STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLANT,
v.
JAMES E. GEE, APPELLEE
AI-generated. These summaries, headnotes, and key points are machine-generated and may contain errors or omissions. Always verify against the full opinion text below. Not legal advice.
Florida's appellate court reversed the trial court's dismissal of an aggravated battery charge, holding that specific intent to cause great bodily harm is a jury question that cannot be resolved on a motion to dismiss.
Specific intent in an aggravated battery prosecution is a jury question that cannot be determined on a motion to dismiss when the facts are disputed or ambiguous.
[1] In an aggravated battery prosecution, specific intent to cause great bodily harm, permanent disability, or permanent disfigurement is a question for the jury and cannot b…
Previewing 1 of 1 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“intent is generally a jury question that in most instances cannot be ascertained by direct evidence but only inferred and is therefore not properly determined on a motion to dismiss”
The court explained why specific intent in aggravated battery cases must be left to the jury rather than resolved at the motion to dismiss stage.
A defendant struck a victim once in the face during a barroom confrontation; the blow itself caused no fractures or tooth loss, but the victim suffere…
The full statement of facts, procedural history, and disposition for this case are member content.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence© FLexlaw, Inc. — AI-generated enrichments are proprietary. All rights reserved.
Explore caselaw by topic → Browse Jury Question cases and more on FLexlaw
PER CURIAM.
In this aggravated battery prosecution, the state appeals the trial court’s order granting defendant’s motion to dismiss. We reverse. The facts of this case, as related in defendant’s motion, are not in dispute. A crowded barroom confrontation culminated with defendant striking the victim with a single blow to the right side of his face, causing him to fall to the floor. Though the blow itself did not break any bones or knock out any teeth, the victim, upon falling down, suffered a broken neck and complete paralysis from either striking his head on a stage or being kicked in the head by an unknown person.
Defendant was charged with aggravated battery, a specific intent crime requiring the intent to cause great bodily harm, permanent disability or permanent disfigurement. § 784.045(l)(a)l, Fla.Stat. (1991); Knott v. State, 573 So. 2d 179,180 (Fla. 2d DCA 1991). We conclude that in this case a jury question existed over whether defendant had the requisite specific intent. As this court noted in State v. Stenza, 453 So. 2d 169 (Fla. 2d DCA 1984), intent is generally a jury question that in most instances cannot be ascertained by direct evidence but only inferred and is therefore not properly determined on a motion to dismiss.
Reversed and remanded for proceedings consistent herewith.
FRANK, C.J., and SCHOONOVER and PATTERSON, JJ., concur.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Cited By
-
State v. Lorette Franchi, 746 So. 2d 1126 (Fla. 4th DCA 1999)…h DCA 1985). Intent is generally a jury question that usually cannot be ascertained by direct evidence but only inferred from the acts of the parties and surrounding circumstances. See State v. Hart, 677 So. 2d 385 (Fla. 4th DCA 1996); State v. Gee, 624 So. 2d 284 (Fla. 2d DCA 1993); State v. J.T.S., 373 So. 2d 418 (Fla. 2d DCA 1979), overruled on other grounds by D.K.D. v. State, 470 So. 2d 1387 (Fla.1985); State v. West, 262 So. 2d 457 (Fla. 4th DCA 1972). As we commented in West- Being a state of mind, in…
-
Williams v. State, 225 So. 3d 349 (Fla. 3d DCA 2017)…next day, because it hurt to even open her eye, she had to go to the hospital. Emmanuel ultimately was diagnosed with a fractured left eye. The jury saw pictures of Emmanuel’s beaten face. Because Williams’ intent was a jury question, State v. Gee, 624 So. 2d 284, 285 (Fla. 2d DCA 1993) (“[Ijntent is generally a jury question that in most instances cannot be ascertained by direct evidence but only inferred .... ”), and he put intent at issue in his closing argument, there was a reasonable inference to be mad…
-
Zellars v. State, 707 So. 2d 345 (Fla. 5th DCA 1998)…d for three minutes and could not cry out or breathe; and he was only stopped from continuing to strangle her by the intervention of another man. We think the question of his intent in this case was properly resolvable by the jury. See State v. Gee, 624 So. 2d 284 (Fla. 2d DCA 1993); State v. Sten- [*347] za, 453 So. 2d 169 (Fla. 2d DCA 1984); Fletcher v. State, 472 So. 2d 537 (Fla. 5 th DCA 1985). However, we reverse the sentence imposed in this case and remand for resentenc-ing under the guidelines. We do…
Previewing 3 of 6 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- CFM Distrib. & Iowa Nat'l Mut. Ins. Co. v. Alpert, 453 So. 2d 169 (Fla. 1st DCA 1984)
- State v. Stenza, 453 So. 2d 169 (Fla. 2d DCA 1984)
- Knott v. State, 573 So. 2d 179 (Fla. 2d DCA 1991)