JOHN D. BANNISTER, PETITIONER,
v.
THE HONORABLE WILLIAM L. HENDRY, CIRCUIT COURT JUDGE OF THE NINETEENTH JUDICIAL CIRCUIT IN AND FOR OKEECHOBEE COUNTY, FLORIDA, RESPONDENT

Fla. 4th DCA | 1993-09-01
No. 93-1315
DELL, C.J., and STONE and POLEN, JJ., concur.
625 So. 2d 1244 Florida District Court of Appeal, Fourth District (1993) Positive Treatment
Cited by 2 cases

AI-generated. These summaries, headnotes, and key points are machine-generated and may contain errors or omissions. Always verify against the full opinion text below. Not legal advice.

Synopsis

Petitioner sought a writ of prohibition to prevent prosecution on grand theft and burglary charges for lack of speedy trial. The court treated the petition as a habeas corpus petition and remanded for an adversary preliminary hearing under Florida Rules of Criminal Procedure 3.133(b), finding that petitioner was arrested when served with a capias and had not been charged by information or indictment within twenty-one days.


Holding

Petitioner is entitled to an adversary preliminary hearing under rule 3.133(b) because he was arrested on the Okeechobee County charges when served with the capias on November 8, 1992, and no information or indictment has been filed within twenty-one days of that arrest. The court remanded with instructions to hold such a hearing within twenty-one days of the mandate.


Headnotes

[1] A petition for writ of prohibition is premature when no information has yet been filed against the petitioner.

[2] A petition for writ of prohibition may be treated as a petition for writ of habeas corpus.

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Key Quotes

“It is undisputed that no information or indictment has been filed against petitioner on the Okeechobee charges. We find, however, that petitioner has been "arrested" on those charges, as Judge Fogan served him with the capias on those charges on November 8, 1992.”

Establishes that service of a capias constitutes arrest for purposes of the twenty-one day rule, even without an information or indictment.

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Facts & Procedural History

On October 6, 1992, petitioner allegedly broke into a car dealership in Okeechobee and stole an automobile, C.B. radio, car stereos, and other items. …

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Opinion of the Court
PER CURIAM.

PER CURIAM.

Petitioner has filed a petition for writ of prohibition seeking to prevent the Okeechobee County Circuit Court from proceeding against him on charges of grand theft, dealing in stolen property and burglary of a structure, on the grounds of lack of speedy trial. We do not reach the speedy trial issue because that issue is premature, no information having yet been filed against petitioner on those charges. However, we treat the petition as a petition for writ of habeas corpus, see Fla.RApp.P. 9.040(c), and remand for an adversary preliminary hearing pursuant to rule 3.133(b), Florida Rules of Criminal Procedure.

On October 6, 1992, petitioner allegedly broke into a car dealership in Okeechobee, Florida, and stole an automobile, a C.B. radio, two car stereos, and some other items. He later allegedly sold some of the small stolen items then drove to Broward County in the stolen vehicle. He was arrested that same night in Broward County for possession of a stolen vehicle and was taken to jail. On November 8, 1992, petitioner appeared before Judge Fogan, Broward County Circuit Court, who informed him that in addition to the Broward County charge of possession of a stolen vehicle, he also had an outstanding capias against him from Okeechobee County.

Petitioner states that Judge Fogan advised him of his rights and of the charges in Okeechobee County, and told him that bond had been preset on the Okeechobee County charges in the total amount of $75,000. As “committing magistrate,” Judge Fogan signed a document titled “First Appearance Hearing And Non-Adversary Probable Cause Determination,” which states that the petitioner “having been arrested,” and the judge “having reviewed the affidavit(s) attached hereto,” finds “[pjrobable cause to believe the defendant has committed, and shall be held to answer for, the offense(s) of’ grand theft, dealing in stolen property and burglary of a structure, with bond set at $25,000 for each offense. A booking sheet states that a “hold” has been placed on petitioner for Okeechobee County.

On December 9, 1992, petitioner pled guilty in the Broward County case and was sentenced to thirty months’ incarceration. He subsequently filed a demand for speedy trial and motion for discharge for lack of speedy trial as to the Okeechobee County charges. The trial court denied the motions on the ground that petitioner had not yet been “arrested” on the Okeechobee County charges.

It is undisputed that no information or indictment has been filed against petitioner on the Okeechobee charges. We find, however, that petitioner has been “arrested” on those charges, as Judge Fogan served him with the capias on those charges on November 8, 1992.

Rule 3.133(b), Florida Rules of Criminal Procedure, provides that a defendant who is not charged in an information or indictment within twenty-one days from the date of arrest or service of the capias on him shall have a right to an adversary preliminary hearing on any felony charge then pending against him. The underlying purpose of this rule is “to force the state to formally charge the accused as soon after arrest as practical.” Bowens v. Tyson, 578 So. 2d 696, 697 (Fla. 1991).

We find that petitioner is entitled to a hearing under rule 3.133(b), Florida Rules of Criminal Procedure, as to the Okeechobee County charges. Accordingly, we remand with instructions to the trial court to hold such a hearing within twenty-one days of issuance of our mandate.

DELL, C.J., and STONE and POLEN, JJ., concur.


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Citator

Cited By

  • Sproule v. McCUTCHEON, 687 So. 2d 77 (Fla. 4th DCA 1997)
    …held on L.T. case no. 96-11537 within a reasonable time. The filing of an information twenty-nine (29) days after the petitioner’s arrest did not meet the requirements of the rule. Fla. R.Crim. P. 3.133(a)(1) & (b)(1); see also Bannister v. Hendry, 625 So. 2d 1244, 1245 (Fla. 4th DCA), rev. denied, 630 So. 2d 1098 (Fla.1993). GLICKSTEIN, KLEIN and STEVENSON, JJ., concur.…

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