NORMAN DREESE, APPELLANT,
v.
CRAFTSMAN AUTO ELECTRIC, INC., APPELLEE
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Florida appellate court reversed a trial court's reduction of attorney's fees from $20,745 to $10,000, holding that a default judgment constitutes full success on the claim and does not justify reducing the lodestar figure, and remanded for recalculation without the erroneous reduction.
A trial court may not reduce attorney's fees based on the lodestar method merely because judgment was obtained by default when the prevailing party succeeded on its entire claim.
[1] Under the lodestar method for calculating attorney's fees, a trial court may reduce the award based on results obtained only when the prevailing party succeeds on some cl…
[2] A trial court must address and consider the contingency risk factor when awarding attorney's fees under a contingency fee agreement, even if ultimately declining to apply…
Previewing 2 of 2 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“The 'results obtained' may reduce the lodestar, but only if the prevailing party is successful on a claim, and unsuccessful on other unrelated claims.”
Explaining the limited circumstances under which lodestar reduction is permitted under Rowe.
Dreese's attorney spent 138.3 hours on a case at a reasonable rate of $150 per hour, yielding a lodestar of $20,745. The trial court awarded only $10,…
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PER CURIAM.
Norman Dreese appeals an award of $10,000.00 as attorney’s fees pursuant to a contingency fee agreement. Although the trial court found that the attorney had reasonably spent 138.3 hours on this case, and that $150.00 per hour was a reasonable fee, the trial court only awarded attorney’s fees in the amount of $10,000.00, as opposed to $20,745.00. The trial court reduced the award for the stated reason that the judgment was obtained by default. Under Florida Patient’s Compensation Fund v. Rowe, 472 So. 2d 1145 (Fla.1985), this was error. The supreme court held in Rowe that a trial court may reduce a lodestar figure depending on the “results obtained.” The “results obtained” may reduce the lodestar, but only if the prevailing party is successful on a claim, and unsuccessful on other unrelated claims. Id. at 1151. In the instant case, the appellant was successful on its entire claim. Therefore, the trial court erred when it reduced the lodestar. Upon remand, the trial court should enter attorney’s fees in the amount of $20,745.00.
In addition, the trial court failed to consider a contingency risk factor when awarding attorney’s fees. Under Standard Guaranty Insurance Co. v. Quanstrom, 555 So. 2d 828 (Fla.1990), this too was error. Though the trial court does not have to impose a contingency risk factor, the trial court must address this factor upon remand. Id. at 831.
REVERSED AND REMANDED WITH INSTRUCTIONS. HERSEY and GUNTHER, JJ., concur. STONE, J., dissents with opinion.
STONE, Judge,
dissenting.
I would affirm. In my judgment it is not an abuse of discretion for the trial court to limit Plaintiffs attorney’s fee to $10,000 on a claim for $7,000 in commissions owed. There is no reason why a trial court may not consider the amount of the claim and judgment relative to the fee awarded, the nature of the action, and the fact that no trial was required, in arriving at a reasonable fee, notwithstanding that the time expended by counsel and the hourly rate sought are otherwise reasonable.
I also cannot read Rowe and Quanstrom as mandating an explanation of why no “multiplier” was applied where the fee awarded by the court is already three times higher than the amount counsel would receive on a one-third contingency payable out of the recovery.
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Am. Sign Co. v. Falconer, 696 So. 2d 473 (Fla. 2d DCA 1997)…American Sign was successful in its entire claim — the only issue relevant to the “results obtained” criterion. See Danis Indus. Corp. v. Ground Improvement Techniques, Inc., 629 So. 2d 985 (Fla. 5th DCA 1993); Dreese v. Craftsman Auto Elec., Inc., 620 So. 2d 1097 (Fla. 4th DCA 1993); but see Dreese, 620 So. 2d at 1098 (Stone, J. dissenting). None of the criteria described in Rowe permit a trial court to reduce an award of attorney’s fees because the fees are disproportionate to the amount of the claim or jud…
Authorities Cited
- Fla. Patient's Comp. Fund v. Rowe, 472 So. 2d 1145 (Fla. 1985)
- Standard Guar. Ins. Co. v. Quanstrom, 555 So. 2d 828 (Fla. 1990)