LUCILE COZINE, WILLIAM CHILD AND JOHN ALDRIDGE, PLAINTIFFS IN ERROR
v.
T. H. RANDOLPH AND C. Z. FENN, CO-PARTNERS, DEFENDANTS IN ERROR

Fla. | 1916-05-02
Taylor, C. J., and Shackleford, and Ellis, JJ., concur., Whitfield, J., disqualified.
71 Fla. 603 Florida Supreme Court (1916) Positive Treatment
Cited by 6 cases

AI-generated. These summaries, headnotes, and key points are machine-generated and may contain errors or omissions. Always verify against the full opinion text below. Not legal advice.

Synopsis

The Florida Supreme Court held that a married woman has the right to interpose a claim proceeding at law for her separate personal property seized under an attachment against her husband, overturning a lower court's denial of this right.


Holding

Yes, a married woman has the right to interpose a claim proceeding for her separate personal property seized under legal process against her husband, and she can do so in her own name.


Key Quotes

“A married woman may interpose a claim to her personal property levied upon under legal process * * * with all the rights, powers and privileges of a feme sole.”

This quote from General Statutes, section 1367, is the basis for the court's holding.

Previewing 1 of 3 key quotes on this case — the court’s exact language, pinpointed for members.

Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence

Facts & Procedural History

Lucile Cozine, William Child, and John Aldridge (plaintiffs in error) sought to recover personal property belonging to Cozine, a married woman, which …

The full statement of facts, procedural history, and disposition for this case are member content.

Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence

© FLexlaw, Inc. — AI-generated enrichments are proprietary. All rights reserved.


Opinion of the Court
Cockrell, J.

Cockrell, J.

This case involves the right of a married woman to interpose a claim proceeding at law for the recovery of her separate personal property, seized under an attachment instituted against her husband. The right was denied apparently upon the theory that she could not give a valid bond or be heard in a court of law in her own name.

General Statutes, section 1367 provides: “A married woman may interpose a claim to her personal property levied upon under legal process * * * with all the rights, powers and privileges of a feme sole.”

We do not know of any constitutional objection to the validity of this enactment and its meaning seems to us clear; a remedial statute providing a prompt method of permitting a married woman to secure herself in the possession of her own. The legislation imposes upon her no obligations interdicted by the constitution, and the plaintiff in attachment is protected by the sureties upon the claim bond who are bound even though we assume that the feme covert principal be not bound. 32 Cyc. 27.

The case of Fairchild v. Knight, 18 Fla. 770, was decided long before the quoted statute and probably brought the statute into being. That case pointed out the difficulties, as the legislation then existed, in the way of a married woman seeking to assert her rights in a court of law, and section 1367 was intended to remove those difficulties.

The judgment is reversed.

Taylor, C. J., and Shackleford, and Ellis, JJ., concur. Whitfield, J., disqualified.


Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus


Citator

Cited By

  • Jonas Jones and his wife v. Griffin, 103 Fla. 745 (Fla. 1931)
    …y the coverture of the wife, the husband remaining liable thereon and not being entitled to raise any defense in his own behalf because of the coverture of his joint obligor. An application of this same principle will be found in Cozine v. Randolph, 71 Fla. 603, 72 So. 177, where it was held that sureties upon a bond may be bound though the feme covert principal be not bound. We deem it pertinent in disposing of this case to call attention to the fact that portions of the brief filed by the appellants cha…
  • …........, Surety." (Seal) Sureties upon a bond may be bound though the principal he not bound because the principal named is fictitious or because the principal is under some legal disability prohibiting his being bound as such. Cozine v. Randolph, 71 Fla. 603, 72 Sou. Rep. 177. The rule is that one who signs as surety warrants the existence and validity of the obligation of the party named as principal. This is so, although it may transpire that one or more of the signatures of the principals are forged.…
  • Cantey v. Smith, 121 Fla. 912 (Fla. 1935)
    …onstitution requiring the subject of a legislative Act to be expressed in its title. The bond given by M. A. Smith, as General Liquidator, binds the sureties on it although Smith may have omitted to sign it as principal obligor. Cozine v. Randolph, 71 Fla. 603, 72 Sou. Rep. 177; Florida School-Book Depository, Inc., v. Liddon, 114 Fla. 149, 153 Sou. Rep. 902. Such bond is therefore a “bond and security” sufficient to comply with Section 19 of Chapter 13576. At all events, the objection is non-availing to…

Authorities Cited

Full citator, related cases, and AI research tools

Open in FLexlaw