LAWRENCE ROBERT HARAM, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
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Lawrence Haram was convicted of thirteen counts of sexual battery and one count of kidnapping. On appeal, he challenged the trial court's denial of his request to represent himself, claiming a constitutional right to self-representation. The appellate court affirmed, finding that Haram's request was not made in good faith but was instead a tactical delay designed to extend proceedings that had already lasted 17 months from arrest to trial.
The trial court did not err in denying Haram's request to represent himself because the request was not made in good faith but was instead a tactical maneuver designed to delay proceedings.
[1] A defendant's request to represent himself may be denied if the court determines the request is not made in good faith but is intended solely for the purpose of further d…
[2] Conflicting requests by a defendant regarding counsel and self-representation, coupled with a stated inability to represent oneself without further instruction, can suppo…
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“the appellant was not desirous of representing himself, but instead wished to further delay the proceedings which had already stretched 17 months from arrest to trial”
States the court's core rationale for affirming the trial court's denial of self-representation
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceHaram was tried by jury and convicted of thirteen counts of sexual battery and one count of kidnapping. The trial occurred 17 months after his arrest.…
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PER CURIAM.
After a jury trial, the appellant was convicted and sentenced for thirteen counts of sexual battery and one count of kidnapping. The issue on appeal is whether the trial court erred by not allowing the appellant to represent himself. We affirm because our review of the record causes us to conclude that the appellant was not desirous of representing himself, but instead wished to further delay the proceedings which had already stretched 17 months from arrest to trial.
The dissent is correct that at least at one point in the record, the appellant stated his desire to represent himself. However, the record is replete with conflicting requests. For example, when the trial judge asked the appellant if he believed he could properly represent himself in a criminal jury trial, the appellant responded:
THE DEFENDANT: No. To be honest with you, no, I don’t. I could if I had the time to research it and study and someone to instruct me.
The appellant also requested the court to relieve the public defender and appoint a private attorney selected by the appellant, to be paid at public expense. In response, the trial judge noted that the appellant had previously caused two attorneys to be discharged from his case. The record further shows that while the appellant contended that his present counsel was not sufficiently prepared for trial, the appellant had directed his attorney not to depose certain witnesses or conduct certain discovery.
Based on the record, we conclude that the appellant’s various conflicting requests were not in good faith, but were designed solely for the purpose of further delay. Accordingly, we affirm the trial court’s denial of the appellant’s request to represent himself.
AFFIRMED.
DAUKSCH and GOSHORN, JJ., concur. COBB, J., dissents with opinion.
COBB, Judge,
dissenting.
As I read this record, the appellant unequivocally asked to represent himself based upon his reading and understanding of Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 95 S.Ct. 2525, 45 L.Ed.2d 562 (1975). He appeared to meet the criteria for self-representation. See Fla.R.Crim.P. 3.111(d); cf. Mitchell v. State, 407 So. 2d 1005 (Fla. 5th DCA 1981). Nevertheless, the trial court, after a laborious and unproductive colloquy with the defendant, denied Haram’s motion to represent himself without any finding that he was incompetent to do so. Indeed, the trial court stated: “You may well be competent to represent yourself with limitations.” This denial, in my view, was error. See Kearse v. State, 605 So. 2d 534 (Fla. 1st DCA 1992), rev. denied, 613 So. 2d 5 (Fla.1993).
I would reverse and remand for a new trial where Haram represents himself.
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Gabby Tennis v. State, 997 So. 2d 375 (Fla. 2008)…CA) (rejecting defendant’s Faretta claim where request to proceed pro se was an attempt to delay prosecution and defendant failed to make an unequivocal demand to represent himself), review denied, 967 So. 2d 199 (Fla.2007); see also Haram v. State, 625 So. 2d 875, 875 (Fla. 5th DCA 1993) (affirming trial court’s denial of defendant’s request to represent himself because the request was “not in good faith, but ... designed solely for the purpose of further delay”). “Our cases make clear that a trial judge is…
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Williams v. State, 163 So. 3d 694 (Fla. 4th DCA 2015)…ontinually frustrate his .trial’”) (quoting State v. Young, 626 So. 2d 655, 657 (Fla.1993)). Likewise, nothing appears in the record to suggest that Defendant has ever engaged in any previous behavior designed for these purposes. See Haram v. State, 625 So. 2d 875, 875 (Fla. 5th DCA 1993) (finding that trial court did not err by refusing to allow appellant to represent himself where appellant “was not desirous of representing himself, but instead wished to further delay the proceedings which had already stret…
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Fleck v. State, 956 So. 2d 548 (Fla. 2d DCA 2007)…e, 677 So. 2d 370, 371 (Fla. 2d DCA 1996) (recognizing that a trial court need not “ ‘allow a defendant to delay and continually frustrate his trial’”) (quoting State v. Young, 626 So. 2d 655, 657 (Fla.1993)). The State also cites to Haram v. State, 625 So. 2d 875, 875 (Fla. 5th DCA 1993), but in Haram, the court pointed out that the proceedings “had already stretched 17 months from arrest to trial” and that Har-am “had previously caused two attorneys to be discharged from his case.” We cannot agree with the…
Previewing 3 of 5 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806 (U.S. 1975)
- Kearse v. State, 605 So. 2d 534 (Fla. 1st DCA 1992)
- Mitchell v. State, 407 So. 2d 1005 (Fla. 5th DCA 1981)