MARK A. DAVIS, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
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On remand from the U.S. Supreme Court, the Florida Supreme Court affirmed Davis's death sentence despite a constitutional defect in the jury instruction regarding the "heinous, atrocious or cruel" aggravating factor. The Court held that the instruction's vagueness was procedurally barred because not raised before the trial judge, and alternatively found any error harmless beyond a reasonable doubt given the horrific nature of the murder.
The vagueness of the instruction was barred because Davis did not raise it before the trial judge, objecting only to the applicability of the factor rather than the wording of the instruction. Alternatively, any instructional error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt given the brutal, premeditated nature of the crime.
[1] A claim that a jury instruction on an aggravating factor is unconstitutionally vague is procedurally barred if not raised before the trial judge.
[2] An unconstitutionally vague jury instruction on an aggravating factor is harmless error beyond a reasonable doubt if the facts of the case are so indicative of the aggrav…
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“These facts are so indicative of the aggravating factor "heinous, atrocious, or cruel" that we are convinced upon review that there is no reasonable possibility that the faulty instruction contributed to the sentence.”
Establishes the harmless error analysis applied by the Court to affirm despite instructional defect
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceDavis murdered a victim with 25 stab wounds to the back, chest, and neck, multiple blows to the face, and strangulation injuries causing a broken hyoi…
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PER CURIAM.
In Davis v. Florida, — U.S. -, 112 S.Ct. 3021, 120 L.Ed.2d 893 (1992), the United States Supreme Court vacated judgment and remanded this case for our consideration in light of Espinosa v. Florida, — U.S. -, 112 S.Ct. 2926, 120 L.Ed.2d 854 (1992), in which the Court declared our former standard jury instruction on the “heinous, atrocious or cruel” aggravating factor constitutionally inadequate.1 We find that the issue is barred because vagueness of the instruction was not raised before the trial judge.2 Thompson v. State, 619 So. 2d 261, (Fla.1993); Ponticelli v. State, 618 So. 2d 154 (Fla.1993). We moreover find that, had the vagueness issue been preserved, the error would be harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.
The facts are recited in our opinion in the direct appeal.
The medical examiner testified that the victim sustained [twenty-five] stab wounds to the back, chest, and neck; multiple blows to the face; was choked or hit with sufficient force to break his hyoid bone; was intoxicated to a degree that impaired his ability to defend himself; and was alive and conscious when each injury was inflicted. The evidence showed that the slashes to the victim’s throat were made with a small-bladed knife, which was broken during the attack, and the wounds to the chest and back were made with a large butcher knife, found at the crime scene.
Davis, 586 So. 2d at 1040. These facts are so indicative of the aggravating factor “heinous, atrocious, or cruel” that we are convinced upon review that there is no reasonable possibility that the faulty instruction contributed to the sentence. We are satisfied that under any instruction, on the instant facts the jury would have recommended and the judge would have imposed the same sentence.3 See State v. DiGuilio, 491 So. 2d 1129, 1138 (Fla.1986); see also Slawson v. State, 619 So. 2d 255, 260 - 261 (Fla.1993) (inadequate instruction harmless where murder was heinous, atrocious, or cruel under any definition of those terms); Thompson v. State, 619 So. 2d 261, 267 (Fla.1993) (same).
Accordingly, we affirm the death sentence.
It is so ordered.
BARKETT, C.J., and OVERTON, McDonald, SHAW, GRIMES and KOGAN, JJ., concur. HARDING, J., did not participate in this ease.
. Davis’ jury was given the instruction found to be impermissibly vague in Espinosa v. Florida, - U.S. -, 112 S.Ct. 2926, 120 L.Ed.2d 854 (1992). Davis raised the vagueness of the statute in his direct appeal. Davis v. State, 586 So. 2d 1038, 1040 (Fla.1991), vacated, — U.S. -, 112 S.Ct. 3021, 120 L.Ed.2d 893 (1992). We summarily rejected the argument without addressing the procedural bar. Id.
. There was no objection at trial made to the wording of the "heinous, atrocious, or cruel” instruction. The objection went only to the applicability of that factor to the case.
. The jury recommended death by a vote of eight to four. Davis v. State, 586 So. 2d 1038, 1039 (Fla.1991). The trial court found four aggravating and no mitigating circumstances. Id. at 1040 & n. 2. The aggravating circumstances found in accordance with section 921.-141(5), Florida Statutes (1985), were that the murder was cold, calculated, and premeditated; was heinous, atrocious, or cruel; was committed while under sentence of imprisonment; and appellant was previously convicted of a capital felony or felony involving the use or threat of violence. Id.
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Perez v. State, 919 So. 2d 347 (Fla. 2005)…eyond a reasonable doubt that Susan Martin was alive and conscious during some of the multiple stab wounds, and the State has proven beyond a reasonable doubt that her murder was unnecessarily torturous, conscienceless, and pitiless. Davis v. State, 620 So. 2d 152 (Fla.1993); Pittman v. State, 646 So. 2d 167 (Fla.1994); Francis v. State, 808 So. 2d 110 (Fla.2002). The evidence presented at trial through the admission of the medical examiner’s testimony and Perez’s statement to the police supports the above f…
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Davis v. State, 928 So. 2d 1089 (Fla. 2005)…mining that the Espinosa issue was proeedurally barred because vagueness of the instruction was not presented to the trial judge and that had the issue been presented, any error would have been harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. See Davis v. State, 620 So. 2d 152 (Fla.1993). In February of 1994, certiorari was denied by the United States Supreme Court. See Davis v. Florida, 510 U.S. 1170, 114 S.Ct. 1205, 127 L.Ed.2d 552 (1994). MOTION FOR POSTCONVICTION RELIEF On May 4, 2000, Davis filed an amended rule 3.…
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Davis v. State, 26 So. 3d 519 (Fla. 2009)…is v. Florida, 505 U.S. 1216, 112 S.Ct. 3021, 120 L.Ed.2d 893 (1992). The High Court vacated the judgment and re [*525] manded to this Court for further' consideration. See id. On remand, this Court reaffirmed the death sentence. See Davis v. State, 620 So. 2d 152 (Fla.1993) (Davis ID, cert. denied, 510 U.S. 1170, 114 S.Ct. 1205, 127 L.Ed.2d 552 (1994). Next, Davis filed an initial motion for postconviction relief which the trial court denied. Davis sought review of that order in this Court and also filed hi…
Previewing 3 of 7 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- State v. DiGUILIO, 491 So. 2d 1129 (Fla. 1986)
- Espinosa v. Florida, 505 U.S. 1079 (U.S. 1992)
- Thompson v. State, 619 So. 2d 261 (Fla. 1993)
- Ponticelli v. State, 618 So. 2d 154 (Fla. 1993)
- Newton Carlton Slawson v. State, 619 So. 2d 255 (Fla. 1993)
- Davis v. State, 586 So. 2d 1038 (Fla. 1991)