MARCELLA SCHETTER, APPELLANT/CROSS-APPELLEE,
v.
MARY HANLEY, AS PERSONAL REPRESENTATIVE OF THE ESTATE OF CLARENCE BERNARD SCHETTER, A/K/A CHARLES BERNARD SCHETTER, APPELLEE/CROSS-APPELLANT, AND DOROTHY MACNEIL, RECEIVER, CROSS-APPELLANT
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In this long-running post-judgment dissolution case, the court affirmed the trial court's approval of the receiver's actions but struck provisions allowing either party to file further claims, finding such claims stale and barred by laches after over 25 years of proceedings.
The court affirmed the trial court's rulings on the receiver's conduct but reversed the portions of the order permitting either party to file or have further claims and objections heard, finding such claims stale and barred by laches. The court directed that remaining funds be divided 50/50 after payment of receivership fees.
[1] A trial court's rulings on objections to the termination of a receivership will not be disturbed on appeal absent an abuse of discretion.
[2] Laches may bar claims and objections that are not brought before the court in a timely fashion, even in post-judgment proceedings.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“These proceedings have lasted over a quarter of a century. There have been innumerable proceedings in the trial court, consuming large amounts of judicial and lawyer time, including three appeals to this court. Enough is enough!”
Establishes the court's rationale for ending the prolonged litigation and preventing further proceedings.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceA dissolution case terminated in 1969 led to a receivership ordered to terminate in 1974, but final distribution was not entered until 1991. In 1984, …
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PER CURIAM.
This case arises out of post-judgment proceedings in a dissolution case which was terminated in 1969. A receivership was ordered to be terminated in 1974 but for one reason or another final order of termination and distribution was not entered until 1991. In between that time the assigned judge and the ex-husband have both died.
We have carefully reviewed the issues raised by all parties on appeal in light of the record submitted to us, which is only a portion of the 25 volume court file. After a lengthy hearing in 1984 regarding appellant’s objections to the termination of the receivership and demand for an accounting, the trial court overruled the objections and found that the receiver had acted properly throughout the proceedings. This order was not entered until 1991, seven years after the hearing. Without a further record, we cannot find that the trial court abused its discretion in its rulings with respect to the matters contained therein.
These proceedings have lasted over a quarter of a century. There have been innumerable proceedings in the trial court, consuming large amounts of judicial and lawyer time, including three appeals to this court. Enough is enough! It is time to end this matter once and for all. We therefore affirm as to all issues except for that portion of paragraphs 4 and 9 of the order on appeal which permit either party to file or have heard further claims and objections. Any such claims and objections are stale, and each party is guilty of laches in failing to bring them back before the court in a timely fashion. While court dockets are crowded, it does not take fifteen years to secure hearings or even trials on issues. To allow further proceedings would only exhaust the remaining funds held by the receiver to neither party’s benefit. On remand, we direct that the remaining funds held by the receiver be divided 50/50 between the parties after the payment of the fees and expenses of the receivership as set forth in the order on appeal as well as any fees granted to the receiver as a result of this appeal.
GLICKSTEIN, C.J., and WARNER and FARMER, JJ., concur.