JAMES A. STAMAN, APPELLANT,
v.
DAIVA T. STAMAN, APPELLEE
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In this divorce appeal, the First District Court of Appeal affirmed the trial court's award of lump sum alimony to the former wife but reversed the exclusion of accounts receivable from the marital estate, holding that accounts receivable from a professional medical practice can be included in marital assets for equitable distribution.
The court held that accounts receivable from a professional medical practice can be included in the marital estate and reversed the trial court's exclusion of such accounts receivable as a matter of law. On remand, the trial court should include accounts receivable in the marital estate and distribute them in an equitable manner.
[1] Accounts receivable of a professional association are marital assets subject to equitable distribution.
[2] A trial court errs in excluding accounts receivable from marital assets as a matter of law.
Previewing 2 of 4 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“We find the trial court erred in apparently concluding that, as a matter of law, accounts receivable cannot be included in the valuation of marital assets.”
Establishes the core holding that accounts receivable are not categorically excluded from marital assets.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceThe parties' marital estate included approximately $5.3 million in assets. The former husband operated a medical professional association with net acc…
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MICKLE, Judge.
The former husband appealed and the former wife cross-appealed the final judgment of dissolution of marriage that, as amended, equally distributed $5.3 million of the parties’ marital assets, awarded the former wife an additional $500,000.00 in lump sum alimony, and excluded from marital assets the accounts receivable of the former husband’s medical professional association. Finding neither an abuse of discretion nor any error as a matter of law on the issue of alimony, we affirm without further comment the award of lump sum alimony.
Section 61.08, Florida Statutes (Supp.1988); Canakaris v. Canakaris, 382 So. 2d 1197, 1201 (Fla.1982); Kuharsky v. Kuharsky, 582 So. 2d 78 (Fla. 4th DCA 1991). As to the former wife’s cross-appeal issue, we reverse that portion of the amended final judgment excluding accounts receivable from marital assets as a matter of law, and remand for proceedings in conformity with this decision.
In the valuation of the marital estate, the trial court initially included the discounted value of the accounts receivable of the former husband’s professional association. Net accounts receivable were found to be worth $489,247.00. The figures were taken from trial testimony and from the former husband’s accountant’s valuation of the marital estate as of September 30, 1988, the date for determination of marital assets pursuant to section 61.075(4), Florida Statutes (Supp.1988). The lower tribunal determined that 35% of the accounts receivable constituted “bad debt” that was to be written off.
Pursuant to the former husband’s motion for rehearing or for amendment of judgment, the trial court deleted accounts receivable and an upward adjustment from the marital estate, in reliance on Leone v. Leone, 577 So. 2d 587 (Fla. 3d DCA 1991).
We find the trial court erred in apparently concluding that, as a matter of law, accounts receivable cannot be included in the valuation of marital assets.
First, in furtherance of reversal on this issue, we need not look beyond our prior opinions in Spillert v. Spillert, 564 So. 2d 1146, 1148 (Fla. 1st DCA), rev. den., 576 So. 2d 291 (Fla. 1990), and Carr v. Carr, 522 So. 2d 880, 885 (Fla. 1st DCA 1988) (finding error in trial court’s exclusion, from marital assets, of the tangible assets of husband's medical practice, including accounts receivable). See In re: Goldstein, 120 Ariz. 23, 583 P. 2d 1343, 1344 (1978); Moulton v. Moulton, 485 A. 2d 976 (Me.1984); Thomas v. Thomas, 571 So. 2d 499, 504 (Fla. 1st DCA 1990); Villaverde v. Villaverde, 547 So. 2d 185, 186-87 (Fla. 3d DCA 1989) (increases in value of breadwinner spouse’s medical practice during the marriage are to be considered among marital assets).
Second, Leone appears to have been the sole Florida decision on which the trial court relied, and we find Leone to be factually distinguishable based on the particular arrangement between Dr. Leone and an outside company concerning the distribution of his business accounts receivable. In addition, the case of Dogu v. Dogu, 652 P. 2d 1308 (Utah 1982), on which the Third District Court relied on reaching its decision in Leone, has been construed narrowly by the Utah Supreme Court. In Sorensen v. Sorensen, 839 P. 2d 774, 777-78 (Utah 1992) (accounts receivable of husband’s solo dental practice could be included in value of practice, for purposes of division of marital property), the court specifically called into question its holding in Dogu. It is unnecessary for us to determine the validity of the Leone holding because it is easily distinguishable. We feel, however, that Leone is to be narrowly construed due to its unusual facts. On remand, the trial court should include accounts receivable within the marital estate, to be distributed in a manner that the trial court deems equitable given the overall division of assets.
Section 61.075, Florida Statutes (Supp.1988).
AFFIRMED in part, REVERSED in part, and REMANDED for further proceedings.
SMITH and WOLF, JJ., concur.
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Layeni v. Kehinde A. Layeni, 843 So. 2d 295 (Fla. 5th DCA 2003)…om this income that the former husband would be required to make his support payments. We find the trial court erred in concluding that, as a matter of law, accounts receivable cannot be included in the valuation of marital assets. Staman v. Staman, 622 So. 2d 1147 (Fla. 1st DCA 1993); Spillert v. Spillert, 564 So. 2d 1146, 1148 (Fla. 1st DCA 1990); Carr v. Carr, 522 So. 2d 880, 885 (Fla. 1st DCA 1988) (finding error in trial court’s exclusion from marital assets of the tangible assets of husband’s medical pra…
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Stern v. Stern, 636 So. 2d 735 (Fla. 4th DCA 1993)…tions based on that information, moot. In addition, we find no error in the trial court designating the $1,900,000 in the former husband’s corporate accounts receivable as a marital asset that was subsequently “awarded” to him. See Staman v. Staman, 622 So. 2d 1147 (Fla. 1st DCA 1993). Finally, we conclude the trial court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to award the former husband at least a portion of his costs and attorney’s fees upon a finding that he had sufficient current income and assets from w…
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Authorities Cited
- Canakaris v. Canakaris, 382 So. 2d 1197 (Fla. 1980)
- Carr v. Carr, 522 So. 2d 880 (Fla. 1st DCA 1988)
- Spillert v. Spillert, 564 So. 2d 1146 (Fla. 1st DCA 1990)
- Villaverde v. Villaverde, 547 So. 2d 185 (Fla. 3d DCA 1989)
- Thomas v. Randell D. Thomas, 571 So. 2d 499 (Fla. 1st DCA 1990)
- Leone v. Leone, 577 So. 2d 587 (Fla. 3d DCA 1990)
- Kuharsky v. Kuharsky, 582 So. 2d 78 (Fla. 4th DCA 1991)