TERRY LEWIS, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
AI-generated. These summaries, headnotes, and key points are machine-generated and may contain errors or omissions. Always verify against the full opinion text below. Not legal advice.
Terry Lewis appeals from his conviction for drug and firearm offenses after pleading nolo contendere while reserving the right to challenge the denial of his suppression motion. The Fourth District reversed, finding that the officers lacked reasonable suspicion to stop Lewis and order him out of his legally parked car based solely on his nervous behavior and the neighborhood's crime rate.
The trial court erred in denying Lewis's motion to suppress because the officers lacked founded suspicion to stop Lewis. Nervous behavior alone—mumbling, fidgeting, avoiding eye contact, and rocking back and forth—does not justify a founded suspicion of criminal activity, and neither Florida Statute section 901.151(2) nor (5) was implicated by these facts.
[1] Ordering a person to step out of their automobile constitutes a stop.
[2] A founded suspicion to stop a person requires more than a hunch or guesswork.
Previewing 2 of 5 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“We conclude that it constituted a stop when Lewis was ordered to step out of his automobile by Officer Skiles. Lewis' motion to suppress should have been granted because the officers did not have a founded suspicion to stop Lewis.”
Establishes the core holding that ordering Lewis from his car was a stop requiring founded suspicion, which the officers lacked.
Previewing 1 of 3 key quotes on this case — the court’s exact language, pinpointed for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceOfficer Skiles ordered Lewis to step out of his automobile while Lewis was legally parked in a parking lot. The officers testified they had no reason …
The full statement of facts, procedural history, and disposition for this case are member content.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence© FLexlaw, Inc. — AI-generated enrichments are proprietary. All rights reserved.
Explore caselaw by topic → Browse Stop And Frisk cases and more on FLexlaw
PER CURIAM.
Appellant, Terry Lewis, brings this appeal from the judgment entered against him after he pleaded nolo contendere to charges of possession of cocaine with intent to sell and carrying a concealed firearm by a convicted felon, expressly reserving the right to appeal from the trial court’s denial of his motion to suppress. We reverse.
We conclude that it constituted a stop when Lewis was ordered to step out of his automobile by Officer Skiles. Lewis’ motion to suppress should have been granted because the officers did not have a founded suspicion to stop Lewis. Rather, the officers were acting on a hunch or guesswork concerning Lewis’ presence in a car legally parked in a lot. Each officer who testified stated that he did not have reason to believe that criminal activity was about to take place when they confronted Lewis. Therefore, the sole support for a determination that the officers’ had a founded suspicion that criminal activity was afoot is Officer Skiles’ testimony that Lewis mumbled, fidgeted, avoided eye contact, and rocked back and forth. This conduct alone does not justify a “founded” suspicion that criminal activity had taken place or was about to take place. See Cooper v. State, 584 So. 2d 1124 (Fla. 4th DCA 1991).
Although the officers testified generally about the area in which appellant was parked being not only a “high crime area” but “as bad as it gets,” neither testified that they suspected appellant had a weapon until after he was ordered out of the ear. Neither subsection (2) nor subsection (5) of 901.151 Florida Statutes1 (1991), was implicated un- der this factual situation. We therefore reverse the order denying the motion to suppress, and remand for further proceedings, if any.
POLEN and KLEIN, JJ., and DOWNEY, JAMES C., Senior Judge, concur. . Section 901.151, Florida Statutes (1991) provides in pertinent part:
901.151 Stop and Frisk Law.—
(2) Whenever any law enforcement officer of this state encounters any person under circumstances which reasonably indicate that such person has committed, is committing, or is about to commit a violation of the criminal laws of this state or the criminal ordinances of any municipality or county, he may temporarily detain such person for the purpose of ascertaining the identity of the person temporarily detained and the circumstances surrounding his presence abroad which led the officer to believe that he had committed, was committing, or was about to commit a criminal offense.
(5) Whenever any law enforcement officer authorized to detain temporarily any person under the provisions of subsection (2) has probable cause to believe that any person whom he has temporarily detained, or is about to detain temporarily, is armed with a dangerous weapon and therefore offers a threat to the safety of the officer or any other, person, he may search such person so temporarily detained only to the extent necessary to disclose, and for the purpose of disclosing, the presence of such weapon. If such a search discloses such a weapon or any evidence of a criminal offense it may be seized.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Cited By
-
Sanchez v. State, 199 So. 3d 472 (Fla. 4th DCA 2016)…ontact with an officer was not sufficient justification for a stop), Clark v. State, 677 So. 2d 903 (Fla. 2d DCA 1996), Parker v. State, 363 So. 2d 383 (Fla. 3d DCA 1978), and Vollmer v. State, 337 So. 2d 1024 (Fla. 2d DCA 1976) with Lewis v. State, 625 So. 2d 84 (Fla. 4th DCA 1993) (finding that avoiding eye contact is not suggestive of criminal conduct), Baggett v. State, 849 So. 2d 1154 (Fla. 2d DCA 2003), and In re Forfeiture of $6,003.00 in U.S. Currency, 505 So. 2d 668 (Fla. 5th DCA 1987). As the Elev…
-
Walker v. State, 625 So. 2d 943 (Fla. 4th DCA 1993)…s right to appeal the motion to suppress. The issue is whether the police officer was justified in stopping the defendant in his vehicle. Police may not stop vehicles on a bare suspicion that the occupants are violating the law. See Lewis v. State, 625 So. 2d 84 (Fla. 4th DCA 1993); State v. Isaacs, 578 So. 2d 523, 524 (Fla. 4th DCA 1991). On the other hand, police officers may temporarily detain a person when they have a “founded suspicion” that the person has committed, is committing or is about to commit…
-
Pittman v. State, 632 So. 2d 291 (Fla. 4th DCA 1994)…94), Alvarez v. State, 515 So. 2d 286, 288 (Fla. 4th DCA 1987), Moore v. State, 584 So. 2d 1122, 1123 (Fla. 4th DCA 1991), Ingram v. State, 364 So. 2d 821 (Fla. 4th DCA 1978), Horvitz v. State, 433 So. 2d 545 (Fla. 4th DCA 1983), and Lewis v. State, 625 So. 2d 84 (Fla. 4th DCA 1993), I believe the trial court erred in denying appellant’s motion to suppress.…
Authorities Cited
- Cooper v. State, 584 So. 2d 1124 (Fla. 4th DCA 1991)