CALVIN CARLOS CAMPBELL, APPELLANT,
v.
FLORIDA PAROLE COMMISSION, APPELLEE
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Campbell challenged a trial court's denial of his mandamus petition against the Florida Parole Commission, raising claims about his presumptive parole release date and parole revocation proceedings. The appellate court affirmed the denial regarding the parole release date claims but vacated and remanded the portion addressing parole revocation because the trial court lacked territorial jurisdiction to hear that claim.
The court affirmed the trial court's rejection of Campbell's claims regarding the presumptive parole release date and use of misdemeanor convictions in aggravation. However, the court vacated the trial court's ruling on the parole revocation proceedings claim because the trial court lacked territorial jurisdiction to hear a mandamus action filed in Leon County when the prisoner was detained in Charlotte County.
[1] A parole board's use of an amended matrix to establish a presumptive parole release date does not violate the ex post facto clause when the supreme court has previously r…
[2] Expired misdemeanor convictions may be used in aggravation of a parole revocation, even if they were the basis for the revocation, provided they were not used to calculat…
Previewing 2 of 6 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“The proper method for challenging an order of the Parole and Probation Commission when revoking parole is by a petition for writ of habeas corpus filed in the county in which the prisoner is detained.”
Establishes that habeas corpus, not mandamus, is the proper remedy for challenging parole revocation orders and must be filed in the county of detention.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceCampbell sought a writ of mandamus challenging his presumptive parole release date and alleging due process violations in parole revocation proceeding…
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ALLEN, Judge.
The appellant challenges an order denying his petition for a writ of mandamus. He sought relief with regard to his presumptive parole release date and asserted due process violations in his parole revocation proceedings. We vacate that part of the order addressing the appellant’s parole revocation proceedings and affirm in all other respects.
We reject the appellant’s claims regarding his presumptive parole release date. His claim that the appellee violated the ex post facto clauses by using an amended matrix, rather than the matrix in effect when his original presumptive parole release date was established, has been rejected by the supreme court. May v. Florida Parole & Probation Comm’n, 435 So. 2d 834 (Fla.1983).
We next reject the appellant’s claim that expired misdemeanor convictions were improperly used in aggravation. Contrary to the appellant’s suggestion, the misdemeanor battery convictions were not used in figuring his salient factor score, and the fact that those convictions provided the basis for revoking his parole (adding one point to his salient factor score) does not preclude their use in aggravation. See Ruzicka v. Florida Parole & Probation Comm’n, 480 So. 2d 190 (Fla. 1st DCA 1985); see also Lamar v. Florida Parole & Probation Comm’n, 430 So. 2d 948 (Fla. 1st DCA 1983). We conclude that the aggravation was neither arbitrary nor excessive. See Fla.Admin.Code Rule 23-21.010.
We likewise reject the appellant’s assertion that the failure to accord him annual review of his presumptive parole release date as provided by the rule in effect at the time of his 1966 offense violates the ex post facto clauses. Appellant’s reliance on Akins v. Snow, 922 F. 2d 1558 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 111 S.Ct. 2915, 115 L.Ed.2d 1079 (1991), is misplaced because, unlike the inmates in Akins, the appellant is not eligible for parole, and will not be eligible until February 9, 2008. Thus, his reviews do not offer “an opportunity for parole.” Id. at 1562. We conclude that any disadvantage suffered by virtue of the extra time between reviews is insubstantial, and therefore does not violate ex post facto provisions. See id. at 1564.
