TIMOTHY TAYLOR, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
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Timothy Taylor appeals his conviction for first-degree murder, attempted robbery, and aggravated assault from a 1991 armed robbery in Pompano Beach. The Fourth District Court of Appeal reversed and remanded for a new trial, finding that the trial court improperly restricted cross-examination of the state's key witness regarding his possible motive to testify falsely.
The trial court committed reversible error by restricting cross-examination. A defendant has a constitutional right to full and fair cross-examination of his accuser, especially when the witness is a key state witness. The court should have allowed Taylor to explore Atkinson's motive to testify falsely. Because Atkinson was the only witness clearly placing Taylor at the scene and there was little other incriminating evidence, the harmless error rule does not apply.
[1] A defendant has a constitutional right to a full and fair cross-examination of a key state witness.
[2] Restricting cross-examination of a key state witness regarding their motive to testify falsely constitutes reversible error.
Previewing 2 of 4 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“It is, of course, clear that a defendant in a criminal case has a constitutional right to a full and fair cross-examination of his accuser. Especially is this true if a key state witness is the subject of the cross-examination.”
Establishes the fundamental constitutional right at issue and emphasizes its particular importance when the witness is a key state witness.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceOn February 2, 1991, an armed robbery and murder occurred in Pompano Beach. The state alleged Taylor, Kelvin Atkinson, and Michael Garland participate…
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PER CURIAM.
Appellant, Timothy Taylor, appeals from a conviction of murder in the first degree, attempted robbery and aggravated assault.
Twelve appellate points have been presented none of which demonstrate reversible error except appellant’s Point II which suggests that the trial court committed reversible error in restricting appellant’s cross-examination of the key state witness.
The state essentially presented a case which purported to show that appellant, Timothy Taylor, Kelvin Atkinson and Michael Garland engaged in a robbery on February 2, 1991 at about 9:30 p.m. in Pompano Beach in which one of the victims was killed. Atkinson testified for the state, admitted that he fired the fatal shot and named Garland and appellant as participants. He also testified that Garland and appellant had stolen a blue Cadillac which they used in the robbery. The state offered in evidence two exculpatory statements given by appellant after Miranda warnings. Appellant denied that he was present on the night in question. In his second statement he asserts an alibi that he was at the South Florida Fair with Mary and Virginia Coleman at the time of the crime and remained there until well after midnight. Other than Atkinson’s testimony the only evidence tending to show appellant’s involvement was given by a pawnbroker who testified that on March 1, 1991 appellant pawned a shotgun which was later identified as having fired the empty cartridge found in the car stolen by appellant and Garland.
It appears that two weeks after the February 2, 1991, Pompano murder/robbery another armed robbery/murder occurred in West Palm Beach involving Atkinson’s cousin, De-andra Yorker, and Michael Garland. Appellant contends Atkinson’s cousin, Deandra Yorker, was present at the Pompano robbery/murder rather than himself. He submits that Atkinson lied in this case when he placed appellant at the scene of the Pompano crime instead of his cousin as a quid pro quo for Yorker testifying that Atkinson was not present at the subsequent West Palm Beach crime scene. The court refused to allow appellant to impeach Atkinson’s testimony with this attack on his motive to testify falsely-
It is, of course, clear that a defendant in a criminal case has a constitutional right to a full and fair cross-examination of his accuser. Especially is this true if a key state witness is the subject of the cross-examination. Cox v. State, 441 So. 2d 1169 (Fla. 4th DCA 1983). We believe this well-established rule is applicable here. The only witness who clearly places appellant at the scene of this crime was Atkinson, the state’s key witness. It is our view that appellant should have been allowed to explore this witness’ motive to testify falsely about appellant’s participation. And because there is so little else to incriminate appellant, we believe State v. DiGuilio, 491 So. 2d 1129 (Fla.1986) precludes resort to the harmless error rule. Auchmuty v. State, 594 So. 2d 859 (Fla. 4th DCA 1992).
Accordingly, we reverse the judgment and sentence and remand the cause to the trial court with direction to grant a new trial.
GUNTHER and FARMER, JJ., and DOWNEY, JAMES C., Senior Judge, concur.
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Washington v. State, 737 So. 2d 1208 (Fla. 1st DCA 1999)…of a State witness to expose any bias or improper motive that the witness may have in' testifying against the defendant. Powe v. State, 413 So. 2d 1272, 1273 (Fla. 1st DCA 1982); Chatman v. State, 687 So. 2d 860 (Fla. 1st DCA 1997); Taylor v. State, 623 So. 2d 832 (Fla. 4th DCA 1993). The Florida Evidence Code reinforces the principle that adequate cross-examination presupposes the right to address questions dealing with a witness’ credibility: Cross-examination of a witness is limited to the subject matter…
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Purcell v. State, 735 So. 2d 579 (Fla. 4th DCA 1999)…Auchmuty v. State, 594 So. 2d 859, 860 (Fla. 4th DCA 1992); see also Perez v. State, 691 So. 2d 1190 (Fla. 4th DCA 1997); Stanley v. State, 648 So. 2d 1268 (Fla. 4th DCA 1995); Pomeranz v. State, 634 So. 2d 1145 (Fla. 4th DCA 1994); Taylor v. State, 623 So. 2d 832 (Fla. 4th DCA 1993); Caton v. State, 597 So. 2d 412 (Fla. 4th DCA 1992); Phillips v. State, 572 So. 2d 16 (Fla. 4th DCA 1990); Cox v. State, 441 So. 2d 1169 (Fla. 4th DCA 1983); Jones v. State, 385 So. 2d 132 (Fla. 4th DCA 1980). Bias may be proved…
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Chatman v. State, 687 So. 2d 860 (Fla. 1st DCA 1997)…at a defendant has the right to fully cross-examine a State’s witness to reveal bias and any improper motive the witness may have had in testifying against the defendant.” Powe v. State, 413 So. 2d 1272, 1273 (Fla. 1st DCA 1982). In Taylor v. State, 623 So. 2d 832 (Fla. 4th DCA 1993), a case involving a substantively similar issue, the court held that the defendant should have been permit [*863] ted to question a former co-defendant who had implicated the defendant regarding his motive to testify falsely abou…1 / 2
Previewing 3 of 5 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- State v. DiGUILIO, 491 So. 2d 1129 (Fla. 1986)
- Auchmuty v. State, 594 So. 2d 859 (Fla. 4th DCA 1992)
- Leamon T. COX v. State, 441 So. 2d 1169 (Fla. 4th DCA 1983)