MARCO A. SOLIS, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
AI-generated. These summaries, headnotes, and key points are machine-generated and may contain errors or omissions. Always verify against the full opinion text below. Not legal advice.
The court held that incarceration as a condition of probation or community control cannot exceed 364 days, including time in probation and restitution centers.
Appellant was sentenced to two years community control with a special condition of 364 days in county jail, followed by placement in a probation and r…
The full statement of facts, procedural history, and disposition for this case are member content.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence© FLexlaw, Inc. — AI-generated enrichments are proprietary. All rights reserved.
PER CURIAM.
Appellant was sentenced upon violation of probation to two years community control with the special condition that he spend 364 days in the county jail. Upon release, appellant was to enter the probation and restitution center and stay there “until he doesn’t need it anymore.” Appellant contends that under Villery v. Florida Parole & Probation Comm’n, 396 So. 2d 1107 (Fla.1980), modified on other grounds sub nom., Van Tassel v. Coffman, 486 So. 2d 528 (Fla.1986), that he cannot be sentenced to more than 364 days incarceration as a condition of probation or community control. We agree.
Section 948.03(5), Florida Statutes (1991), which appears to have codified Vil-lery, specifically states that incarceration as a condition of probation or community control may not exceed 364 days. Both the county jail and probation and restitution centers are included in the definition of incarceration. We would also note under Horner v. State, 597 So. 2d 920 (Fla. 2d DCA 1992), approved, Horner v. State, 617 So. 2d 311 (Fla.1993), that placement in a probation and restitution center as a condition of probation or community control cannot exceed 364 days. The trial court also erred when it sentenced appellant to remain “until he doesn’t need it anymore.”
Because of the date of the sentencing, appellant will now have served 364 days in the county jail. We therefore strike that portion of the sentence which requires appellant to spend time at the probation and restitution center. If he is currently incarcerated there he is to be immediately released.
Reversed and remanded for proceedings consistent herewith.
SCHOONOVER, A.C.J., and THREADGILL and BLUE, JJ., concur.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Cited By
-
Ezekiel Peterson v. State, 645 So. 2d 1028 (Fla. 4th DCA 1994)…the first year of probation in a probation and restitution center. Mandatory residency at a probation and restitution center, even as a condition of probation, is “incarceration” within the meaning of the sentencing guidelines.2 See Solis v. State, 622 So. 2d 584 (Fla. 2d DCA 1993); Parker v. State, 636 So. 2d 794 (Fla. 1st DCA 1994). Thus, Peterson’s sentence exceeded the permitted guideline sentence by one year. Contrary to Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.701(d)(ll), there was no written statement del…
-
Fletcher Berry v. State, 636 So. 2d 555 (Fla. 2d DCA 1994)…tence and remand for resentencing.3 We discuss these issues in inverse order. We have held that under section 948.-03(5) “[b]oth the county jail and probation and restitution centers are included in the definition of incarceration.” Solis v. State, 622 So. 2d 584, 584-585 (Fla. 2d DCA 1993). Since incarceration under this statute cannot exceed 364 days, the trial court’s sentence of an additional 364 days in the restitution center was illegal. Based on the date of Berry’s sentencing, he obviously has served…
-
Anselmo Rivas v. State, 667 So. 2d 908 (Fla. 4th DCA 1996)…erms followed by a period of probation. We reject defendant’s assertion that the sentences rendered were illegal Vil-lery 1 sentences of incarceration as a condition of probation exceeding 364 days. See § 948.03(5), Fla.Stat. (1995); Solis v. State, 622 So. 2d 584 (Fla. 2d DCA 1993). See also Poore v. State, 531 So. 2d 161 (Fla.1988). A review of the sentencing transcript supports the position taken by the state that the sentences imposed were split sentences. The expressed intent of the trial court was that…
Previewing 3 of 4 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Villery v. The Fla. Parole & Prob. Comm'n, 396 So. 2d 1107 (Fla. 1980)
- Peter v. VAN Tassel, 486 So. 2d 528 (Fla. 1986)
- Hampton Alonzo Corry v. State, 617 So. 2d 311 (Fla. 1993)
- Horner v. State, 617 So. 2d 311 (Fla. 1993)
- Horner v. State, 597 So. 2d 920 (Fla. 2d DCA 1992)