THE STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLANT,
v.
T.S., A JUVENILE, APPELLEE
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Florida's appeal of a trial court order dismissing a juvenile delinquency petition on double jeopardy grounds. The court held that because the trial court found the prosecutor's misconduct was inadvertent rather than bad-faith, double jeopardy did not bar retrial after the defendant consented to a mistrial.
Double jeopardy does not bar retrial when a defendant consents to a mistrial based on prosecutorial misconduct that is merely negligent or inadvertent in nature. Bad-faith prosecutorial misconduct intentionally designed to provoke a mistrial is the only narrow exception that would bar retrial under double jeopardy.
[1] A mistrial consented to by a defendant generally does not bar retrial on double jeopardy grounds.
[2] Double jeopardy bars retrial when a mistrial consented to by the defendant is based on bad-faith prosecutorial or trial court misconduct intentionally designed to provoke…
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“where, as here, a person accused of a crime consents at trial to a mistrial of the case, the state is not barred by double jeopardy from retrying the accused for the same offense or offenses”
Establishes the general rule that consensual mistrials do not trigger double jeopardy bar to retrial
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceDuring a non-jury juvenile delinquency trial, the prosecutor responded to a trial court question by stating that the respondent had been warned previo…
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PER CURIAM.
Because the trial court (1) expressly declined to find that the prosecuting attorney in a prior trial deliberately defied a pretrial court order to refrain from adducing evidence of the defendant’s bad character when the attorney responded to a trial court question during a non-jury, juvenile delinquency trial by stating, in part, that the respondent “had been warned previously to leave the property because he was out there committing some delinquent offenses”; (2) expressly concluded that the subject response “may have been inadvertent,” on the part of the prosecuting attorney, which is fully supported by the prosecuting attorney’s subsequent query on the record as to why the trial court was granting the respondent’s motion for mistrial based on this response; and (3) made no finding that the prosecuting attorney intentionally gave the subject response to the trial court in bad faith in order to provoke the respondent into moving for a mistrial, which the trial court granted at the prior trial [a result which we think was not required in any event], we hold that the trial court committed reversible error in subsequently granting the respondent’s motion to dismiss the petition for delinquency based on double jeopardy grounds.
Generally speaking, where, as here, a person accused of a crime consents at trial to a mistrial of the case, the state is not barred by double jeopardy from retrying the accused for the same offense or offenses. One narrow exception to this rule has been recognized, which exception is inapplicable to this case. Where, unlike this ease, a mistrial consented to by the defendant is based on bad-faith, prosecutorial or trial court misconduct intentionally designed to provoke a mistrial, the state is barred by double jeopardy from ever retrying the accused for the same offense or offenses. On the other hand, where, as here, the prosecuting attorney engages in alleged misconduct which, at worst, is merely negligent or even grossly negligent in nature and is not intentionally designed to provoke a mistrial, double jeopardy does not bar a retrial of the accused for the same offense or offenses when the accused successfully moves for such a mistrial. State v. Iglesias, 374 So. 2d 1060 (Fla. 3d DCA 1979).
The respondent’s reliance on Duncan v. State, 525 So. 2d 938 (Fla. 3d DCA 1988), is misplaced because in the instant case the trial court expressly declined to find any bad-faith conduct on the part of the prosecuting attorney and, to the contrary, concluded that the prosecutorial misconduct may have been inadvertent. No such findings or conclusions were present in Duncan.
The order dismissing the delinquency petition in this case is reversed and the cause is remanded to the trial court with directions to deny the respondent’s motion to dismiss.
Reversed and remanded.
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Willie G. Banks v. State, 702 So. 2d 1381 (Fla. 3d DCA 1997)…3d DCA 1969), cert. denied, 234 So. 2d 119 (Fla. 1969), however, the point does not justify reversal. The other issues presented are similarly without merit. See Oregon v. Kennedy, 456 U.S. 667, 102 S.Ct. 2083, 72 L.Ed.2d 416 (1982); State v. T.S., 627 So. 2d 1254 (Fla. 3d DCA 1993); Burgess v. State, 644 So. 2d 589 (Fla. 4th DCA 1994); Faison v. State, 426 So. 2d 963 (Fla.1983). Affirmed.…
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Roundtree v. State, 706 So. 2d 95 (Fla. 3d DCA 1998)…o by the defendant is based on bad-faith prosecuto-rial or trial court misconduct intentionally designed to provoke a mistrial, the state is barred by double jeopardy from ever retrying the defendant for the same offense or offenses. State v. T.S., 627 So. 2d 1254, 1255 (Fla. 3d DCA 1993); Duncan v. State, 525 So. 2d 938, 940-41 (Fla. 3d DCA 1988); State v. Iglesias, 374 So. 2d 1060, 1062 (Fla. 3d DCA 1979). The defendant further argues that the mistrial was provoked by prosecutorial misconduct because the pr…
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State v. Axel Rodriguez, 723 So. 2d 888 (Fla. 2d DCA 1998)…ubsequently retrying appellee. We cannot agree with the court’s reasoning. While the prosecutor’s acts may amount to negligence or even gross negligence, they do not amount to intentional misconduct designed to provoke a mistrial. See State v. T.S., 627 So. 2d 1254 (Fla. 3d DCA 1993); State v. Iglesias, 374 So. 2d 1060 (Fla. 3d DCA 1979). First, the record does not demonstrate that the prosecutor’s alleged violations were intentional. To the contrary, the prosecutor stated that his actions were not intentional…
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- State v. Iglesias, 374 So. 2d 1060 (Fla. 3d DCA 1979)
- Dole Duncan v. State, 525 So. 2d 938 (Fla. 3d DCA 1988)