GENERAL DEVELOPMENT UTILITIES, INC.; GENERAL DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION; BARCLAY'S BANK PLC; BANKAMERICA TRUST COMPANY, N.A.; SECURITY PACIFIC NATIONAL BANK; CHEMICAL BANK; IRVING TRUST COMPANY AND VICTOR DESGUIN, CHARLOTTE COUNTY TAX COLLECTOR, APPELLANTS,
v.
CHARLOTTE COUNTY, FLORIDA, APPELLEE
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In this eminent domain case, the court reverses a non-final order that excluded contributed property (so-called Contributions in Aid of Construction) from the valuation of G.D.U.'s utility system being condemned by Charlotte County. The court holds that Florida Supreme Court precedent in Dade County v. General Waterworks Corp. clearly establishes that such contributed property must be included in determining just compensation.
The court holds that contributed property must be included in determining the full and fair compensation owed to the utility company in an eminent domain proceeding. This ruling is mandated by the Florida Supreme Court's clear precedent in Dade County v. General Waterworks Corp., which established that condemnation of utility property must be distinguished from rate-making cases and that contributed property cannot be excluded from the just compensation calculation.
[1] Contributions in Aid of Construction (C.I.A.C.) property must be included in the determination of just compensation in an eminent domain proceeding for the condemnation o…
[2] Eminent domain proceedings for the condemnation of utility property are distinct from utility rate-making processes, and rate-making concepts cannot be used as a basis fo…
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“The condemnation of utility property is entirely different from the rate-making process. The complete dissimilarity between rate-making concepts and the just or full compensation standards which govern eminent domain have resulted in rejection of attempts to equate rate-making with eminent domain as a basis for determining fair market value.”
Establishes the fundamental distinction between eminent domain valuation and rate-making, requiring inclusion of contributed property in condemnation compensation
Previewing 1 of 2 key quotes on this case — the court’s exact language, pinpointed for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceGeneral Development Utilities, Inc. (G.D.U.) owned a utility system providing water, sewer, and L.P. gas services in Charlotte County, Florida. Charlo…
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CAMPBELL, Acting Chief Judge.
Appellants, General Development Utilities, Inc. (G.D.U.) and General Development Corporation (G.D.C.), appeal the non-final order arising out of an eminent domain proceeding that limited the amount of compensation to be paid G.D.U. by appel-lee, Charlotte County, Florida (Charlotte County), for its condemnation of G.D.U.’s utility system (water, sewer and L.P. gas). We reverse.
The order on appeal excluded all properties acquired by G.D.U. as so-called Contributions in Aid of Construction (C.I.A.C. or “contributed property”) from the determination of the amount of compensation G.D.U. was to be paid as full and fair compensation for its condemned properties to be acquired by Charlotte County. Such a ruling is directly contrary to the only clear supreme court ruling in this regard. See Dade County v. Gen. Waterworks Corp., 267 So. 2d 633 (Fla.1972). General Waterworks is specifically on point, and we are bound to follow its precedent. See Hoffman v. Jones, 280 So. 2d 431 (Fla.1973).
In an attempt to distinguish General Waterworks, Charlotte County relies upon such cases as Sarasota County v. Tamaron Utils., Inc., 429 So. 2d 322 (Fla.2d DCA 1983), quashed and remanded, 460 So. 2d 347 (Fla.1984); Village of North Palm Beach v. Mason, 188 So. 2d 778 (Fla.1966); City of Plantation v. Mason, 170 So. 2d 441 (Fla.1964); and Florida Cities Water Co. v. Board of County Commissioners of Sarasota County, 334 So. 2d 622, 625 (Fla.2d DCA), app. dismissed, 341 So. 2d 1081 (Fla.1976). However, those are rate-making cases which, according to General Waterworks, must be clearly distinguished from eminent domain cases regarding the use of C.I.A.C. property:
The condemnation of utility property is entirely different from the rate-making process. The complete dissimilarity between rate-making concepts and the just or full compensation standards which govern eminent domain have resulted in rejection of attempts to equate rate-making with eminent domain as a basis for determining fair market value.
267 So. 2d at 640. Cf. Duval Util. Co. v. Florida Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 380 So. 2d 1028 (Fla.1980).
Being bound by the clear precedent of General Waterworks, we reverse and remand for further proceedings consistent herewith.
SCHOONOVER and THREADGILL, JJ„ concur.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Cited By
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Gen. Dev. Utils. v. ST. Lucie Cnty., 641 So. 2d 198 (Fla. 4th DCA 1994)…PER CURIAM. We reverse and remand for further proceedings in accord with the decisions in Dade County v. General Waterworks Corp., 267 So. 2d 633 (Fla.1972), and General Development Utilities, Inc. v. Charlotte County, 620 So. 2d 1035 (Fla. 2d DCA), rev. denied, 630 So. 2d 1098 (Fla.1993). ANSTEAD, GLICKSTEIN and STONE, JJ., concur.…
Authorities Cited
- Hoffman v. Jones, 280 So. 2d 431 (Fla. 1973)
- Duval Util. Co. v. The Fla. Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 380 So. 2d 1028 (Fla. 1980)
- Dade Cnty. v. Gen. Waterworks Corp., 267 So. 2d 633 (Fla. 1972)
- Sarasota Cnty. v. Tamaron Utils., Inc., 429 So. 2d 322 (Fla. 2d DCA 1983)
- City OF Plantation v. Mason, 170 So. 2d 441 (Fla. 1964)
- Vill. OF N. Palm Beach v. Mason, 188 So. 2d 778 (Fla. 1966)
- Fla. Cities Water Co. v. Bd. OF Cnty. Comm'rs OF Sarasota Cnty., 334 So. 2d 622 (Fla. 2d DCA 1976)
- Tamaron Homeowners Ass'n, Inc. v. Tamaron Utils., Inc., 460 So. 2d 347 (Fla. 1984)