FISCHBACH & MOORE, INC., APPELLANT,
v.
MCBRO, A DIVISION OF MCCARTHY BROTHERS COMPANY, APPELLEE
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Fischbach & Moore appealed the trial court's denial of post-judgment interest on attorney's fees awarded in an arbitration dispute. The court affirmed the underlying award of attorney's fees but reversed the denial of post-judgment interest, holding that interest accrues from the date entitlement to fees is fixed, not from the date the amount is determined.
Post-judgment interest on attorney's fees should accrue from June 12, 1990, the date the trial court's partial summary judgment fixed F&M's entitlement to fees, not from the later date when the amount was determined. The Second District's ruling in Brouwer's Flowers was limited to eminent domain cases and does not apply here.
[1] An appellate court may reconsider and reverse its prior ruling if convinced that the original pronouncement of law was erroneous, but not when it amounts to a second appe…
[2] A prior appellate ruling remains the law of the case unless the court is convinced its original decision was erroneous.
Previewing 2 of 5 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“for purposes of assessing post-judgment interest, a claim becomes liquidated and subject to interest when a verdict or court decision has the effect of fixing entitlement to the fee as of a prior date”
Establishes the legal standard that entitlement to interest is fixed when the right to receive fees is determined, regardless of when the amount is later calculated.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceThe trial court granted Fischbach & Moore's partial summary judgment on June 12, 1990, determining that F&M was entitled to attorney's fees and costs …
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PER CURIAM.
Appellant/cross-appellee, Fischbach & Moore (F & M), appeals the trial court’s amended final judgment denying post-judgment interest. Appellee/cross-appellant, McBro, requests this court to revisit its decision in McBRO v. Fischbach & Moore, 576 So. 2d 1360 (Fla. 3d DCA 1991) {McBRO I), which affirmed the trial court’s partial summary judgment in favor of F & M for attorneys fees it incurred in an arbitration proceeding.
An appellate court has the power to reconsider and reverse a previous ruling that has become the “law of the case” when convinced, on a subsequent appeal of the same case, that its original pronouncement of the law was erroneous. Escambia County Council on Aging v. Goldsmith, 500 So. 2d 626 (Fla. 1st DCA 1986). However, reconsideration of a case should never be allowed when it would amount to nothing more than a second appeal on a question determined in the first appeal. Strazzulla v. Hendrick, 177 So. 2d 1, 4 (Fla.1965). Here, McBro is seeking a second appeal of a question already determined by this court in McBRO I. As we are unconvinced that our decision in McBRO I was erroneous, it remains the “law of the case,” and we, therefore, affirm.
F & M contends that the trial court erred in denying post-judgment interest from June 12, 1990, the date the court awarded it attorney’s fees. We agree. The court based its amended final judgment on Department of Transportation v. Brouwer’s Flowers, Inc., 600 So. 2d 1260 (Fla. 2d DCA 1992). In that case, the second district found “no statutory authority for entitlement to interest on attorney’s fees in eminent domain cases before the trial court’s determination of the amount of attorney’s fees.” Id. at 1261. We find that the Brouwer’s Flowers decision is limited to eminent domain cases, especially in light of cases such as Tallahassee Memorial Regional Medical Center v. Poole, 547 So. 2d 1258 (Fla. 1st DCA 1989), review denied, 558 So. 2d 19 (Fla.1990) and Inacio v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 550 So. 2d 92 (Fla. 1st DCA 1989), rejected on other grounds, Sonara v. Star Casualty Ins. Co., 603 So. 2d 661 (Fla. 3d DCA 1992), which hold that for purposes of assessing post-judgment interest, a claim becomes liquidated and subject to interest when a verdict or court decision has the effect of fixing entitlement to the fee as of a prior date.
In the present case, the trial court, on June 12, 1990, granted F & M’s partial summary judgment against McBro which determined that F & M, as the prevailing party in the arbitration proceeding, was entitled to attorney’s fees and costs, the amount of which was to be determined at a later date. Thus, F & M’s entitlement to attorneys fees was fixed as of June 12, 1990. Although the amount was not determined until June 26, 1992, the interest started accruing from the date the attorney’s right to receive the fee was fixed. Since a prevailing party should not be penalized when a non-prevailing party decides' to contest entitlement to attorneys fees, Inacio, 550 So. 2d at 97, interest should have been assessed from June 12, 1990.
Accordingly, we affirm as to the cross-appeal and reverse as to the appeal.
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Lipsig v. Zahid A. Ramlawi, 760 So. 2d 170 (Fla. 3d DCA 2000)…r that “for purposes of assessing post-judgment interest, a claim becomes liquidated and subject to interest when a verdict or court decision has the effect of fixing entitlement .., [.]” Fischbach & Moore, Inc. v. McBro, Div. of McCarthy Bros. Co., 619 So. 2d 324, 325 (Fla. 3d DCA 1993). Thus, we agree with Ramlawi and remand for the trial court to award post-judgment interest as to verdicts 9,16-22, nunc pro tunc from the date of the jury’s verdict and post-judgment interest on the accounting award nunc pro…
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Ira S. Jacobson, M.D. v. Humana Med. Plan, Inc., 636 So. 2d 120 (Fla. 3d DCA 1994)…fest injustice will result from a strict adherence to its prior pronouncement. Reconsideration should never be allowed when it would amount to nothing more than a second appeal on a question determined in the first. Fischbach & Moore, Inc. v. McBro, 619 So. 2d 324 (Fla. 3d DCA 1993); see Strazzulla, 177 So. 2d at 4; see also Raymond T. Elligett, Jr. & Charles P. Schropp, Law of the Case Revisited, Fla.B.J. Mar. 1994, at 54. In the present case, when the Supreme Court denied review and our mandate was sent do…
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Mark and Barbara Okun v. Litwin Sec., Inc., 652 So. 2d 387 (Fla. 3d DCA 1995)…to their motion to confirm the arbitration award. Post judgment interest properly accrued on the Okuns and Braunstein judgment from May of 1994, and will continue to do so until Litwin satisfies same. See Argonaut; Fischbach & Moore, Inc. v. McBro, 619 So. 2d 324 (Fla. 3d DCA 1993) (post judgment interest on fee award proper from date court determined fee award was proper). See and compare West v. Jamison, 182 Ga. App. 565, 356 S.E. 2d 659 (1987) (party entitled to post judgment interest following confirmati…
Previewing 3 of 8 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Strazzulla v. Hendrick, 177 So. 2d 1 (Fla. 1965)
- Escambia Cnty. Council ON Aging & Auto-Owners Ins. Co. v. Goldsmith, 500 So. 2d 626 (Fla. 1st DCA 1986)
- Inacio v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 550 So. 2d 92 (Fla. 1st DCA 1989)
- Tallahassee Mem'l Reg'l Med. Ctr., Inc. v. Poole, 547 So. 2d 1258 (Fla. 1st DCA 1989)
- State v. Brouwer's Flowers, Inc., 600 So. 2d 1260 (Fla. 2d DCA 1992)
- Sonara v. Star Cas. Ins. Co., 603 So. 2d 661 (Fla. 3d DCA 1992)
- McBRO v. Fischbach & Moore, Inc., 576 So. 2d 1360 (Fla. 3d DCA 1991)
- Clay v. The Prudential Ins. Co. OF Am., 576 So. 2d 1360 (Fla. 4th DCA 1991)