J.R., A CHILD, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
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J.R., a juvenile, appealed his adjudication on three charges: battery, resisting an officer without violence, and battery on a law enforcement officer. The appellate court affirmed the convictions for battery and battery on a law enforcement officer but reversed the conviction for resisting an officer without violence, holding that a suspect's refusal to identify himself prior to arrest cannot constitute criminal conduct.
The court affirmed the convictions for battery and battery on a law enforcement officer based on sufficient evidence, but reversed the conviction for resisting an officer without violence because a defendant's pre-arrest refusal to identify himself cannot constitute criminal conduct consistent with Fourth and Fifth Amendment protections.
[1] A juvenile's refusal to identify himself to police prior to arrest does not constitute the offense of resisting an officer without violence.
[2] A defendant's failure to cooperate with police by refusing to answer questions or identify himself by name cannot itself be criminal conduct consistent with Fourth and Fi…
Previewing 2 of 4 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“a defendant's failure to cooperate with the police by refusing to answer questions or identify himself by name cannot itself be criminal conduct consistent [with] fourth and fifth amendment protections”
Establishes the core legal principle that pre-arrest refusal to identify oneself is protected and cannot constitute the crime of resisting an officer without violence.
Previewing 1 of 2 key quotes on this case — the court’s exact language, pinpointed for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceJ.R. was charged with battery against a victim, resisting an officer without violence based on his refusal to provide his name to police prior to arre…
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DIAMANTIS, Judge.
J.R., a juvenile, appeals the trial court’s order of disposition which found that J.R. committed the offenses of battery,1 resisting an officer without violence,2 and battery on a law enforcement officer.3 We affirm the trial court’s order relative to the offenses of battery and battery on a law enforcement officer because the record contains sufficient evidence that J.R. battered the victim and later battered a law enforcement officer while she was in the process of arresting J.R.; however, we reverse the trial court’s finding that J.R. committed the offense of resisting an officer without violence, which was based on J.R.’s refusal to give his name to the police prior to being arrested. In Robinson v. State, 550 So. 2d 1186, 1187 (Fla. 5th DCA 1989), we held that a defendant’s failure to cooperate with the police by refusing to answer questions or identify himself by name cannot itself be criminal conduct consistent with fourth and fifth amendment protections.4
We note that the state could have charged J.R. with resisting an officer with violence based on J.R.’s conduct after he was arrested; however, this conduct cannot provide a basis for affirming the trial court’s finding that J.R. committed the offense of resisting an officer without violence because resisting an officer without violence is not a necessarily lesser included offense of resisting an officer with violence. See Benjamin v. State, 462 So. 2d 110, 111 (Fla. 5th DCA 1985).
Accordingly, we affirm the order of disposition as to the offenses of battery and battery on a law enforcement officer but reverse as to the offense of resisting an officer without violence.
AFFIRMED in part; REVERSED in part.
HARRIS, C.J., and PETERSON, J., concur. . § 784.03, Fla.Stat. (1991).
. § 843.02, Fla.Stat. (1991).
.§§ 784.03, 784.07(2)(b), Fla.Stat. (1991).
. U.S. Const, amends. IV, V.
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Citator
Cited By
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Beverley Foreshaw v. State, 639 So. 2d 683 (Fla. 5th DCA 1994)…hout violence. Anderson, 639 So. 2d at 610. Because this is dicta (even though I agree with it) and because the court did not consider Benjamin or Lee (discussed hereafter), the certified question still seems appropriate. . See also J.R. v. State, 627 So. 2d 126 (Fla. 5th DCA 1993). . Blockburger v. United States, 284 U.S. 299, 52 S.Ct. 180, 76 L.Ed. 306 (1932). . There are no cases directly in conflict with Benjamin or Lee. However, Judge Schwartz, specially concurring in Lee, states that he would find t…
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Burkes v. State, 719 So. 2d 29 (Fla. 2d DCA 1998)…as others, has held that silence in the face of police questioning is constitutionally protected. See Charton v. State, 23 Fla. L. Weekly D1655 (Fla. 4th [*31] DCA July 15, 1998); Thompson v. State, 634 So. 2d 169 (Fla. 1st DCA 1994); J.R. v. State, 627 So. 2d 126 (Fla. 5th DCA 1998); Robinson v. State, 550 So. 2d 1186 (Fla. 5th DCA 1989); Burgess v. State, 313 So. 2d 479 (Fla. 2d DCA 1975). The majority reads Allred v. State, 622 So. 2d 984 (Fla.1993), for the proposition that post-arrest silence may be pros…1 / 2
Authorities Cited
- Benjamin v. State, 462 So. 2d 110 (Fla. 5th DCA 1985)
- Robinson v. State, 550 So. 2d 1186 (Fla. 5th DCA 1989)