ROBERT LOUIS JOHNSON, A/K/A ROBERT LEE JOHNSON, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
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Johnson appealed his convictions for burglary, grand theft, and criminal mischief, arguing that the trial court failed to adequately inquire into his reasons for discharging his public defender and whether his waiver of counsel was knowing and voluntary. The appellate court agreed and reversed, holding that the trial court must conduct meaningful inquiries before allowing a defendant to represent himself.
The court held that the trial court committed reversible error. When a defendant seeks to discharge his attorney, the court must inquire whether there are reasonable grounds for dismissal. Additionally, before allowing a defendant to waive counsel and proceed pro se, the court must determine that the defendant is literate, competent, and understands the implications of self-representation so as to ensure the waiver is voluntary and informed.
[1] A trial court must conduct adequate inquiries into a defendant's reasons for wanting to discharge appointed counsel to determine if there are reasonable grounds for dismi…
[2] A trial court must inquire whether a defendant's waiver of the right to counsel is intelligent and understanding, ensuring the defendant is literate, competent, and volun…
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“When the appellant informed the court that he was dissatisfied with his assistant public defender and wanted to discharge her, it was incumbent upon the court to inquire of the appellant to determine if there were reasonable grounds to dismiss the assistant public defender.”
Establishes the trial court's duty to inquire into the adequacy of reasons before allowing attorney discharge.
Previewing 1 of 3 key quotes on this case — the court’s exact language, pinpointed for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceJohnson faced charges of three burglary counts, two grand theft counts, and criminal mischief across three cases. At pretrial hearings on May 22-23, 1…
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DANAHY, Judge.
The appellant, Robert Louis Johnson, contends that the trial court erred when it failed to conduct adequate inquiries into his reasons for wanting to discharge his public defender, and whether his waiver of his right to counsel was intelligent and understanding. We agree that the trial court’s inquiries were insufficient and reverse. The appellant faced charges of three counts of burglary of a dwelling, two counts of grand theft, and a count of criminal mischief in three different cases. At pretrial hearings on May 22 and 23, 1990, the appellant informed the trial court that he was dissatisfied with his assistant public defender and that he wished to fire her citing to the court only that she was not in “the best of his interest.” The court did not inquire further as to what was meant by this statement but proceeded to tell the appellant that to represent himself would be very difficult and that the court did not advise it. The court made no inquiry concerning whether there were reasonable grounds to dismiss the appellant’s assistant public defender but merely outlined the penalties the appellant would face upon conviction, including possible enhancement under the habitual offender statute, section 775.084, Fla.Stat. (1989). At the conclusion of the hearing the court allowed the appellant to discharge his counsel and proceed pro se.
Later, on the date of the scheduled trial, June 18, 1990, the appellant appeared before a different judge, still without counsel. The trial court at this critical stage failed to renew the offer of counsel, and, furthermore, did not again inquire to determine whether the appellant’s waiver of his right to counsel was an intelligent and understanding one as required by Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.111(d). Suffice it here to say that the appellant was subsequently adjudicated guilty of all the charges and sentenced.
Our analysis begins with the events of May 22, 1990. When the appellant informed the court that he was dissatisfied with his assistant public defender and wanted to discharge her, it was incumbent upon the court to inquire of the appellant to determine if there were reasonable grounds to dismiss the assistant public defender. See Taylor v. State, 605 So. 2d 958 (Fla. 2d DCA 1992), citing Nelson v. State, 274 So. 2d 256 (Fla. 4th DCA 1973); Williams v. State, 427 So. 2d 768 (Fla. 2d DCA 1983). It was error to fail to do so. It was also error to allow the appellant to waive his right to counsel without also determining whether he was literate, competent and understanding of this choice, so that the court was assured that the appel-
lant was voluntarily exercising his informed free will. Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 95 S.Ct. 2525, 45 L.Ed.2d 562 (1975); Hardwick v. State, 521 So. 2d 1071 (Fla.), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 871, 109 S.Ct. 185, 102 L.Ed.2d 154 (1988); Muhammad v. State, 494 So. 2d 969 (Fla.1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1101, 107 S.Ct. 1332, 94 L.Ed.2d 183 (1987); Williams; Taylor; Fla.R.Crim.P. 3.111(d). These errors require us to reverse. Hayes v. State, 566 So. 2d 340 (Fla. 2d DCA 1990) (reversed and remanded for new trial after more detailed inquiry than in instant case); Williams; Taylor; Smith v. State, 512 So. 2d 291 (Fla. 1st DCA 1987).
We reverse the appellant’s convictions and remand for further proceedings.
FRANK, C.J., and SCHOONOVER, J., concur.
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Citator
Cited By
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Pall v. State, 632 So. 2d 1084 (Fla. 2d DCA 1994)…istance of counsel. The court must renew the offer of assistance of counsel at each subsequent stage of the proceedings at which the defendant appears without counsel. Fla.R.Crim.P. 3.111(d). These errors require us to reverse. See Johnson v. State, 629 So. 2d 1050 (Fla. 2d DCA 1993); Hayes v. State, 566 So. 2d 340 (Fla. 2d DCA 1990); Mullins v. State, 438 So. 2d 908 (Fla. 2d DCA 1983). [*1085] Because the trial court failed to renew the offer of counsel at a critical stage of the proceedings, we reverse the j…
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Malone v. State, 852 So. 2d 412 (Fla. 5th DCA 2003)…ingly and intelligently waiving the right to court-appointed counsel, as required by Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 95 S.Ct. 2525, 45 L.Ed.2d 562 (1975). The failure to conduct a proper Nelson hearing is reversible error. See Johnson v. State, 629 So. 2d 1050, 1051 (Fla. 2d DCA 1993). “Requests for self-representation and claims of ineffective assistance of court-appointed counsel present a real quagmire to the trial judges, who must deal with them. Such difficulties are understandable, since the case l…
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Jones v. State, 658 So. 2d 122 (Fla. 2d DCA 1995)…ligently waiving the right to court-appointed counsel. Accord Reddick v. State, 636 So. 2d 176 (Fla. 2d DCA 1994). We have also held that a trial court commits reversible error in failing to conduct the inquiry required by Nelson. Johnson v. State, 629 So. 2d 1050 (Fla. 2d DCA 1993); Taylor v. State, 605 So. 2d 958 (Fla. 2d DCA 1992). The trial court’s failure, in that regard, is subject to review under the abuse of discretion standard. Kearse v. State, 605 So. 2d 534 (Fla. 1st DCA 1992), review denied, 613 S…
Authorities Cited (11 total)
- Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806 (U.S. 1975)
- Nelson v. State, 274 So. 2d 256 (Fla. 4th DCA 1973)
- Thompson v. Louisiana, 488 U.S. 871 (U.S. 1988)
- Hardwick v. State, 521 So. 2d 1071 (Fla. 1988)
- Askari Abdullah Muhammad v. State, 494 So. 2d 969 (Fla. 1986)
- Williams v. State, 427 So. 2d 768 (Fla. 2d DCA 1983)
- Henkel v. United States, 479 U.S. 1101 (U.S. 1987)
- Parker v. Illinois, 479 U.S. 1101 (U.S. 1987)
- Hayes v. State, 566 So. 2d 340 (Fla. 2d DCA 1990)
- Taylor v. State, 605 So. 2d 958 (Fla. 2d DCA 1992)