EUSEBIO RODRIGUEZ, APPELLANT,
v.
THE STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
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Eusebio Rodriguez appeals his conviction for attempted second-degree murder, challenging the trial court's allowance of impeachment testimony based on his pre-arrest silence. The court affirmed, holding that use of pre-arrest, pre-Miranda silence to impeach a defendant's credibility does not violate the Fifth Amendment.
The use of pre-arrest, pre-Miranda silence to impeach a defendant's credibility does not violate the Fifth Amendment. When a defendant testifies at trial and his testimony differs from his spontaneous statements to police, the State may properly impeach the inconsistent testimony by inquiring into the defendant's prior silence on the matter.
[1] The use of pre-arrest silence to impeach a defendant's credibility does not violate the Constitution.
[2] Impeaching a defendant's credibility with pre-Miranda silence is proper because a police officer has not yet assured the defendant that such silence cannot be used agains…
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“The use of pre-arrest silence to impeach a defendant's credibility does not violate the Constitution.”
Establishes the core holding that pre-arrest silence may be used for impeachment purposes without Fifth Amendment violation.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAfter an argument with his wife, Rodriguez retrieved a gun and attempted to shoot her. The gun misfired on the first attempt but fired on the second, …
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PER CURIAM.
Appellant, Eusebio Rodriguez (Rodriguez), appeals from his conviction of attempted second degree murder with a firearm. We affirm.
This case concerns whether using a defendant’s pre-arrest silence to impeach his credibility violates a defendant’s Fifth Amendment rights.
The facts are brief. After an argument with his wife, Rodriguez went to a closet and brought out a gun. Although Rodriguez initially aimed the gun at his wife’s chest, the gun misfired. On a second attempt at firing the gun, Rodriguez shot his wife in the leg.
Rodriguez then called the police. When the officer arrived, Rodriguez immediately told the officer that he had “shot his wife and was turning himself in.”
At trial, Rodriguez testified that the shooting was accidental. Over objection, the trial court allowed appellee, the State, to cross-examine Rodriguez about whether Rodriguez told the officer that the shooting was accidental. Rodriguez replied that he failed to tell the officer that the shooting was accidental.
Rodriguez contends that the State’s inquiry into his failure to inform the officer that the shooting was accidental violated his Fifth Amendment right. The State asserts that there is no Fifth Amendment violation when impeaching a defendant’s credibility by using his pre-arrest, pr e-Miranda silence.
“The use of pre-arrest silence to impeach a defendant’s credibility does not violate the Constitution.” Jenkins v. Anderson, 447 U.S. 231, 240, 100 S.Ct. 2124, 2130, 65 L.Ed.2d 86, 96 (1980). Impeaching a defendant’s credibility with pre-Miranda silence is proper because a police officer has yet to assure the defendant that such silence cannot be used against him. Brecht v. Abrahamson, — U.S.-, 113 S.Ct. 1710, 123 L.Ed.2d 353 (1993).
Here, as in Jenkins and Brecht, when Rodriguez first claimed the shooting was accidental at trial, it was proper for the State to impeach his testimony by inquiring whether Rodriguez had previously told the officer that the shooting was accidental.
In addition, a defendant’s right to remain silent is not violated when a defendant testifies in his own defense and is impeached with his prior silence. Jenkins, 447 U.S. at 238, 100 S.Ct. at 2129. Under these circumstances, “impeachment follows the defendant’s own decision to cast aside the cloak of silence and advances the truth-finding function of the criminal trial.” Id.
When Rodriguez’s trial statement differed from his spontaneous statements to the officer, the State’s inquiry into the appellant’s pre-Miranda silence was proper in order to impeach the inconsistent testimony.
Affirmed.
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State v. Hoggins, 718 So. 2d 761 (Fla. 1998)…ial, pre-Miranda silence violated the due process guarantees found in article I, section 9 of the Florida Constitution.4 Hoggins, 689 So. 2d at 384-86. The court recognized that its decision might be construed as conflicting with Rodriguez v. State, 619 So. 2d 1031 (Fla. 3d DCA 1993), review denied, 629 So. 2d 135 (Fla.1993), which found that impeachment with a defendant’s prearrest, pr e-Miranda silence did not violate the Fifth Amendment of the United States Constitution. Accordingly, the court certified the…1 / 2
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Parker v. State, 641 So. 2d 483 (Fla. 5th DCA 1994)…emean- or and actions did not indicate surprise. Further, once the defendant has taken the stand, the prosecution may prove his pre arrest and pre Miranda silence if such silence is inconsistent with his “at trial” testimony. See Rodriquez v. State, 619 So. 2d 1031 (Fla. 3d DCA), rev. denied, 629 So. 2d 135 (Fla.1993). During closing argument, the prosecutor stated: Ladies and Gentlemen, I submit to you, if somebody has been accused of trafficking a half a pound of cocaine, when their day in court comes they…
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Horwitz v. State, 189 So. 3d 800 (Fla. 4th DCA 2015)…ilence is not inconsistent .with his or her exculpatory statement at trial then the [silence] lacks probative value and is inadmissible. Id. at 770-71 (emphasis added; citations omitted). The prosecutor in this case relied upon Rodriguez v. State, 619 So. 2d 1031 (Fla. 3d DCA 1993), disapproved in part by State v. Hoggins, 718 So. 2d 761 (Fla.1998), to argue that pre-arrest, pre-Miranda silence was admissible. But Rodriguez merely held that the use of pre-arrest silence to impeach a defendant’s credibility d…
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619 (U.S. 1993)
- Jenkins v. Anderson, 447 U.S. 231 (U.S. 1980)