FIRST D.M.V., INC., APPELLANT,
v.
JOAQUIN FRANCISCO BLAYA, ET AL., APPELLEES
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First D.M.V., Inc., a commercial lessor, appealed a judgment awarding rent for a defaulted lease, arguing the judgment should have been larger. The court partially reversed, holding that a $50,000 prepaid rent credit attributable to a later period should not have been applied against the lessor's claim for the earlier period, but affirmed the trial court's refusal to allow recovery for rent accruing after the property was sold.
The court reversed as to the $50,000 credit, holding it was improperly applied against rental amounts due in the 1985-1988 period when it was attributable to 1991-92. The court affirmed the trial court's determination that the lessor could not maintain a claim for rent accruing after the March 1, 1988 sale of the property.
[1] A landlord cannot recover rental amounts that accrued after the sale of the leased property.
[2] A defaulting tenant is entitled to a credit for prepaid rent for the final twelve months of a lease when calculating the landlord's damages, provided the landlord can mai…
Previewing 2 of 4 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“We agree with the lessor that the trial court erred by giving the $50,000 credit (attributable to the period 1991-92) against the lease amounts due for the period March 1, 1985 through March 1, 1988.”
Establishes the core holding that the prepaid rent credit was improperly applied to an earlier period.
Previewing 1 of 2 key quotes on this case — the court’s exact language, pinpointed for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceFirst D.M.V. leased commercial property beginning in 1983; the lease went into default in 1984. The lessor sued and recovered judgment for rental loss…
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COPE, Judge.
Lessor First D.M.V., Inc., appeals a final judgment for rent due under a lease. Although the judgment is in the lessor’s favor, lessor contends that the final judgment should be for a larger amount.
The lease at issue in the present ease was described in this court’s opinion in First D.M.V., Inc. v. Amster, 645 So. 2d 936 (Fla. 3d DCA 1989). It originated in 1983 and went into default in 1984. The landlord relet the premises, but could only do so at a lower rental.
The defaulted lease did not have an acceleration clause, so the lessor could only sue for rental amounts as they became due. The landlord brought suit and recovered judgment for its loss in rental amounts due up to March 1, 1985. That litigation was reviewed in First D.M.V., Inc. v. Amster, 545 So. 2d at 936-38.
In 1990 the lessor initiated the present suit for its loss on later-due installments. In the meantime, on March 1, 1988, the lessor had sold the property to the successor tenant. The court awarded the lessor its loss in rental amounts for the period March 1, 1985 through March 1,1988, after giving credit for the rental amounts received from the new tenant. However, the court also reduced the landlord’s claim by giving the defaulting tenant credit for $50,000 in prepaid rent for the final twelve months under the original lease., Under that lease, the final twelve months would have occurred in the period 1991-92.
We agree with the lessor that the trial court erred by giving the $50,000 credit (attributable to the period 1991-92) against the lease amounts due for the period March 1, 1985 through March 1, 1988. This point was resolved against the lessee in the prior appeal. See id. at 937.* Accordingly, the judgment must be reversed and the cause remanded with directions to delete the $50,-000 credit.
As to the determination that the lessor could not maintain a claim for rent accruing after the March 1, 1988 date of sale, we affirm on authority of Gray v. Callahan, 143 Fla. 673, 197 So: 396, 398-99 (1940), and Stroshein v. Harbour Hall Inlet Club II Condominium Ass’n, Inc., 418 So. 2d 473, 474-75 (Fla. 4th DCA 1982); see also § 689.-10, Fla.Stat. (1991); Robinson v. Peterson, 375 So. 2d 294 (Fla. 2d DCA 1979).
Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded.
*
The lessor concedes that if it had been able to maintain a suit for unpaid rental installments through the end of the lease in 1992, the lessee would have been entitled to the $50,000 credit.
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Citator
Authorities Cited
- Gray v. Callahan, 143 Fla. 673 (Fla. 1940)
- Robinson v. Fernanda Peterson, 375 So. 2d 294 (Fla. 2d DCA 1979)
- First D.M.V., Inc. v. Amster, 545 So. 2d 936 (Fla. 3d DCA 1989)
- Stroshein v. Harbour Hall Inlet Club II Condo. Ass'n, Inc., 418 So. 2d 473 (Fla. 4th DCA 1982)