IN RE C.T.D., A CHILD, APPELLANT
AI-generated. These summaries, headnotes, and key points are machine-generated and may contain errors or omissions. Always verify against the full opinion text below. Not legal advice.
This appeal challenges an order denying a motion to amend an uncontested adoption petition. The court dismissed the appeal, holding that the trial court never entered a final judgment, making the order denying the motion to amend non-final and nonappealable.
An order denying a motion to amend is a non-final, nonappealable order when no final judgment has been entered. A final judgment in an adoption proceeding requires words of finality, and a mere order denying relief does not constitute a final judgment.
[1] An order denying a motion to amend a petition for adoption is a non-final, non-appealable order when no final judgment has been entered in the adoption proceeding.
[2] An order denying relief does not constitute a final judgment unless it contains words of finality.
Previewing 2 of 3 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“An order denying relief does not constitute a final judgment. Words of finality are required to make the order an appealable order.”
Establishes the core holding that the trial court's order denying the motion to amend lacked finality
Previewing 1 of 3 key quotes on this case — the court’s exact language, pinpointed for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceThe trial court denied an uncontested verified petition for adoption on the ground that the natural mother was not joined as a petitioner, even though…
The full statement of facts, procedural history, and disposition for this case are member content.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence© FLexlaw, Inc. — AI-generated enrichments are proprietary. All rights reserved.
Explore caselaw by topic → Browse Non-Final, Non-Appealable Order cases and more on FLexlaw
PER CURIAM.
This is an appeal from an order denying a motion to amend an uncontested petition for adoption. We hold that there is no final judgment entered, and an appeal from an order denying a motion to amend is a non-final, nonappealable order, and dismiss the appeal.
In denying the motion to amend the trial court was under the impression that it had entered a final judgment in the adoption proceeding. However, when presented with the uncontested verified petition for adoption, the trial court entered an order denying the petition on the ground that the natural mother was not joined as a petitioner. While she consented to the adoption, she did not thereby intend to terminate her parental rights. The court reasoned that under Section 63.172(l)(a) and (b), Florida Statutes (1991), her rights would terminate unless she too were a petitioner. Thus, the denial was based on the failure to join an indispensable party, a defect which could have been cured by the amendment of the petition.
Section 63.142(3)(a) and (4), Florida Statutes, requires the court to dismiss the petition or enter the judgment for adoption. Cf. In re Adoption of Stinebaker, 382 So. 2d 413 (Fla. 5th DCA 1980). An order denying relief does not constitute a final judgment. Words of finality are required to make the order an appealable order. Kreager v. Glickman, 519 So. 2d 666 (Fla. 4th DCA 1988); Armstrong Contracting & Supply Corp. v. Aerospace Industries, Inc., 254 So. 2d 242 (Fla. 4th DCA 1971).
As there is no final order, an appeal from the order denying the motion to amend is not an appealable order.1
Appeal dismissed. STONE and WARNER, JJ., and WALDEN, JAMES H., Senior Judge, concur. . We would also note that even if we were dealing with a final order of dismissal, an order dismissing the cause for lack of an indispensable party is not an adjudication on the merits, and therefore serves as no impediment to an amended petition for adoption. Fla.R.Civ.P. 1.420(b). See also Yancey v. Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services, 413 So. 2d 438 (Fla. 3d DCA 1982). Our order is without prejudice to the petitioner, who may either secure a final order or move again to amend, now that we have clarified that the trial court’s reason for denying the motion to amend was based on the erroneous premise that a final judgment had been entered.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Cited By
-
Millsaps v. Orlando Wrecker, Inc., 634 So. 2d 680 (Fla. 5th DCA 1994)…unty, 485 So. 2d 892 (Fla. 1st DCA 1986); National Carloading Corp. v. Gemini Transportation, Inc., 364 So. 2d 504 (Fla. 3d DCA 1978). An order dismissing a cause for lack of an indispensable party is not an adjudication on the merits. In re C.T.D., 623 So. 2d 834, 834 n 1, (Fla. 4th DCA 1993); Fulmer v. Northern Central Bank, 386 So. 2d 856 (Fla. 2d DCA 1980), rev. denied, 394 So. 2d 1152 (Fla.1981). Thus a dismissal of an action for failure to join an indispensable party should be without prejudice. Spierer…
-
Fla. Dep't OF Revenue v. S.B., 124 So. 3d 377 (Fla. 2d DCA 2013)…nity to amend. See Kapley, 714 So. 2d at 1218. Further, an order dismissing a pleading for lack of an indispensable party is not a merits adjudication. Millsaps v. Orlando Wrecker, Inc., 634 So. 2d 680, 681 (Fla. 5th DCA 1994) (citing In re C.T.D., 623 So. 2d 834, 834 n. 1 (Fla. 4th DCA 1993); Fulmer v. N. Cent. Bank, 386 So. 2d 856 (Fla. 2d DCA 1980)). A dismissal for failing to join an indispensable party should be without prejudice, unless the pleader refuses to amend to add a party necessary for a determ…
Authorities Cited
- Kreager v. Glickman, 519 So. 2d 666 (Fla. 4th DCA 1988)
- Armstrong Contracting & Supply Corp. v. Aerospace Indus., Inc., 254 So. 2d 242 (Fla. 4th DCA 1971)
- Yancey v. Dep't OF Health & Rehabilitative Servs., 413 So. 2d 438 (Fla. 3d DCA 1982)
- In re the Adoption of Kathryn Ann Stinebaker, 382 So. 2d 413 (Fla. 5th DCA 1980)