SAMANTHA KUHARCIK AND DAVID S. KUHARCIK, APPELLANTS,
v.
SANDRA LYNN KUHARCIK, APPELLEE
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The Fourth District Court of Appeal affirmed the dissolution of marriage and designation of the wife as primary residential parent, but reversed the trial court's grant of ultimate parental decision-making authority to the primary residential parent and the award of rehabilitative alimony, finding both orders violated statutory requirements for shared parental responsibility and lacked evidentiary support.
The court held that the trial court erred in granting the primary residential parent ultimate authority over all major decisions, as this undermines the statutory intent of shared parental responsibility; and that the court erred in awarding rehabilitative alimony because the wife failed to demonstrate that her earning capacity diminished due to the marriage.
[1] A trial court errs by granting the primary residential parent ultimate authority over all long-range and major decisions affecting a child, as this undermines the intent…
[2] Shared parental responsibility contemplates that divorced parents will continue to make joint decisions regarding their child, irrespective of which parent is designated…
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“Shared parental responsibility contemplates that after dissolution parents will continue to make joint decisions affecting a child without regard to whom primary physical residence is given.”
Establishes the core principle that shared parental responsibility requires ongoing joint decision-making despite the designation of a primary residential parent.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceThe trial court dissolved the marriage between Samantha and David Kuharcik and designated the wife as the primary residential parent of their minor ch…
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GUNTHER, Judge.
We affirm the granting of dissolution of marriage and the trial court’s determination that wife is to be the primary residential parent. We find, however, that the trial court erred in granting the primary residential parent ultimate authority to make long-range and major decisions affecting the child and in awarding wife rehabilitative alimony.
In the final judgment, the trial court provided that the parents shall have shared parental responsibility of the minor child. § 61.13(2)(b)2., Fla.Stat. (1991). “In ordering shared parental responsibility, the court may consider the expressed desires of the parents and may grant to one party the ultimate responsibility over specific aspects of the child’s welfare or may divide those responsibilities between the parties based on the best interests of the child.” § 61.-13(2)(b)2.a., Fla.Stat. (1991) (emphasis added).
After providing for shared parental responsibility and designating wife as the primary residential parent, the trial court ordered:
Parents are to consult each other on long range and major decisions, and if no agreement can be reached, the primary residential parent will decide.
We conclude that the effect of this order gives one parent complete control over all the decision-making, which undermines the intent of the child custody statute regarding shared parental responsibility. Shared parental responsibility contemplates that after dissolution parents will continue to make joint decisions affecting a child without regard to whom primary physical residence is given. Markham v. Markham, 485 So. 2d 1299,1300 (Fla. 5th DCA 1986). Because the trial court failed to follow the intent of section 61.13 and failed to delineate which specific aspects of the child’s welfare wife should have ultimate responsibility over, we reverse that portion of the final judgment dealing with parental responsibility. On remand, the trial court should determine, in accordance with section 61.13, which specific aspects of the child’s welfare wife should have ultimate responsibility over. In addition, the trial court erred in awarding wife rehabilitative alimony since the record does not support that wife’s earning capacity diminished or suffered as a result of the marriage. McDonald v. Mc-Donald, 429 So. 2d 795, 796 (Fla. 4th DCA 1983). Wife failed to demonstrate that an award of rehabilitative alimony was necessary to establish her capacity for self-support, either through training or the redevelopment of previous skills. Kanouse v. Kanouse, 549 So. 2d 1035, 1036 (Fla. 4th DCA 1989). Wife was employed before, during, and after the marriage and her income was greater at the end of the marriage then at its commencement. Therefore, we reverse the rehabilitative alimony award to wife. On remand, the trial court, at its discretion, may reconsider the entire distribution scheme including the equitable distribution of marital assets, attorney’s fees, and the parties’ respective tax liability during the marital years.
AFFIRMED IN PART; REVERSED IN PART, AND REMANDED.
HERSEY and WARNER, JJ., concur.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
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Smith v. Smith, 971 So. 2d 191 (Fla. 1st DCA 2007)…ntemplates that the parties will mutually confer on major decisions (e.g., medical, religious, educational) affecting the child’s welfare and will reach agreement. See Sotnick v. Sotnick, 650 So. 2d 157, 159 (Fla. 3d DCA 1995); Kuharcik v. Kuharcik, 629 So. 2d 224 (Fla. 4th DCA 1993). “The court shall order that the parental responsibility for a minor child be shared by both parents unless the court finds that shared parental responsibility would be detrimental to the child.” § 61.13(2)(b)2., Fla. Stat. (2005…
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Crowley v. Crowley, 678 So. 2d 435 (Fla. 4th DCA 1996)…spouse can develop skills or receive training necessary to become selfsuffi-cient, Canakaris v. Canakaris, 382 So. 2d 1197 (Fla.1980), and maintain the standard of living commensurate with that established during the marriage. Kuharcik v. Kuharcik, 629 So. 2d 224 (Fla. 4th DCA 1993). We are satisfied from the record that the wife competently demonstrated her entitlement to rehabilitative alimony and her ability through further education and training to prepare herself for the transition from marriage to sing…
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Schneider v. Ivy Schneider, 864 So. 2d 1193 (Fla. 4th DCA 2004)…ility, but then making the former wife the final decision-maker over the children’s health, education, and travel, is “precisely the type of ‘covert’ sole parental responsibility award” that this court previously struck down in Kuharcik v. Kuharcik, 629 So. 2d 224 (Fla. 4th DCA.1993). The final judgment at issue in Kuharcik stated that the “[pjarents are to consult each other on long range and major decisions, and if no agreement can be reached, the primary residential parent will decide.” Id. at 225. We rev…
Previewing 3 of 7 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Kanouse v. Kanouse, 549 So. 2d 1035 (Fla. 4th DCA 1989)
- Markham v. Markham, 485 So. 2d 1299 (Fla. 5th DCA 1986)
- Tippett v. State, 429 So. 2d 795 (Fla. 5th DCA 1983)