STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLANT,
v.
LAWRENCE S. BROWN, APPELLEE

Fla. 2d DCA | 1993-05-26
No. 92-03920
THREADGILL and PATTERSON, JJ., concur.
619 So. 2d 378 Florida District Court of Appeal, Second District (1993) Positive Treatment
Cited by 14 cases

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Holding

The court held that the trial court erred in suppressing evidence because the appellee voluntarily consented to the search of his vehicle following a lawful traffic stop.


Facts & Procedural History

Following a valid traffic stop, an officer asked for and received the appellee's consent to search his vehicle. During the search, the officer discove…

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Opinion of the Court
HALL, Acting Chief Judge.

HALL, Acting Chief Judge.

The state contends the trial court erred in granting the appellee’s motion to suppress because the appellee consented to the search in question. We agree and reverse.

As the trial court found, there was a valid stop for a tag violation, which was not contested by the appellee. The trial court then, without considering the appel-lee’s consent to the search, granted the motion to suppress based on the lack of danger to the officer which would justify the search.

After the stop, the officer asked the appellee to step out of the vehicle, and the appellee complied. The officer then asked the appellee if he had any weapons, to which the appellee replied, no. Next, the officer asked the appellee if he would mind if the officer looked through his vehicle. The appellee gave the officer permission to look in the vehicle. Upon so looking, the officer noticed a piece of rock cocaine in plain view, where the appellee had been sitting.

There appears to be no dispute as to the appellee’s consent to the search of the vehicle; however, the appellee contends that the consent was rendered involuntary because he was detained illegally beyond the time necessary to issue a traffic citation. The record reflects a continuous sequence of events between the legal stop and the ensuing consent to search. We, therefore, find no merit in the appellee’s contention.

Since there was a proper stop and consent to search, the trial court erred in suppressing the search on the basis of lack of danger to the officer. See State v. Govea, 514 So. 2d 80 (Fla. 3d DCA 1987).

Accordingly, this case is reversed and remanded with directions to set aside the order granting the appellee’s motion to suppress.

THREADGILL and PATTERSON, JJ., concur.


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Cited By

  • Hall v. State, 643 So. 2d 635 (Fla. 1st DCA 1994)
    …. See also Arnett v. State, 591 So. 2d 1014 (Fla. 1st DCA 1992); and Priest v. State, 483 So. 2d 900 (Fla. 1st DCA 1986). In the instant case, the court below should have treated Hall’s motion as if filed pursuant to rule 3.850.1 See Young v. State, 619 So. 2d 378 (Fla. 2d DCA 1993); DeSantis v. State, 400 So. 2d 525 (Fla. 5th DCA 1981). We reverse and remand this cause with directions to attach those portions of the files and records conclusively showing that Hall is entitled to no relief, or, if the record…
  • Schebel v. State, 721 So. 2d 1177 (Fla. 1st DCA 1998)
    …obation. . Although appellant's motion was styled under rule 3.850, the courts have the authority to treat prisoner petitions as if the proper remedy had been sought. See Hall v. State, 643 So. 2d 635 (Fla. 1st DCA 1994) (on reh’g); Young v. State, 619 So. 2d 378 (Fla. 2d DCA 1993); DeSantis v. State, 400 So. 2d 525 (Fla. 5th DCA 1981).…
  • Jett v. State, 722 So. 2d 211 (Fla. 1st DCA 1998)
    …ule of Criminal Procedure 3.850 does not preclude relief from an illegal sentence because a “court can on its own decide the proper rule to use to correct the sentence.” DeSantis v. State, 400 So. 2d 525, 526 (Fla. 5th DCA 1981). See Young v. State, 619 So. 2d 378 (Fla. 2d DCA 1993). A court does not have jurisdiction to impose sentence in the absence of an “offense of which the defendant has been adjudged guilty.” Fla. R.Crim. P. 3.700. Such a sentence is illegal. “A court may at any time correct an illegal…

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