THE SEBRING AIRPORT AUTHORITY AND SEBRING INTERNATIONAL RACEWAY, INC., APPELLANTS,
v.
C. RAYMOND MCINTYRE, PROPERTY APPRAISER OF HIGHLANDS COUNTY, FLORIDA; THE DEPARTMENT OF REVENUE, STATE OF FLORIDA; AND J.T. LANDRESS, TAX COLLECTOR OF HIGHLANDS COUNTY, FLORIDA, APPELLEES
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The Sebring Airport Authority and Sebring International Raceway challenged a denial of ad valorem tax exemption for raceway property. The court affirmed the denial, holding that operating a racetrack for profit does not constitute a governmental or public purpose sufficient to qualify for the statutory exemption available to nongovernmental lessees of government property.
Operating an automobile racetrack for profit does not constitute a governmental-governmental function and therefore does not qualify for the tax exemption. The lessee's operation is purely proprietary and for-profit, which is determinative. The burden is on the claimant to demonstrate clearly any entitlement to tax exemption, and such exemptions are strictly construed against the party claiming them.
[1] Leasehold interests in publicly owned property are subject to ad valorem taxation unless expressly exempted by statute.
[2] Leasehold interests in property owned by a governmental entity are exempt from ad valorem taxation only when the lessee performs a function that could properly be perform…
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“Operating an automobile racetrack for profit is not even arguably the performance of a "governmental-governmental" function.”
Establishes the core holding that profit-making racetrack operations cannot qualify for the governmental purpose exemption
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceThe Sebring Airport Authority and Sebring International Raceway sought a public purpose exemption from ad valorem taxation under section 196.199, Flor…
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CAMPBELL, Judge.
Appellants, The Sebring Airport Authority and Sebring International Raceway, Inc., challenge the final summary judgment entered against them in their action against appellees, Raymond McIntyre, the Highlands County Property Appraiser; the Department of Revenue; and J.T. Landress, Highlands County Tax Collector. Appellants, relying on section 196.199, Florida Statutes (1989), had requested and been denied a public purpose exemption from ad valorem taxation for the property used by the raceway. We affirm.
The pertinent parts of section 196.199 provide as follows:
(2) Property owned by the following governmental units but used by nongovernmental lessees shall only be exempt from taxation under the following conditions:
(a) Leasehold interests in property of the United States, of the state or any of its several political subdivisions, or of municipalities ... shall be exempt from ad valo-rem taxation only when the lessee serves or performs a governmental, municipal, or public purpose or function, as defined in Section 196.012(6).
In affirming, we rely upon Capital City Country Club, Inc. v. Tucker, 613 So. 2d 448 (Fla.1993) and Volusia County v. Daytona Beach Racing and Recreational Facilities Districts, 341 So. 2d 498 (Fla.1976), dismissed, 434 U.S. 804, 98 S.Ct. 32, 54 L.Ed.2d 61 (1977). In Volusia County, the supreme court held as follows:
Other statutory provisions exempt privately held leaseholds of governmental property from taxation “only when the lessee,” Section 196.199(2)(a), Florida Statutes (1975), “is demonstrated to perform a function or serve a governmental purpose which could properly be performed or served by an appropriate governmental unit, or .. [sic] which would otherwise be a valid subject for the allocation of public funds.” Section 196.012(5), Florida Statutes (1975). The lessee in the present case does not serve a governmental purpose. The Corporation’s operation of the speedway “is purely proprietary and for profit.” Williams v. Jones, 326 So. 2d 425, 433 (Fla. 1975) (reh. den. 1976). The Corporation exists in order to make profits for its stockholders and uses the leasehold to further that purpose. This use is determinative: “It is the utilization of leased property from a governmental source that determines whether it is taxable under the Constitution.” Straughn v. Camp, [293 So. 2d 689 (Fla.1974) ] supra, at 695.
