STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLANT,
v.
VERNON LEE BROWN, APPELLEE

Fla. 5th DCA | 1993-06-25
No. 92-2305
DIAMANTIS, J., and STROKER, R.J., Associate Judge, concur.
622 So. 2d 17 Florida District Court of Appeal, Fifth District (1993) Positive Treatment
Cited by 6 cases

AI-generated. These summaries, headnotes, and key points are machine-generated and may contain errors or omissions. Always verify against the full opinion text below. Not legal advice.

Synopsis

Vernon Lee Brown pleaded guilty as a habitual offender and was sentenced to 15 years. Over a year after commencing his sentence, he filed a motion to withdraw his plea, claiming he did not understand the consequences, particularly the loss of gain time. The trial court granted the motion, but the appellate court reversed, finding the record did not support Brown's claim of lack of understanding at the time of plea.


Holding

The appellate court reversed, finding that the record did not support the trial court's finding that Brown lacked understanding of the consequences of his plea. The court held that Brown's mere allegation of confusion, made over a year after sentencing, without corroborating evidence that he was under the influence or actually confused at the time of the plea, was insufficient to support withdrawal of the plea.


Headnotes

[1] A defendant's post-sentencing regret or dissatisfaction with a plea agreement does not, in itself, establish a lack of understanding of the consequences of the plea at th…

[2] A trial court's finding that a defendant did not fully understand the consequences of a plea agreement must be supported by evidence in the record beyond the defendant's…

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Key Quotes

“There is nothing in the record, save Brown's general allegation that he did not fully understand and appreciate the consequences of his plea, that supports the trial court's finding. To permit the withdrawal of the plea in this case, based on the record before the trial judge, would make every negotiated plea, (or any plea for that matter) voidable by the defendant at any time by merely alleging that he was confused.”

Establishes the standard requiring more than mere allegation of confusion to support plea withdrawal; protects finality of negotiated pleas

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Facts & Procedural History

Brown pleaded guilty to burglary of a structure, escape from a law enforcement officer, and possession of drug paraphernalia. Pursuant to a plea agree…

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Opinion of the Court
HARRIS, Judge.

HARRIS, Judge.

Vernon Lee Brown pled guilty to burglary of a structure, escape from a law enforcement officer, and possession of drug paraphernalia and was, pursuant to a plea agreement, sentenced as an habitual offender to fifteen years in prison, suspended upon completion of five years on probation. One of the conditions of probation was that Brown would continue attending a drug treatment program.

Brown violated his probation by discontinuing the drug treatment program. The suspension of the previously imposed sentence was revoked, and Brown was committed to prison to serve the fifteen-year sentence. Over a year later, he filed a 3.850 motion contending that he did not fully understand the consequence of his original plea agreement — specifically that he would not receive normal gain time as an habitual offender. After hearing, the trial court found:

1) The Defendant was effectively and competently represented by attorney Don Gleason, however,

2) The Defendant did not have a thorough understanding or appreciation of the consequences of his plea as an Habitual Felony Offender. The court, therefore, permitted Brown to withdraw his plea. The State appeals and we reverse.

There is nothing in the record, save Brown’s general allegation that he did not fully understand and appreciate the consequences of his plea, that supports the trial court’s finding. To permit the withdrawal of the plea in this case, based on the record before the trial judge, would make every negotiated plea, (or any plea for that matter) voidable by the defendant at any time by merely alleging that he was confused.

Consider the facts of this case. Attorney Gleason testified that he had advised Brown about the loss of gain time if he pleaded as an habitual offender. At his plea, Brown expressed satisfaction with his attorney and assured the court that he was not under the influence of drugs or alcohol. Brown waited a year after commencing his sentence to complain:

Now that the Court has sentenced me as a habitual criminal I have had time to think about it. And it leads me now to see that fifteen years as a habitual criminal — not even, you know, having shot anyone, not committing any robbery, not store robberies, any of these things that, Your Honor, that’s — that’s a pretty long time to really sit back and take — for eleven years just for using drugs and being charged with a charge of a Grand Theft and a Burglary, you know, which actually nothing really was — property over a value of a thousand dollars wasn’t even took.

It is apparent that Brown, on reflection, felt he had not made the greatest deal. But the record does not support the finding that Brown did not understand, at the time of his plea and sentence, the deal that he made. He does not say, for example, that he was under the influence of anything either when he pled or when he was sentenced. He merely claims that he was suffering withdrawal symptoms and was confused.

The record does not support a finding that Brown did not understand the consequences of his plea; it merely shows that he no longer wished to be bound by it.

REVERSED and REMANDED.

DIAMANTIS, J., and STROKER, R.J., Associate Judge, concur.


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Citator

Cited By

  • Gillis v. State, 807 So. 2d 204 (Fla. 5th DCA 2002)
    …359 (Fla.1984); Montgomery v. State, 615 So. 2d 226 (Fla. 5th DCA 1993). A general claim by a defendant that he did not fully understand the consequences of his plea is insufficient to entitle the defendant to postconviction relief. State v. Brown, 622 So. 2d 17 (Fla. 5th DCA 1993). The written plea agreement and transcript of the plea hearing attached to the trial court’s order denying Gillis’s postconviction motion conclusively refute the claim that his plea was not knowingly and voluntarily entered. An i…
  • Davis v. State, 783 So. 2d 288 (Fla. 5th DCA 2001)
    …rmatively stated under oath that he had both sold and delivered the cocaine as charged. Furthermore, Davis has failed to cite to any statutory or case law which supports his claim. Accordingly, we affirm the trial court’s ruling. See State v. Brown, 622 So. 2d 17 (Fla. 5th DCA 1993). Judgments and Sentences AFFIRMED. SHARP, W. and PLEUS, JJ„ concur.…
  • Hodgdon v. State, 662 So. 2d 437 (Fla. 3d DCA 1995)
    …PER CURIAM. Affirmed. Elam v. State, 636 So. 2d 1312 (Fla.1994); Hunt v. State, 613 So. 2d 893 (Fla.1992); State v. Brown, 622 So. 2d 17 (Fla. 5th DCA 1993); Adler v. State, 382 So. 2d 1298 (Fla. 3d DCA 1980).…

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