HUSTON WYETH, PLAINTIFF IN ERROR,
v.
WILLIAM J. WHITMAN AS CHIEF OF POLICE, DEFENDANT IN ERROR
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This case concerns whether a city ordinance restricting building setbacks from sidewalks is within the city's statutory authority. The court found that the city exceeded its powers, as the ordinance was not reasonably related to the purpose of establishing fire limits.
No, the city did not have the statutory authority to enact such an ordinance. The power to prescribe rules and regulations for building erection and repair, when granted in conjunction with the power to fix fire limits, does not extend to regulating property setbacks from sidewalks in residential areas.
“Municipalities are legal entities for local governmental purposes, and they can exercise only such authority as is conferred by express or implied provisions of law.”
Establishes the principle that municipal powers are limited to those granted by law.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceWyeth was arrested for violating a city ordinance that prohibited constructing dwellings with front porches or fronts closer than fifteen feet to the …
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Whitfield, J.
—In habeas corpus proceedings before the Circuit Judge it appears that Wyeth was taken in custody for violating a city ordinance providing that within a prescribed area of the city no dwelling shall be constructed so that the front porch, or if there be no porch, the front of the house, shall be closer than fifteen feet to the inner side of the sidewalk.
The statute oh which it is claimed the ordinance rests, is as follows: “The city council shall have the power to fix and establish a fire limit within said city, and to prescribe rules and regulations for the erection and repairs of buildings in said city.” A writ of error was allowed and taken to the judgment remanding the petitioner to custody. Municipalities are legal entities for local governmental purposes, and they can exercise only such authority as is conferred by express or implied provisions of law. The existence of authority to act cannot be assumed, but it should be made to appear. Malone v. City of Quincy, 66 Fla. 52, 62 South. Rep. 922; State ex rel. Worley v. Lewis, 55 Fla. 570, 46 South. Rep. 630.
Authority conferred upon a municipality by statute should not be extended beyond the fair import of the language used considered in connection with the general powers and purposes of the municipality. This rule of interpretation is particularly applicable when the asserted authority directly and materially affects the rights of an owner to the use of his property.
Authority given the municipality by the statute “to prescribe rules and regulations for the erection and repair of buildings,” is in connection with and in aid of the power to fix fire limits in.the city, and does not confer the power asserted in the ordinance to provide that no dwelling, etc., in the residential portion of the city shall be constructed so that the front porch, or if there be no porch, the front of the house, shall be closer than fifteen feet to the inner side 'of the sidewalk.
The judgment is reversed and the petitioner will be discharged.
Taylor, C. J., and Shackleford, Cockrell and Ellis, JJ., concur.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Cited By
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Sparks v. Ewing, 120 Fla. 520 (Fla. 1935)…275, 55 South. Rep. 983; State, ex rel. Simpson, v. Ackerly, 69 Fla. 23, 67 South. Rep. 232; Anderson v. Shackleford, 74 Fla. 36, 76 South. Rep. 343; Malone v. City of Quincy, 66 Fla. 52, 62 South. Rep. 922, Ann. Cas. 1916D, 208 n; Wyeth v. Whitman, 72 Fla. 40, 72 South. Rep. 472; State, ex rel. Ellis, v. Tampa Water Works Co., 56 Fla. 858, 47 South. Rep. 358, 19 L. R. A. (N. S.) 183; Ferguson v. McDonald, 66 Fla. 494, 63 South. Rep. 915, and as all doubts as to the existence of a power in a municipality…
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State of Fla. on the Relation of Retta E. Shad & Solomon S. Shad v. Fowler, 90 Fla. 155 (Fla. 1925)…ure of the regulation contained in the ordinance does not warrant a judicial holding that power to pass the ordinance is included in or may fairly be inferred from the general welfare or other [*160] powers expressly conferred. See Wyeth v. Whitman, 72 Fla. 40, 72 South. Rep. 472; Curry v. Osborne, 76 Fla. 39. It does not clearly appear that the city then had the power here sought to be exercised; and doubt as to the existence of the power, particularly in a case of this nature, should be resolved agains…
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City OF Miami Beach v. State of Fla. ex rel. Fontainebleau Hotel Corp., 108 So. 2d 614 (Fla. 3d DCA 1959)…ors below a certain minimum distance, then the result was not accomplished. We therefore conclude that the trial judge correctly determined that the ordinance provided for a setback of the building. The Supreme Court of Florida in Wyeth v. Whitman, 72 Fla. 40, 72 So. 472, 473, held that the authority granted to a city by statute “to prescribe rules and regulations for the erection and repair of buildings” was not a sufficient basis for an ordinance establishing a setback. See also McQuillin, Municipal Co…
Authorities Cited
- Malone v. City of Quincy, 66 Fla. 52 (Fla. 1913)
- State v. Lewis, 55 Fla. 570 (Fla. 1908)