MANFRED BREMSHEY, APPELLANT,
v.
LAWRENCE A. MORRISON AND ELLEN F. MORRISON, HIS WIFE; ROBERT G. FERRETTI AND ANNA E. FERRETTI, HIS WIFE; PATRICK M. CROWLEY AND JOAN F. CROWLEY, HIS WIFE; AND PEBBLE BEACH VILLAGE HOMEOWNERS ASSOCIATES, A FLORIDA CORPORATION, NOT FOR PROFIT, APPELLEES
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Bremshey appeals a trial court's award of attorney's fees under Florida Statute § 57.105 and prejudgment interest on those fees. The appellate court affirmed the attorney's fees award but reversed the prejudgment interest award, holding that when a court simultaneously determines entitlement to and sets the amount of attorney's fees in a single judgment, prejudgment interest cannot be awarded.
Prejudgment interest cannot be awarded on attorney's fees when the trial court's judgment simultaneously determines both the entitlement to and the amount of the fees. Prejudgment interest accrues only from the date the entitlement to attorney's fees is determined, but when both entitlement and amount are determined in the same judgment, no gap exists for prejudgment interest to accrue.
[1] A party is entitled to attorney's fees under section 57.105, Florida Statutes, when their opponent's defenses fail to raise a justiciable issue of law or fact.
[2] Prejudgment interest may be awarded on attorney's fees when the entitlement to such fees is determined by the court.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“When a court makes a determination which triggers a party's entitlement to an award of attorney's fees, the date of this determination fixes the date for awarding prejudgment interest on previously incurred attorney's fees, even though the actual amount of the award has not yet been determined.”
Establishes the general rule for when prejudgment interest accrues on attorney's fees
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceThe trial court determined that Bremshey's defenses failed to raise a justiciable issue of law or fact, making him liable for appellees' attorney's fe…
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DIAMANTIS, Judge.
Appellant appeals the trial court’s judgment awarding attorney’s fees to appellees pursuant to section 57.105, Florida Statutes (1989), and awarding prejudgment interest on such fees. We affirm the award of attorney’s fees but reverse the award of prejudgment interest.
In its judgment, the trial court determined that appellant’s defenses failed to raise a justiciable issue of law or fact and, thus, that appellees were entitled to recover attorney’s fees from appellant under section 57.105. The trial court’s judgment also set the amount of the attorney’s fees and awarded prejudgment interest on this amount. When a court makes a determination which triggers a party’s entitlement to an award of attorney's fees, the date of this determination fixes the date for awarding prejudgment interest on previously incurred attorney's fees, even though the actual amount of the award has not yet been determined. Mason v. Reiter, 564 So. 2d 142 (Fla. 3d DCA 1990); Inacio v. State Farm Fire & Casualty Co., 550 So. 2d 92 (Fla. 1st DCA 1989). In the instant case, appellees’ entitlement to an award of attorney’s fees was determined when the trial court found in its final judgment that appellant’s defenses failed to raise a justiciable issue of law or fact. In the same judgment, the trial court also established the amount of the award of attorney’s fees. Because the trial court’s judgment had the effect of simultaneously determining appellant’s liability for, and setting the amount of, attorney’s fees, the trial court erred in awarding prejudgment interest in this case. Accordingly, we reverse the award of prejudgment interest and strike such award from the final judgment.
AFFIRMED in part and REVERSED in part.
SHARP and GRIFFIN, JJ., concur.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Mason v. Reiter, 564 So. 2d 142 (Fla. 3d DCA 1990)
- Inacio v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 550 So. 2d 92 (Fla. 1st DCA 1989)