STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLANT,
v.
THERESA A. REAVES AND GARY D. REAVES, APPELLEES
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Florida's Fourth District Court of Appeal reversed a suppression order, holding that a vehicle parked substantially within the curtilage of a residence is searchable under a warrant despite partial placement on a road right-of-way or easement.
A vehicle substantially within the curtilage of premises described in a search warrant is searchable, and technical encroachments onto easements or road rights-of-way do not remove it from the warrant's scope.
[1] A vehicle parked substantially within the curtilage of premises described in a search warrant is searchable despite partial placement on a road right-of-way or easement,…
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“Where a vehicle is substantially within the curtilage of premises described in the warrant, all other things being equal, a search of that vehicle is appropriate and authorized.”
Court's statement of the governing rule for vehicle searches under residential search warrants.
Officers sought to search a vehicle parked partially on a county road right-of-way and partially within the front yard of a residence near bushes and …
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PER CURIAM.
The state appeals from an order granting a motion to suppress physical evidence. The trial court, in reliance on Hartpence v. State, 509 So. 2d 975 (Fla. 5th DCA 1987), ruled by necessary implication that an automobile parked in such a way that it was partially on a county road right-of-way and partially on an easement (which was within the curtilage) was not within the curtilage of the premises described by the search warrant. A photograph showing the location of the automobile was introduced into evidence. The wheels on the passenger side of the vehicle rested on the dirt portion of the road. The remainder of the vehicle was within the “front yard” of the residence near bushes and trees. It was stipulated that the vehicle was partially upon an easement held by the power company.
We reverse. It is immaterial that the vehicle was parked on an area of the curtilage that had been subjected to an easement. Nor is it persuasive of appellee’s position either that a small portion of the vehicle rested on the road right-of-way. Neither a survey nor a title' search should be a prerequisite to the issuance, in the first instance, or the implementation, in the second instance, of a search warrant. Where a vehicle is substantially within the curtilage of premises described in the warrant,, all other things being equal, a search of that vehicle is appropriate and authorized. See e.g., State v. Courtright, 60 N.C.App. 247, 298 S.E. 2d 740, rev. denied, 308 N.C. 192, 302 S.E. 2d 245 (1983).
We reverse and remand for further appropriate proceedings.
REVERSED AND REMANDED.
ANSTEAD, HERSEY and STONE, JJ., concur.