STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLANT,
v.
CHAUNCEY DAVIS, APPELLEE
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The Fourth District Court of Appeal affirmed the dismissal of escape charges against juvenile Chauncey Davis, holding that Florida's juvenile escape statute unconstitutionally delegates legislative authority to the Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services by granting unbridled discretion to classify facility restrictiveness levels without sufficient statutory standards.
The statute unconstitutionally delegates unbridled discretion to HRS without providing a sufficient substantive standard to guide the agency's classification of facilities. The delegation violates Article II, Section 3 of the Florida Constitution because the legislature prohibited the agency from exercising powers that the Constitution reserves to the legislature itself.
[1] A statute criminalizing escape from juvenile residential facilities is an unconstitutional delegation of legislative authority when it grants unbridled discretion to an a…
[2] The Florida Constitution prohibits the legislature from conferring upon administrative agencies authority that the constitution reserves to the legislature.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“Section 39.061 delegates unbridled discretion to HRS to say what the law of juvenile escape from residential facilities shall be without providing a sufficient substantive standard.”
Establishes the core constitutional violation—the statute grants the administrative agency too much discretion without adequate legislative standards.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceChauncey Davis was charged with violating section 39.061, Florida Statutes (1990), which made escape from secure detention or residential commitment f…
The full statement of facts, procedural history, and disposition for this case are member content.
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PER CURIAM.
We affirm an order dismissing escape charges against Chauncey Davis on the grounds that the provision of section 39.-061, Florida Statutes (Supp.1990), governing juvenile escape, constitutes an unconstitutional delegation of legislative authority. See D.P. v. State, 597 So. 2d 952 (Fla. 1st DCA 1992).
Davis was charged with violating the 1990 version of section 39.061, which provided:
An escape from any secure detention or any residential commitment facility of re-strietiveness level VI or above maintained for the treatment or rehabilitation of children found to have committed delinquent acts or violations of law constitutes escape within the intent and meaning of s. 944.40 and is a felony of the third degree.
Section 39.01(61) of the Florida Statutes defined restrictiveness level as:
The identification of broad custody categories for committed children, including nonresidential, residential, and secure residential. Specific placement in restrictiveness levels within these categories depends upon the risk and needs of the individual child. Restrictiveness levels must be established by the department by rule, provided, however that there shall be no more than eight levels.
As the First District held in D.P., section 39.061 violates Article II, Section 3 of the Florida Constitution, which mandates that no person belonging to one branch shall exercise any powers appertaining to either of the other branches. The legislature is prohibited from conferring upon administrative agencies authority which the constitution gives to the legislature itself. Florida State Bd. of Architecture v. Wasserman, 377 So. 2d 653, 655 (Fla.1979).
Section 39.061 delegates unbridled discretion to HRS to say what the law of juvenile escape from residential facilities shall be without providing a sufficient substantive standard. D.P., 597 So. 2d at 955. See also M.C. v. State, 595 So. 2d 1110 (Fla. 1st DCA 1992); S.H. v. State, 598 So. 2d 320 (Fla. 1st DCA 1992); D.W. v. State, 599 So. 2d 736 (Fla. 1st DCA 1992); J.G. v. State, 600 So. 2d 1144 (Fla. 1st DCA 1992). The D.P. court explained:
The statute does not mandate that all residential facilities shall be level VI or above. Indeed, it does not require that any residential facility shall be classified as level VI or above. In fact, HRS could have, in full conformity with the statutory language, decided that no nonresidential or residential facility should be classified as level VI or higher, thereby decriminalizing juvenile escape from residential programs altogether. The only substantive standard provided by the statute is the provision that escape from nonresidential facilities may not be criminalized by classifying such facilities as level VI or above.
597 So. 2d at 955. We concur with this reasoning and also find that the statute is unconstitutional.
STONE, POLEN and KLEIN, JJ., concur.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Cited By
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B.H. v. State, 622 So. 2d 615 (Fla. 5th DCA 1993)…ch B.H. was adjudicated to be a delinquent, section 39.061, Florida Statutes (Supp.1990), is unconstitutional for the reasons stated by the First District Court of Appeal in D.P. v. State, 597 So. 2d 952 (Fla. 1st DCA 1992). See also State v. Davis, 619 So. 2d 517 (Fla. 4th DCA 1993). Accordingly, I would reverse B.H.’s adjudication. I also think we should certify a conflict with D.P., as well as R.A.H. v. State, 614 So. 2d 1189 (Fla. 1st DCA 1993). Both D.P., and the child in this case, were adjudicated gui…
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B.M. v. State, 625 So. 2d 956 (Fla. 5th DCA 1993)…1 was constitutional for those juveniles who had been committed to a restrictiveness level VI or more, by the juvenile judge. I disagree that this circumstance saves the statute from [*957] the unconstitutional defects pointed out in State v. Davis, 619 So. 2d 517 (Fla. 4th DCA1993) and D.P. v. State, 597 So. 2d 952 (Fla. 1st DCA1992).1 Further, even if B.H. is correct on that point, the juveniles in this case were prosecuted under a repealed statute — a non-crime in 1992. That is sufficient to invalidate the…
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D.F. v. State, 623 So. 2d 867 (Fla. 5th DCA 1993)…ile judge set the restrictiveness levels. I disagree with that premise, as I have stated in my dissent in B.H., and I continue to note a conflict with our sister courts. See D.P. v. State, 597 So. 2d 952 (Fla. 1st DCA 1992). See also State v. Davis, 619 So. 2d 517 (Fla. 4th DCA 1993); State v. Brower, 608 So. 2d 536 (Fla. 2d DCA 1992). However, that leaves us in this case with a situation where a juvenile defendant has been charged and convicted under a nonexistent criminal statute. Section 39.112 was repeal…
Previewing 3 of 5 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- In the Interest of B.H. v. State, 597 So. 2d 952 (Fla. 1st DCA 1992)
- In the Interest of D.P. v. State, 597 So. 2d 952 (Fla. 1st DCA 1992)
- The Fla. State Bd. OF Architecture & the Dep't of Prof'l & Occupational Reg. v. Wasserman, 377 So. 2d 653 (Fla. 1979)
- In the Interest of S.H. v. State, 598 So. 2d 320 (Fla. 1st DCA 1992)
- In the Interest of D.W. v. State, 599 So. 2d 736 (Fla. 1st DCA 1992)
- In the Interest of J.G. v. State, 600 So. 2d 1144 (Fla. 1st DCA 1992)
- Hampton v. Payne, 600 So. 2d 1144 (Fla. 3d DCA 1992)
- M.O. v. State, 595 So. 2d 1110 (Fla. 3d DCA 1992)
- In the Interest of M.C. v. State, 595 So. 2d 1110 (Fla. 1st DCA 1992)