LONNIE LOGAN, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
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Lonnie Logan appealed the summary denial of his motion for postconviction relief, raising claims about errors in his sentencing guideline scoresheet and allegations of ineffective assistance of counsel. The court reversed and remanded for the trial court to conduct a more thorough review of Logan's claims rather than summarily denying the motion.
The trial court's summary denial was improper and the case must be remanded. Logan may pursue ineffective assistance of counsel claims despite previously attempting to correct the sentence under Rule 3.800(a), and the trial court must reexamine the file to determine whether evidence conclusively refutes Logan's claims regarding scoresheet errors, counsel's knowledge of such errors, and false promises about actual time served.
[1] A defendant may raise a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel based on trial counsel's failure to correct sentencing scoresheet errors, even if the underlying scores…
[2] A claim that sentencing scoresheet errors were known to and not corrected by trial counsel is not procedurally barred simply because the defendant previously sought to co…
Previewing 2 of 5 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“On the other hand, if trial counsel was apprised of these scoresheet errors, and made no effort to correct them, this could constitute ineffective assistance. Lanier v. State, 478 So.2d 1184 (Fla.2d DCA 1985). In fact, Logan makes exactly this claim. Moreover, he is not barred from doing so solely because he previously attempted to correct the sentence via rule 3.800(a).”
Establishes that ineffective assistance claims are not barred by prior Rule 3.800(a) motions and that counsel's failure to correct known scoresheet errors constitutes potential ineffective assistance.
Previewing 1 of 3 key quotes on this case — the court’s exact language, pinpointed for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceLogan pleaded guilty to numerous felony charges in 1991 and received a sentence of twelve years. He claimed points were incorrectly awarded under 'pri…
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PER CURIAM.
Lonnie Logan appeals the summary denial of his motion for postconviction relief. We reverse.
In 1991 Logan pled to numerous felony charges and received a sentence of twelve years. All but one of the issues raised in the present motion center around the guideline scoresheet used in connection with Logan’s sentencing. For example, Logan contends that points were awarded under “prior record” for charges that did not result in convictions. He also claims that the scoresheet erroneously reflects the “primary offense” as a second degree felony, when in fact it is a third degree felony.
The state filed a response to the motion in which it asserted that Logan had raised these same claims in a previous motion to correct sentence. However, Logan would have been procedurally barred from raising via Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.800(a) any matters which should have been preserved by contemporaneous objection. Lomont v. State, 506 So. 2d 1141 (Fla. 2d DCA 1987). Our holding in Lomont would preclude consideration, apart from plenary appeal, of either issue described above.
On the other hand, if trial counsel was apprised of these scoresheet errors, and made no effort to correct them, this could constitute ineffective assistance. Lanier v. State, 478 So. 2d 1184 (Fla.2d DCA 1985). In fact, Logan makes exactly this claim. Moreover, he is not barred from doing so solely because he previously attempted to correct the sentence via rule 3.800(a). Vann v. State, 569 So. 2d 867 (Fla.2d DCA 1990).
The state also contended that, even if Logan’s assertions were true, the error is harmless. Since at least one of the case numbers below represented a violation of probation, the court could have “bumped” the recommended sentence by one cell. Fla.R.Crim.P. 3.701(d)(14). This argument is unavailing. Logan’s guideline score-sheet indicates the “bump” authorized by rule 3.701(d)(14) — which is discretionary, not automatic — was not exercised at the time of sentencing. We cannot presume the trial court would have imposed the same sentence had the scoresheet errors been brought to its attention. Perhaps more importantly, Logan also states that he negotiated a plea for the low end of the recommended sentencing range. Cf. Johnson v. State, 523 So. 2d 755 (Fla.2d DCA 1988). If the scoresheet is corrected as Logan suggests, he would fall into a lower range and might be entitled to a three-year reduction in his sentence.
A final issue, unrelated to the score-sheet problems, concerns Logan’s discussions with counsel prior to entering his plea. Logan claims that he agreed to the plea only after counsel promised he would “only” serve about 2¾⅛ years. In fact he expects to serve “a minimum of 3 to 4 years.” He also states he was promised, incorrectly, that he would be eligible for controlled release. If these allegations are true Logan might be entitled to withdraw the plea. Cf. Tarpley v. State, 566 So. 2d 914 (Fla.2d DCA 1990); Ray v. State, 480 So. 2d 228 (Fla.2d DCA 1985). Neither the trial court’s order nor the state’s response addresses this particular claim.
After remand the trial court should reexamine the files and records in this case to determine whether anything therein conclusively refutes Logan’s claims that (a) his scoresheet was incorrectly calculated; (b) counsel knew of, and failed to correct, the error(s); and (c) counsel made unfulfillable promises about the amount of time Logan would actually serve in prison. If so, the court may again deny the motion, attaching to its order whatever exhibits it has relied upon. Otherwise, an evidentiary hearing may be necessary. Any party aggrieved by the subsequent action of the trial court must file a timely notice to obtain further appellate review.
Reversed.
RYDER, A.C.J., and FRANK and PATTERSON, JJ., concur.
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Cited By
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Carmichael v. State, 631 So. 2d 346 (Fla. 2d DCA 1994)…nt of Corrections that he is not eligible for controlled release and now seeks to withdraw his pleas for a trial on the merits. If his sworn assertion about his trial counsel’s misrepresentation is true, he may be entitled to relief. Logan v. State, 619 So. 2d 350 (Fla. 2d DCA 1993). We reverse and remand for an evidentiary hearing. In doing so, we find that the written plea form and the transcript of the plea colloquy attached to the trial court’s order do not conclusively refute Carmichael’s allegation of…
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Warren v. State, 638 So. 2d 156 (Fla. 2d DCA 1994)…a prison sentence is reason to allow withdrawal of a plea, when such misrepresentations induced the defendant to plead. See Carmichael v. State, 631 So. 2d 346 (Fla. 2d DCA 1994); Zduniak v. State, 620 So. 2d 1083 (Fla. 2d DCA 1993); Logan v. State, 619 So. 2d 350 (Fla. 2d DCA 1993). With regard to the first case, there is nothing in the record to conclusively refute Warren’s claim that “his plea[s] [were] undercut by incorrect promises about the actual duration of his sentence.” Zduniak, 620 So. 2d at 1084.…
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Inmon v. State, 642 So. 2d 1166 (Fla. 4th DCA 1994)…381 (Fla. 4th DCA 1993), rev. denied, 634 So. 2d 626 (Fla. 1994) (although a trial court has the authority to impose any sentence it might have imposed plus a bump up, it should be given an opportumty to express its intent clearly); Logan v. State, 619 So. 2d 350, 351 (Fla. 2d DCA 1993) (even though a trial court could bump up a defendant on resentencing, thus giving him the same sentence as before, it cannot be presumed that a trial court would impose the same sentence had the seoresheet errors been brought…
Authorities Cited
- Lomont v. State, 506 So. 2d 1141 (Fla. 2d DCA 1987)
- RAY v. State, 480 So. 2d 228 (Fla. 2d DCA 1985)
- Tarpley v. State, 566 So. 2d 914 (Fla. 2d DCA 1990)
- Lanier v. State, 478 So. 2d 1184 (Fla. 2d DCA 1985)
- Johnson v. State, 523 So. 2d 755 (Fla. 2d DCA 1988)
- Vann v. State, 569 So. 2d 867 (Fla. 2d DCA 1990)