We turn lastly to the appellant’s argument that the trial court erred in addressing the merits of a claim relating to his parole revocation proceedings after he confessed error in raising the claim by way of this mandamus action. The proper method for challenging an order of the Parole and Probation Commission when revoking parole is by a petition for writ of habeas corpus filed in the county in which the prisoner is detained. Young v. Simmons, 506 So. 2d 434, 435 (Fla. 2d DCA 1987); § 79.09, Fla.Stat. (1991). Because the authority of the court to issue a writ is limited to its territorial jurisdiction, the court lacks jurisdiction where the writ would have to be executed beyond the court’s territorial jurisdiction. Newman v. Hornsby, 385 So. 2d 1106,1108 (Fla. 5th DCA 1980); see Stein v. Stein, 537 So. 2d 613 (Fla. 4th DCA 1988). In this case, the appellant is incarcerated in Charlotte County, but filed his mandamus action in Leon County. The court below was therefore without jurisdiction on this claim and should have refrained from ruling on the merits of the claim.
Accordingly, we vacate that portion of the trial court’s order addressing the parole revocation proceedings, and we remand with instructions to dismiss that claim without prejudice to the appellant’s right to file a habeas corpus petition in the appropriate court. See Bush v. State, 545 So. 2d 506 (Fla. 1st DCA 1989). We affirm on all other issues.
ERVIN and SMITH, JJ., concur.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
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Raley v. State, 675 So. 2d 170 (Fla. 5th DCA 1996)…the court in the county where the defendant is detained. Thus, Mr. Raley-should have pursued habeas corpus relief in Volusia County where he is detained and where the writ, if issued, would have been executed. Campbell v. Florida Parole Commission, 630 So. 2d 1210 (Fla. 1st DCA 1994). Accord Neuman v. Hornsby, 385 So. 2d 1106 (Fla. 5th DCA 1980). The trial court properly recognized that it lacked authority to rule upon a petition for writ of habeas corpus filed by a prisoner detained outside the court’s terri…
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Burgess v. Crosby, 870 So. 2d 217 (Fla. 1st DCA 2004)…appellate counsel may be filed pursuant to rule 9.141. If an inmate alleges that he is entitled to immediate release, it has generally been held that a petition for writ of habe-as corpus is the proper remedy. See Campbell v. Florida Parole Comm’n, 630 So. 2d 1210 (Fla. 1st DCA 1994), rev. denied, 639 So. 2d 976 (Fla.1994), vacated, 514 U.S. 1094, 115 S.Ct. 1819, 131 L.Ed.2d 742 (1995), reinstated, 657 So. 2d 67 (Fla. 1st DCA), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 996, 116 S.Ct. 533, 133 L.Ed.2d 438 (1995). If an inmate is…
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Richardson v. State, 918 So. 2d 999 (Fla. 5th DCA 2006)…court lacked the authority to rule upon the defendant’s petition for writ of habeas corpus because the defendant is detained outside the court's territorial jurisdiction. The petition should have been dismissed.”); Campbell v. Florida Parole Comm’n, 630 So. 2d 1210, 1211 (Fla. 1st DCA 1994) ("Because the authority of the court to issue a writ is limited to its territorial jurisdiction, the court lacks jurisdiction where the writ would have to be executed beyond the ■court's territorial jurisdiction.”) (citatio…
Previewing 3 of 10 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- C.T. Akins v. Snow, 922 F.2d 1558 (11th Cir. 1991)
- MAY v. Fla. Parole & Prob. Comm'n, 435 So. 2d 834 (Fla. 1983)
- Young v. Simmons, 506 So. 2d 434 (Fla. 2d DCA 1987)
- Newman v. Hornsby, 385 So. 2d 1106 (Fla. 5th DCA 1980)
- Hornsby v. The Honorable H. Eugene Fischer, 385 So. 2d 1106 (Fla. 4th DCA 1980)
- Vallejo v. State, 545 So. 2d 506 (Fla. 5th DCA 1989)
- Dieter K. Pawlik v. Pawlik, 545 So. 2d 506 (Fla. 2d DCA 1989)
- Stein v. Stein, 537 So. 2d 613 (Fla. 4th DCA 1988)
- Lamar v. Fla. Parole & Prob. Comm'n, 430 So. 2d 948 (Fla. 1st DCA 1983)
- Ruzicka v. Fla. Parole & Prob. Comm'n, 480 So. 2d 190 (Fla. 1st DCA 1985)