, INC., APPELLANTS,
v.
SUSAN A. RANDOLPH, APPELLEE

Fla. 5th DCA | 1993-05-14
No. 92-2475
DAUKSCH, PETERSON and GRIFFIN, JJ., concur.
618 So. 2d 770 Florida District Court of Appeal, Fifth District (1993) Positive Treatment
Cited by 5 cases

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Synopsis

In this dissolution of marriage appeal, the Fifth District Court of Appeal granted the wife's motions for interim attorney's fees pending appeal and for an order relinquishing jurisdiction to the trial court to enforce the final judgment. The court clarified that trial courts retain jurisdiction to enforce their orders and judgments even while those orders are on appeal, absent a stay or supersedeas.


Holding

The court held that the trial court may award interim attorney's fees where the wife meets the statutory criteria and must retain jurisdiction to enforce its final judgment orders, including fee awards and property/money distributions, even while those orders are on appeal absent a stay or supersedeas.


Headnotes

[1] A party may be awarded interim attorney's fees and costs pending appeal if they meet the criteria for such an award, including demonstrating a need and the opposing party…

[2] A trial court retains jurisdiction to enforce its own orders and judgments, even when those orders are on appeal, unless a stay pending appeal has been granted.

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Key Quotes

“The trial court has incorrectly concluded it is without jurisdiction to enforce its orders and judgments in the present case.”

Establishes the core holding that trial courts retain enforcement jurisdiction while orders are on appeal

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Facts & Procedural History

In a dissolution of marriage proceeding, the trial court awarded attorney's fees to the wife based on findings that the husband had superior ability t…

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Opinion of the Court
PER CURIAM.

MOTIONS FOR ATTORNEY’S FEES AND COSTS AND ORDER OF ENFORCEMENT

PER CURIAM.

In this appeal of a final judgment of dissolution of marriage and an order awarding attorney’s fees, appellee Susan Randolph (wife) has filed two motions, both of which we grant.

Wife’s first motion seeks an award of interim attorney’s fees and costs pending appeal. Wife had previously been awarded attorney’s fees in the trial court based upon the lower court’s findings that husband has the superior ability to retain an attorney, has a superior income and has liquid assets available to him which can be used as a source of funds to pay fees. The court also found wife is unemployed and has no liquid assets to pay her counsel or the costs of litigation. Based on the appellate record thus far developed, it does appear that wife meets the criteria for an interim award of appellate attorney’s fees and costs as set forth in Miller v. Miller, 586 So. 2d 1315 (Fla. 5th DCA 1991) and Boyer v. Boyer, 588 So. 2d 615 (Fla. 5th DCA 1991), rev. denied, 599 So. 2d 654 (Fla.1992). Accordingly, wife’s motion is granted and we remand this issue to the trial court for a determination of the appropriate amount of interim attorney’s fees and costs she should receive.

Wife also seeks an order from this court relinquishing jurisdiction to the trial court to enter orders enforcing the final judgment currently on appeal. Although the lower court denied husband’s motion for a stay pending appeal, the court has refused to enter any post-judgment enforcement orders sought by wife on the stated basis that it lacks the jurisdiction to do so while his orders are on appeal.

The trial court has incorrectly concluded it is without jurisdiction to enforce its orders and judgments in the present case. Fla.R.App.P. 9.600(c).1 Jurisdiction to enforce the fees award is clear. The lower court denied a stay of its order awarding fees and no supersedeas has been filed by appellant. The fee award, like any other money judgment, is enforceable by the lower court absent a stay, even though the fee award is appealed. Similarly, the provisions of the final judgment of dissolution requiring conveyance to appellee of a parcel of real property and payment to her of certain monies are enforceable by the trial court in the absence of an appropriate stay. Cf. Steele v. Steele, 558 So. 2d 526 (Fla. 1st DCA 1990). The lower court has the power to entertain and rule upon the motions seeking enforcement of the final orders presently on appeal and by this opinion is instructed to do so.

MOTIONS GRANTED.

DAUKSCH, PETERSON and GRIFFIN, JJ., concur. . The lower court incorrectly relied on Casavan v. Land O’Lakes Realty, Inc., 526 So. 2d 215 (Fla. 5th DCA 1988) and Bailey v. Bailey, 392 So. 2d 49 (Fla. 3d DCA 1981). Enforcement of a court’s order does not normally interfere with the appellate court’s power to rule on the appeal. See Greenberg v. Carlisle, 481 So. 2d 106 (Fla. 4th DCA 1986). Where it does, a stay is the appropriate device. See Bazzano v. Bazzano, 175 So. 2d 801 (Fla. 3d DCA 1965).


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Citator

Cited By

  • Starkey v. Linn, 727 So. 2d 386 (Fla. 5th DCA 1999)
    …obtained a supersedeas bond. Starkey’s decision not to obtain a bond left him subject to enforcement proceedings. When Linn sought to enforce the order being appealed, the trial court had jurisdiction to order enforcement. See Randolph v. Randolph, 618 So. 2d 770 (Fla. 5th DCA 1993) (in the absence of a stay, trial court retains jurisdiction to enforce attorney fee award even though that issue is on appeal). It did not, however, have the authority to order Starkey to post the supersedeas bond as a condition…
  • Katz v. N.M.E. Hosps., Inc., 842 So. 2d 853 (Fla. 4th DCA 2002)
    …cution and collection of the judgment. See Bernstein v. Bernstein, 48 So. 2d 356 (Fla.1949); Mellon United Nat’l Bank v. Cochran, 776 So. 2d 964, 964 (Fla. 3d DCA 2000); Starkey v. Linn, 727 So. 2d 386, 388 (Fla. 5th DCA 1999); Randolph v. Randolph, 618 So. 2d 770, 771 (Fla. 5th DCA 1993); Finst Dev., Inc. v. Bemaor, 449 So. 2d 290, 291 (Fla. 3d DCA 1983). Thus, the trial judge’s enforcement of discovery in aid of execution was proper. Further, we find no merit in Green-blatt’s arguments that the fee award i…
  • Arnold v. John R. Arnold, M.D. (Fla. 5th DCA 2021)
    …lower court can proceed in matters related to the final judgment so long as it does not affect the subject matter of the appeal. See Casavan v. Land O’Lakes Realty, Inc. of Leesburg, 526 So. 2d 215, 215–16 (Fla. 5th DCA 1988); Randolph v. Randolph, 618 So. 2d 770, 771 (Fla. 5th DCA 1993). As a result, while a lower court cannot amend, modify, or vacate a final judgment while the appeal is pending, the lower court is free to take lawful action necessary to enforce the final judgment. See Ruby Mountain Const…

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