DANIEL GRETKA, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
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Defendant's sentence for conspiracy to commit robbery with a firearm exceeded the statutory maximum of fifteen years, requiring vacation and resentencing on that count while affirming the armed robbery conviction and sentence.
A sentence for conspiracy to commit robbery with a firearm that exceeds the statutory maximum must be vacated and remanded for resentencing, even when the total concurrent sentence is within guidelines.
[1] A sentence for a specific offense cannot exceed the statutory maximum for that offense merely because it is imposed concurrently with other sentences that are within stat…
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Court explaining why concurrent sentences must still comply with individual statutory maximums
Gretka was convicted of conspiracy to commit robbery with a firearm and armed robbery, receiving concurrent sentences of five and a half years impriso…
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HALL, Judge.
Daniel Gretka challenges his sentence for conspiracy to commit robbery with a firearm as in excess of the statutory maximum. We agree that Gretka’s sentence improperly exceeds the statutory maximum and remand for resentencing.
Gretka was sentenced to two concurrent terms of five and a half years’ imprisonment, to be followed by ten years’ probation, upon his convictions for conspiracy to commit robbery with a firearm and armed robbery. These sentences were within the permitted range according to Gretka’s scoresheet, and the sentence for armed robbery with a firearm is within the statutory maximum for that offense. § 775.082(3)(b), Fla.Stat. (1991). However, the sentence for the conspiracy count exceeds the statutory maximum of fifteen years. §§ 777.04(4)(b), 775.082(3)(c), Fla.Stat. (1989). Since the total time imposed pursuant to a split sentence cannot exceed the maximum period of incarceration provided by law, Smith v. State, 584 So. 2d 154 (Fla. 2d DCA 1991), we must vacate Gretka’s sentence for the conspiracy count and remand for resentencing.
Accordingly, we affirm Gretka’s convictions and his sentence for armed robbery, but we reverse his sentence for the conspiracy count and remand with directions consistent with this opinion.
CAMPBELL, A.C.J., and PARKER, J., concur.
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