LYNDON DEAL HODGE, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE

Fla. 5th DCA | 1993-12-23
No. 92-3147
COBB and GOSHORN, JJ., concur.
629 So. 2d 973 Florida District Court of Appeal, Fifth District (1993) Positive Treatment
Cited by 2 cases

AI-generated. These summaries, headnotes, and key points are machine-generated and may contain errors or omissions. Always verify against the full opinion text below. Not legal advice.

Synopsis

Lyndon Hodge was stopped for speeding and consented to a vehicle search. An officer searched a female passenger's purse without her consent and found cocaine. The trial court suppressed evidence as to the passenger but denied Hodge's motion to suppress, finding he lacked standing to challenge a violation of the passenger's Fourth Amendment rights. The appellate court affirmed, holding that a defendant cannot suppress evidence merely because it was obtained in violation of a codefendant's constitutional rights.


Holding

A defendant does not have standing to suppress evidence merely because the evidence was obtained in violation of a codefendant's Fourth Amendment rights. Hodge had no expectation of privacy in the contents of his codefendant's purse and therefore had no standing to challenge the search.


Headnotes

[1] A traffic infraction provides probable cause for a lawful stop, regardless of the officer's subjective motivations.

[2] A driver's commission of a traffic violation provides probable cause for a lawful stop of the vehicle.

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Key Quotes

“A defendant does not have standing to suppress evidence merely because the evidence was obtained in violation of the Fourth Amendment rights of a codefend-ant.”

Establishes the core holding that a defendant cannot challenge a violation of another's constitutional rights.

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Facts & Procedural History

Hodge was stopped for speeding and given a traffic warning. After the warning, the officer asked to search the vehicle and its contents for drugs, and…

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Opinion of the Court
HARRIS, Chief Judge.

HARRIS, Chief Judge.

Lyndon Deal Hodge was stopped for speeding.1 After a traffic warning was given and Hodge was free to leave, the officer asked Hodge if he could search the “vehicle and the contents therein” for drugs. Hodge, assuring the officer that he would find no drugs, consented to the search. Hodge and the two passengers vacated the vehicle so that the search could be conducted. The officer observed that the female passenger was carrying a purse. He searched it and found 259 grams of cocaine. There was conflict in the evidence as to whether the passenger consented to the search of her purse.

When the cocaine was found, and after Miranda warnings were given, Hodge “confessed” that he and the male passenger had purchased the cocaine in Miami. Because the female passenger was carrying the cocaine, all three were arrested.

The trial judge subsequently suppressed the evidence as it related to the female passenger, finding that she had not consented to the search and that her Fourth Amendment rights had been violated. The trial court further found that Hodge had no standing, however, to raise a violation of the passenger’s rights in order to suppress the evidence against him. Therefore, the court denied Hodge’s motion to suppress. Hodge appeals; we affirm.

This court faced an identical challenge in Thomas v. State, 596 So. 2d 518 (Fla. 5th DCA 1992). Judge Cowart, in writing for a unanimous court, held:

The passenger/codefendant stated that the defendant handed her the package of cocaine. When charged with possession the codefendant successfully moved to have the evidence suppressed on the ground the search was illegal but the trial court denied the defendant’s motion to suppress the evidence illegally seized from the passenger/codefendant on the ground the defendant had no reasonable expectation of privacy for the package of contraband and therefore had no standing to challenge the search of the passenger/codefendant.

A defendant does not have standing to suppress evidence merely because the evidence was obtained in violation of the Fourth Amendment rights of a codefend-ant. (Citations omitted.)

Here, Hodge had no expectation of privacy in the contents of his codefendant’s purse and, therefore, has no standing to raise her constitutional challenge to suppress the evidence against him.

AFFIRMED.

COBB and GOSHORN, JJ., concur. . We find sufficient evidence in the record to sustain the court’s finding that the stop was legal and the search, except as discussed in this opinion, was properly conducted.


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Citator

Cited By

  • Ingram v. State, 928 So. 2d 423 (Fla. 1st DCA 2006)
    …as, 439 U.S. at 133-34, 99 S.Ct. 421, and Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 492, 83 S.Ct. 407, 9 L.Ed.2d 441 (1963), the Fifth District Court agreed with the finding that Thomas lacked standing. See 596 So. 2d at 519; see also Hodge v. State, 629 So. 2d 973, 974 (Fla. 5th DCA 1993) (holding that defendant/driver who consented to vehicle search after a valid traffic stop had no reasonable expectation of privacy in contents of passenger’s purse, which was searched as passenger exited vehicle, revealing c…

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