KAREN LINDA GABRIEL, APPELLANT,
v.
JOSEPH LOUIS GABRIEL, APPELLEE
AI-generated. These summaries, headnotes, and key points are machine-generated and may contain errors or omissions. Always verify against the full opinion text below. Not legal advice.
In a dissolution of marriage case, the Florida Fourth District Court of Appeal reversed a trial court's blanket restriction prohibiting any person from residing in the marital home with the former wife and child, finding such restrictions to be error. The court also remanded for inclusion of a credit provision for the former husband's mortgage and related expense payments upon future partition or sale.
The blanket restriction on residency is reversed as error. On remand, the judgment should be amended to provide that the former wife is entitled to a credit for the former husband's share of mortgage and related expenses upon subsequent partition or sale of the home, though such inclusion is not necessarily mandatory in all cases where rights are disputed.
[1] A blanket restriction prohibiting any person from residing in the former marital home with a former spouse and child as a condition of their continued right to possession…
[2] A party making mortgage and related expenses on a former marital home is entitled to a credit for the other party's share upon subsequent partition or sale of the home, a…
Previewing 2 of 3 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“The final judgment of dissolution provides that no person can reside in the former marital home with the former wife and child as a condition of their continued right to possession of the residence. Appellee concedes that such a blanket restriction is error.”
Establishes that the blanket residency restriction is conceded error and the primary basis for reversal
Previewing 1 of 3 key quotes on this case — the court’s exact language, pinpointed for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceThe parties were in a dissolution of marriage proceeding. The final judgment awarded the former wife and child the right to possess the former marital…
The full statement of facts, procedural history, and disposition for this case are member content.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence© FLexlaw, Inc. — AI-generated enrichments are proprietary. All rights reserved.
Explore caselaw by topic → Browse Credit For Mortgage Payments cases and more on FLexlaw
STONE, Judge.
The final judgment of dissolution provides that no person can reside in the former marital home with the former wife and child as a condition of their continued right to possession of the residence. Appellee concedes that such a blanket restriction is error. Therefore, the judgment is reversed. Price v. Price, 570 So. 2d 1138 (Fla. 4th DCA1990); Danoff v. Danoff, 501 So. 2d 1361 (Fla. 4th DCA1987); Miller v. Miller, 423 So. 2d 638 (Fla. 4th DCA1982).
On remand, the court should also amend the judgment to provide that the former wife is entitled to a credit upon a subsequent partition or sale of the home, for the former husband’s share of the mortgage and related expenses. The former husband does not dispute her ultimate right to the credit but questions whether the court’s failure to specifically provide for it in the judgment is reversible error. It is undisputed that one making such payments has the right to a credit upon the subsequent sale or partition of the home, absent a contrary provision in the judgment. See Kelly v. Kelly, 583 So. 2d 667 (Fla.1991); Brandt v. Brandt, 525 So. 2d 1017 (Fla. 4th DCA1988).
We need not resolve whether the court’s failure to include such a provision, standing alone, is necessarily reversible error. We do not agree with Appellant’s contention that the inclusion of such terms in every final judgment that awards temporary possession is mandated by Kelly and Greenberg v. Greenberg, 602 So. 2d 626 (Fla. 4th DCA1992). However, where Appellant’s right to this credit is clear and undisputed, there is no reason to omit it in the modified judgment. See Tate v. Tate, 432 So. 2d 601 (Fla. 4th DCA 1983); Gallardo v. Gallardo, 593 So. 2d 522 (Fla. 3d DCA 1991), rev. denied, 604 So. 2d 486 (Fla.1992).
In all other respects, the final judgment is affirmed.
FARMER, J., and MAY, MELANIE, Associate Judge, concur.
PER CURIAM.
Appellant’s motion for rehearing is denied. However, we modify our opinion of July 7, 1993 by adding the following paragraph at the end of the opinion:
STONE and FARMER, JJ., and MAY, MELANIE, Associate Judge, concur.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Cited By
-
Gray v. Gray, 658 So. 2d 607 (Fla. 2d DCA 1995)…nses she was required to make on the marital residence from the date of the dissolution of the marriage up to the date of the sale before dividing the net proceeds.2 We agree. See, e.g., Kelly v. Kelly, 583 So. 2d 667 (Fla.1991); Gabriel v. Gabriel, 625 So. 2d 1230 (Fla. 4th DCA 1993). On remand, therefore, the trial court shall provide that the former wife is entitled to these credits. The former wife’s final meritorious complaint is that the trial court erred in awarding the former husband the federal [*611…
Authorities Cited
- Brandt v. Brandt, 525 So. 2d 1017 (Fla. 4th DCA 1988)
- Kelly v. Kelly, 583 So. 2d 667 (Fla. 1991)
- Gallardo v. Gallardo, 593 So. 2d 522 (Fla. 3d DCA 1991)
- Danoff v. Burton H. Danoff, 501 So. 2d 1361 (Fla. 4th DCA 1987)
- Joni Tate v. Tate, 432 So. 2d 601 (Fla. 4th DCA 1983)
- Ward v. State, 423 So. 2d 638 (Fla. 4th DCA 1982)
- Miller v. Miller, 423 So. 2d 638 (Fla. 4th DCA 1982)
- Greenberg v. Greenberg, 602 So. 2d 626 (Fla. 4th DCA 1992)
- Price v. Price, 570 So. 2d 1138 (Fla. 4th DCA 1990)