The burden is on the claimant to show clearly any entitlement to tax exemption. “The rule is that all property is subject to taxation unless expressly exempt and such exemptions are strictly construed against the party claiming them. State ex rel. Wedgworth Farms, Inc. v. Thompson, 101 So. 2d 381 (Fla.1958).” Williams v. Jones, supra, at 435. Mr. Justice Sundberg, writing for the Court in Williams v. Jones, supra, delineated the scope of the exemption at issue here in the following words:
The exemptions contemplated under Sections 196.012(5) and 196.199(2)(a), Florida Statutes, relate to “governmental-governmental” functions as opposed to “governmental-proprietary” functions. With the exemption being so interpreted all property used by private persons and commercial enterprises is subjected to taxation either directly or indirectly through taxation on the leasehold. Thus all privately used property bears a tax burden in some manner and this is what the Constitution mandates.
At 433.
Operating an automobile racetrack for profit is not even arguably the performance of a “governmental-governmental” function.
341 So. 2d at 502 (emphasis in original).
Appellants, however, rely upon Page v. Femandina Harbor Joint Venture, 608 So. 2d 520 (Fla. 1st DCA 1992), rev. denied, 620 So. 2d 761 (Fla. May 6, 1993). Page, which does not refer to Volusia County and was prior to the decision in Capital City, does appear to be contra to the holdings in those cases and we are unable to properly distinguish Page. We are bound by the decisions of our supreme court which appear to us to be on point. See Hoffman v. Jones, 280 So. 2d 431 (Fla.1973). Inasmuch as the supreme court in Volusia County has held that “[ojperating an automobile racetrack for profit is not even arguably the performance of a ‘governmental-governmental’ function,” we are prohibited from holding otherwise.
Affirmed.
FRANK, C.J., and THREADGILL, J., concur.
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The Sebring Airport Auth. v. McINTYRE, 642 So. 2d 1072 (Fla. 1994)…SHAW, Justice. We have for review Sebring Airport Authority v. McIntyre, 623 So. 2d 541 (Fla. 2d DCA 1993). We have jurisdiction. Art. V, § 3(b)(3) Fla. Const. We approve the decision of the court below. Sebring Airport Authority is a legislatively-created public instrumentality. Ch. 67-2070, § 2, at 4238, Laws of Fla. From the late 1…
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Page v. City OF Fernandina Beach, 714 So. 2d 1070 (Fla. 1st DCA 1998)…ed the circuit court’s summary judgment against an airport authority and international raceway denying their request for a public purpose exemption from ad valorem taxation for the property used by the raceway. See Sebring Airport Auth. v. McIntyre, 623 So. 2d 541 (Fla. 2d DCA 1993). The Florida Supreme Court held that the operation of the automobile raceway for profit was a governmental-proprietary function, and therefore, a tax exemption was not allowed under section 196.199(2)(a). Sebring II, 642 So. 2d at…
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City OF Sarasota v. Mikos, 645 So. 2d 417 (Fla. 1994)…SHAW, Justice. We have for review City of Sarasota v. Mikos, 633 So. 2d 1075 (Fla. 2d DCA 1993) (table report of unpublished opinion), based on a conflict between Sebring Airport Authority v. McIntyre, 623 So. 2d 541 (Fla. 2d DCA 1993) and Page v. Fernandina Harbor Joint Venture, 608 So. 2d 520 (Fla. 1st DCA 1992), review denied, 620 So. 2d 761 (Fla. 1993). We have jurisdiction. Art. V, § 3(b)(3), Fla. Const. The court below affirmed the trial court based on the…1 / 2
Previewing 3 of 6 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Hoffman v. Jones, 280 So. 2d 431 (Fla. 1973)
- Williams v. Jones, 326 So. 2d 425 (Fla. 1975)
- Straughn v. Lindley M. Camp, 293 So. 2d 689 (Fla. 1974)
- Cap. City Country Club, Inc. v. Tucker, 613 So. 2d 448 (Fla. 1993)
- State ex rel. Wedgworth Farms, Inc. v. Ina S. Thompson, 101 So. 2d 381 (Fla. 1958)
- Merrill Lynch v. Byrne, 341 So. 2d 498 (Fla. 1976)
- Volusia Cnty. v. Daytona Beach Racing & Recreational Facilities Dist., 341 So. 2d 498 (Fla. 1976)
- Page v. Fernandina Harbor Joint Venture, 608 So. 2d 520 (Fla. 1st DCA 1992)
- John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Brady, 434 U.S. 804 (U.S. 1977)
- Getty Oil Co. v. Tax Comm'n of Okla., 434 U.S. 804 (U.S. 1977)