JAMES VICTOR HARRELSON, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
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James Victor Harrelson appealed his sentence imposed after pleading nolo contendere to violation of probation. The court affirmed that he was not entitled to double credit for 141 days previously awarded, but reversed and remanded regarding credit for time served in county jail pending the VOP resolution and to ensure the written sentence reflected the oral credit award for the original incarcerative term.
Harrelson is not entitled to a second award of 141 days credit, as he already received the benefit of that credit against the original 3-year incarcerative term. The trial court's oral award of credit for the original incarcerative term was proper but must be reflected in the written sentence. The trial court erred in failing to award credit for time spent in jail pending resolution of the VOP proceeding, and this credit must be calculated and awarded on remand.
[1] A defendant is not entitled to a second award of jail time credit when the benefit of that credit was already applied against a prior incarcerative term.
[2] A written sentence must conform to the trial court's oral pronouncement regarding the award of jail time credit.
Previewing 2 of 3 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“We agree that Harrelson is not entitled to a second award of 141 of days credit, in that the benefit of such credit was enjoyed against the original 3-year incarcerative term.”
Establishes that jail time credit, once applied to one sentence, cannot be double-credited against a subsequent sentence.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceIn April 1990, Harrelson pled nolo contendere to attempted armed robbery and received 3 years incarceration plus 12 years probation with 141 days jail…
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PER CURIAM.
James Victor Harrelson has appealed the sentence imposed after he pled nolo conten-dere to violation of probation. We affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand with directions.
In April 1990, Harrelson pled nolo con-tendere to attempted armed robbery. He received 3 years of incarceration followed by 12 years of probation, with 141 days of jail time credit. He completed the incarcer-ative portion of the sentence and, in March 1992, an affidavit of violation of probation (VOP) was filed.
In September 1992, the trial court revoked probation, and sentenced Harrelson to 9 years of incarceration. As to the incarcerative portion of the original sentence, the court orally awarded “the credit that he’s entitled to according to the determination of the Department of Corrections.” Harrelson also argued that he was entitled to credit for time spent in county jail between the VOP arrest and sentencing, but there was no oral award of that credit. The written sentence reflects no credit whatever. Harrelson argues that he is entitled to an award of credit for: 1) the incarcerative portion of the original sentence; 2) the county jail time served between the VOP arrest and sentencing; and 3) the 141 days of jail time credit awarded at the 1990 sentencing. The state concedes that Har-relson-must be credited with the county jail time following the VOP arrest. As for the remaining credit, the state points out that the trial court orally awarded Harrelson credit for the incarcerative portion of the original sentence, and that he has already received the benefit of the 141 days of credit against the original period of incarceration.
We agree that Harrelson is not entitled to a second award of 141 of days credit, in that the benefit of such credit was enjoyed against the original 3-year incarcerative term. We therefore affirm as to this issue. While we also affirm the trial court’s action with regard to credit for the original incarcerative term, we remand with directions to conform the written sentence to the court’s oral pronouncement awarding the credit. See Cecil v. State, 614 So. 2d 603 (Fla. 1st DCA 1993). The state concedes that the trial court erred in failing to award credit for time spent in jail pending resolution of the instant revocation proceeding. See also Townsend v. State, 604 So. 2d 541 (Fla.2d DCA 1992). On remand, the trial court shall calculate and award such credit.
Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded with directions.
JOANOS, MINER and WEBSTER, JJ., concur.
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Kitchen v. State, 644 So. 2d 150 (Fla. 1st DCA 1994)…n November 17, 1993, and to reinstate the original sentence. Additionally, the sentence should reflect that the appellant is entitled to credit for all time previously served in the Department of Corrections on these charges. See Harrelson v. State, 620 So. 2d 1131 (Fla. 1st DCA 1993). The amended sentencing order failed to provide for this credit. BOOTH, WOLF and MICKLE, JJ., concur. . The only appropriate mechanism for the state to challenge an improper sentence is by filing a timely notice of appeal. Gart…
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Raiford Pierce v. State, 676 So. 2d 69 (Fla. 1st DCA 1996)…n the arrest for violation of probation.” The record reveals that Pierce spent at least 238 days in confinement.1 The judge’s written order however awards Pierce only 180 days’ credit. The oral pronouncement of sentence controls. Harrelson v. State, 620 So. 2d 1131 (Fla. 1st DCA 1993). We therefore affirm the revocation of Pierce’s probation, and affirm his forty-two-month prison sentence. We however reverse his sentence insofar as it awards only 180 days’ credit for time served, and remand for a determinatio…
Authorities Cited
- Glinder Lee Cecil v. State, 614 So. 2d 603 (Fla. 1st DCA 1993)
- Townsend v. State, 604 So. 2d 541 (Fla. 2d DCA 1992)