BOBBY JONES, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE

Fla. 4th DCA | 1993-10-25
No. 92-1972
HERSEY, GUNTHER and WARNER, JJ., concur.
625 So. 2d 1291 Florida District Court of Appeal, Fourth District (1993) Positive Treatment
Cited by 2 cases

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Synopsis

Bobby Jones appeals his armed robbery conviction, arguing the trial court erred in admitting hearsay evidence from a BOLO (Be On Lookout) and in denying a mistrial when a police officer testified about an in-store identification by a witness who did not testify. The court reversed and remanded for a new trial, citing its recent reversal of Jones' codefendant's conviction on identical grounds.


Holding

Yes. The court reversed Jones' conviction and sentence because the two evidentiary errors were prejudicial and could have affected the verdict. The BOLO contents were inadmissible hearsay, and the identification testimony by the non-testifying store clerk was particularly prejudicial given that Jones and his codefendant were apprehended together and jointly presented for identification.


Headnotes

[1] The contents of a BOLO are generally inadmissible as they may contain incriminating hearsay details unnecessary to establish a logical sequence of events.

[2] A mistrial should be granted when a police officer testifies that a defendant's codefendant was identified by a witness who does not testify at trial, if the identificati…

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Key Quotes

“As has been repeatedly held by various courts, the contents of a BOLO are generally inadmissible in that they contain incriminating hearsay details unnecessary to establish a logical sequence of events.”

Establishes the legal standard that BOLO contents are inadmissible hearsay

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Facts & Procedural History

Jones was arrested for armed robbery along with a codefendant. At trial, an arresting officer testified regarding contents of a BOLO that included inf…

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Opinion of the Court
PER CURIAM.

PER CURIAM.

Jones appeals his conviction and sentence for armed robbery. Jones argues that the trial court erred in admitting hearsay statements contained in a-BOLO and in failing to grant a mistrial when a police officer testified that Jones’ eodefendant was identified by a store clerk who did not testify at trial. In a separate appeal, this court recently reversed the conviction and sentence of Jones’ code-fendant based on the same issues raised in this appeal. Shaffer v. State, 619 So. 2d 409 (Fla. 4th DCA1993). Likewise, we reverse Jones’ conviction and sentence and remand for a new trial.

At trial, the State elicited testimony from one of the arresting officers regarding the contents of a BOLO. In particular, the BOLO contained information from a store clerk, who did not testify at trial, with respect to the race of the suspects. The BOLO was the only evidence presented to the jury concerning the race of the suspects. “As has been repeatedly held by various courts, the contents of a BOLO are generally inadmissible in that they contain incriminating hearsay details unnecessary to establish a logical sequence of events.” Shaffer, 619 So. 2d at 410. Another officer testified that when he brought the suspects back to the store for a show up, the store clerk, who did not testify at trial, identified Jones’ codefendant. Although the trial court sustained the objection to this hearsay statement and instructed the jury to disregard it, the trial court denied the motion for mistrial. We find, however, that the hearsay statement identifying Jones’ codefendant as a perpetrator was prejudicial to Jones since the suspects were apprehended together and brought back to the store for identification. See Postell v. State, 398 So. 2d 851, 856 (Fla. 3d DCA), rev. denied, 411 So. 2d 384 (Fla.1981). At trial, no witness identified Jones or his codefendant, and the state’s case consisted entirely of circumstantial evidence.

Because we cannot conclude that these two errors did not affect the verdict, we reverse Jones’ conviction and sentence and remand for a new trial.

REVERSED AND REMANDED.

HERSEY, GUNTHER and WARNER, JJ., concur.


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  • S.D.T. v. State, 33 So. 3d 779 (Fla. 4th DCA 2010)
    …d 180 (Fla.1993); Owens v. State, 948 So. 2d 1009 (Fla. 4th DCA 2007); Taylor v. State, 845 So. 2d 301 (Fla. 2d DCA 2003); Tosta v. State, 786 So. 2d 21 (Fla. 4th DCA 2001); [*781] Horne v. State, 659 So. 2d 1311 (Fla. 4th DCA 1995); Jones v. State, 625 So. 2d 1291 (Fla. 4th DCA 1993). For example, in Conley, the defendant was charged with armed burglary, armed robbery, and sexual battery with a deadly weapon. 620 So. 2d at 182. The state offered the testimony of an officer who received a police dispatch repo…

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